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Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COMPLAINT & Jury Demand

BRYAN J. WHATLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRUCE E. CHAPMAN. CERI CHAPMAN,
JAMES L. CHRISTENSEN, and DOES I - V,
Defendants.

Civil No.

020405636

Judge: [#5]

COMES NOW Plaintiff by and through his attorney of record and for his cause of relief
alleges and states as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. Plaintiff is an individual who resides in Provo, Utah.
2. Lots 241 and 242 in the Sherwood Hills subdivision in Provo, Utah are owned by
plaintiff and are the subject matter of an attempted foreclosure action by defendants which is a
part of the subject matter of this action.
3. Defendants Bruce E. and Cheri Chapman ("Chapman*5 or "Chapmans") are. on
information and belief, husband and wife, residing at 1421 S Carterville Rd? Orem UT 84098.

4. Defendant Christensen is an individual who, on information and belief, resides in the
state of Utah, but whose precise residence address is unknown. Defendants Christensen and the
Chapmans are referred to collectively as "named defendants."
5. Defendants Doe are individuals whose specific identities are presently unknown, but
who reside in Utah County who have assisted Chapmans in perpetrating the activities
complained of herein.
6. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4(1).
7. All of the matters alleged in this complaint, with the possible exception of the
participation of defendant Christensen, occurred in Utah County. Defendant Christensen's
actions took place partially in Salt Lake County and partially in Utah County.
8. The real estate involved in this matter is located in Utah County.
9. Venue is proper in this Court under Utah Code Ann. §78-13-1 because this matter
involves an injury to real property. Venue is proper under Utah Code Ann.§78-13-7 because both
of the principal Defendants reside in this county and it is possible that all defendants reside there,
and because the cause of action arose in Utah County, State of Utah.

INTRODUCTION
10. On or about December 9, 1992, Mr. Whatley purchased Lots 241 and 242 on Plat F of
the Sherwood~Hiffs Subdivision. Those lots are adjacent to one another and share a common
boundary along the west edge of Lot 241 and the east edge of Lot 242.

11. On or about April 5, 2001, Mr. Whatley and Chapmans entered into an agreement
entitled "Stock and Asset Purchase and Sale." That document was drafted by defendant
Christensen. The stated purpose of that agreement was to transfer ownership and control of a
photographic business, including developing, printing, enlarging, and other photography
processing related activities, to Mr. Whatley, who also owned another, similar, photographic
business and for Chapmans to quit their involvement with photography processing, except on a
hobby basis in their own home.
12. Mr. Chapman was, at all times relevant hereto, and remains, the prime mover in the
operation of that business, but Mrs. Chapman is an officer and a vested owner and has some
function within the business and was a signatory of the contract, including representations and
warranties.
13. Mr. Chapman's business processes are, at best, eccentric. Among other things, in
negotiating to attempt to sell the business to Mr. Whatley, Mr. Chapman made many oral
representations to Mr. Whatley about the value, viability and vitality of his business. The
essence of those representations was that the business that Mr. Chapman was attempting to sell
was a 'gold mine,' generating huge positive cash flows and running extraordinarily smoothly.
He represented that the equipment in the business was worth "well over" $400,000, net, and that
annual gross sales were double that figure. However, Mi*. Chapman absolutely refused to allow
Mr. Whatley access to any of the books and records of account so that Mi*. Whatley could
investig"ateThose claims. The two most significant of the many material representations which
Mr. Whatley ultimately relied upon were that the business (1) had, for at least the last year,

maintained a minimum positive cash flow of $10,000 each and ever}7 month, i.e., the business
had never had less than a $10,000 positive cash flow each month for the last twelve, although it
had several months that were in excess of $10,000, and (2) was possessed of all the resources,
assets, and processes needed to continue to operate at that level of income without any
significant problems or modifications. Because of Mr. Chapman's refusal to allow Mr. Whatley
to perform an ordinary business evaluation, those representations and others were incorporated
into the written document signed by Mr. Whatley and the Chapmans. In some cases the
representations of the Chapmans were made conditions precedent to the validity of the contract.
A copy of the agreement is appended hereto.

14. To secure Mr. Whatley's performance of the payment obligation of the April 5
agreement, the named defendants insisted upon receiving a "deed of trust," covering each of the
two lots of real property described above. The ostensible trust deeds were drafted and provided
by named defendants and both had Mr. Chapman as both trustee and beneficiary. Realizing that
the trust deeds were invalid as trust documents, having an incompetent beneficiary, Mr. Whatley
agreed. Mr. Whatley was willing to allow a security interest in the land, but because Mr.
Chapman was incompetent to be a trustee, the land could not be sold without judicial
intervention. Therefore, Mr. Whatley was willing to sign the ostensible trust deeds and did so.
Copies of those deeds are appended hereto.

15. Mr. Whatley went forward in good faith to attempt to perform his obligation under
the~cohtract. He performed each material obligation imposed upon him by the agreement from
its inception through most of April of 2002.

16. From April of 2001 through April 2002, Mr. Whatley frequently requested that
Chapmans honor the agreement they made by complying with its terms. Those requests were
sometimes general and sometimes specific. In no case did Mr. Whatley's remonstrance result in
compliance by Chapmans.
17. At the first of April 2002, Mr. Whatley finally received some limited financial
records related to the year prior to his ostensible purchase of the business. Upon reviewing those
records he learned that Chapman's representations were false. He immediately sought to discuss
the matter with Mr. Chapman. Mr. Chapman ignored the problem. The contract requires a
minimum cash flow, not an average.
18. Faced with Chapmans' ongoing refusal to comply with the contract requirements, and
the documents showing that the purchase had been procured by the named defendants on the
basis of knowingly false information, Mr. Whatley sought to rescind the agreement. Mr.
Chapman refused to discuss the matter. Ultimately, Mr. Whatley gave Mr. Chapman notice that
he would not continue to operate the business when what he got was not what he agreed to buy
and where no effort at performance by Chapmans was received. At that point Mr. Whatley left
and Chapmans re-entered the business totally.
Count T - Void Contract/Rescission
19. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint
.a&if each were fully set forth in this count.

20. The minimum monthly cash flow represented in the recitals, and made a condition

precedent to the validity of the agreement by paragraph 6 thereof, did not exist. Although the
financial records required by the "agreement" have not been fully provided as of the date of this
complaint, the financial records that are available show that less than six months before the
putative sale the cash flows were down to approximately a fifth of the representation minimum.
The previous October's cash flow was $4,509 and the following month, November, was only
$2,009, the following month, December, was only $8,603. Furthermore, the average information
provided by Squire & Co. was false and misleading. That information included approximately
$30,000 as positive cash flows for the previous time periods that were actually business
EXPENSES paid out, not benefits to sellers. When the correct figures are used, the data for the
nine months that we have obtained show that the average monthly cash flow is only $8,863. In
summary, four of the nine months for which we have data are below the contractually specified
monthly minimum. It was only by the deception of including tens of thousands of dollars in
business expenses that even the average was made to appear to equal $10,000 or more per
month. Since Mr. Whatley was denied access to the business records, he was unable to discover
that deception until long after the purported sale. On information and belief, those
misrepresentations were knowing misrepresentations of material fact, made for the express
purpose of obtaining Mr, Whatley's reliance. Mr. Whatley did so rely. That reliance lasted fdi
as long as it was reasonable to do so, but terminated in April 2002 when he received financial
records showing the representations were false.

2"h Despite having had over a year to do so, the ostensible sellers have not yet provided
the 12 month financial records for the 12 months immediately preceding the putative sale as
required by paragraph 6 of the agreement.

22. Mr. Chapman himself has also urged that the contract was not effective. In spite of
the fact that the contract provides for the sale price to include a "mutually agreed" value for
inventory, and the fact that on the ostensible closing date, the parties did mutually agree to an
inventory value, Mr. Chapman has sought on multiple occasions to renegotiate the sale price by
retroactively and unilaterally raising the inventory amount and adding additional payments for
business assets that were ostensibly already transferred and removing assets that were included
in the sale.
23. The material representation of seller contained in footnote 1 of the agreement, that the
seller was selling Uwall assets of the business that were necessary to achieving the sales and cash
flow represented by sellers to buyer" is false and was false at the time it was made. On
information and belief, plaintiff alleges that Chapmans knew it to be false or only avoided such
knowledge by a reckless disregard for the truth.
24. Another reason the contract is void is because the fundamental basis for the
agreement was Mr. Chapman's false assertion that the business had a minimum monthly positive
cash flow of $10,000, and one of the reasons that such a cash flow did not exist and cannot be
maintained is because of the worthless, non-functional equipment. The Agfa 6550 C-41 film
processor, the Fuji 720 Enlarger, the Agfa MSC 2.0 printer, the Agfa MSC 101 printer, and the
Hope 42 inch paper processor were all part of the business and all were non-functional without
Herculean efforts to maintain them. Such equipment is completely inconsistent with a
photographic business running at a level necessary to generate a minimum of $10,000 per monrh
in positive cash flow.

25. In addition, at the time of the purported sale, Mr. Chapman removed from the
business certain equipment that was vital to its operation. While a portion of the equipment
removed had been subject to a pre-agreement disclosure of intention to remove, by keeping all of
the operating and financial records of the business hidden, the named defendants prevented Mr.
Whatley from knowing how vital the equipment to be removed actually was.
26. There has been no meeting of the minds on the contract price. A condition precedent
of the sale as stated in paragraph 2(a) and 3(d) is that a mutually agreeable value for inventory
and stock be arrived at. As of the date of this complaint that had not occurred.
27. Sellers have not transferred any of the stock of the corporation to Mr. Whatley as
required by paragraph 2(a).
28. The representation of sellers regarding no outstanding liabilities other than those
disclosed prior to the date of sale has been determined to be false. That representation is in
paragraph 3(e) of the contract. The bank accounts required to be transferred under 3(f) have not,
in fact, been transferred. That failure has severely hampered Mr. Whatley5s ability to operate the
business because there was no continuous banking history for the business as a result of that
failure.
29. Neither of the two enumerated conditions with respect to paragraph 4, Realty, in the
contract have been complied with. No written acceptance and continuation of the lease in favor
of World-Wide Photo from Southland has been obtained. No agreement has been obtamechfrom
the owner of the Pleasant Grove store. Mr. Whatley has also learned that the owner of the

Pleasant Grove store may have been actually mislead by Chapmans regarding what was
supposedly transpiring.
30. Chapmans have deliberately breached the provisions of paragraph 5 of the agreement.
That breach includes, but is not limited to, direct and deliberate violations of the non-competition
clause of the putative sale document. Those violations were conducted using resources,
including intellectual property, of Mr. Whatley. In addition, the sellers' son has been receiving
assistance from sellers in operating a photographic business which is not only in direct
competition with World-Wide Photo, it has actually hijacked Mr. Whatley's ftp site to assist their
customers to take their business away from Mr. Whatley.

31. The material representation of sellers regarding the functionality of the business has
been found to be false. Those representations are false in both the fact that not all necessary
equipment was sold and the fact that the equipment that was sold was not functional.
32. Paragraph 6 of the agreement also requires that the business as disclosed in the
records be reasonably capable of supporting the payments hereunder. That is definitely not the
case.
33. Chapmans did not disclose all the claims or potential claims against Worldwide
Photo. Two examples of that non-disclosure include the contract that Mr. Chapman had entered
with Trans Western Publishing for approximately $1,000, and outstanding health insurance
liability which, Mr. Whatley learned after closing, was continuously behind by at-leas-tthree
months. That arrearage was only partially cured on April 11th (a three month payment). The

health insurance problem also cost Mr. Whatley approximately $1,000. A potential liability
exists in that Chapmans were violating insurance regulations regarding group health insurance by
the discriminatory way in which Chapmans had administered this fiasco. Another claim that was
not only not disclosed, but actively concealed, was the "sellers"5 appointment of Sam Rodriquez
as manager of the Pleasant Grove store, with a share of gross sales from that store. Mr.
Rodriquez was not even listed as an employee in any company records presented to Mr.
Whatley, nor was his existence disclosed to Mr. Whatley. The extent of this potential liability
cannot be completely determined at this time.

34. Seller's representations in paragraph 9(n) of the agreement are also false. Seller had
not maintained any corporate formalities whatsoever.
35. Paragraph 3(f) of the contract requires that bank accounts would be transferred as part
of the sale and that Chapmans would not have any more access to the same. That was a material
representation because having a banking history is a significant factor in obtaining business
financing. The sellers did not transfer those accounts and Mr. Chapman, at least, has continued
to control those accounts.
36. Paragraph 9(d) of the document states that sellers are required to resign from any
official status with World-Wide Photo. That provision also requires that as of the date of
execution of the agreement that the sellers had already removed all of their personal property
from the premises. Notwithstanding those two representations, Mr. Chapman has surreptitiously
used World-Wide Photo's confidential data and computer systems and he has also continuously
removed property from the business premises subsequent to the effective date of the supposed

sale.
37. The contract states, "Therefore, the sale contemplated hereunder is made expressly
contingent upon (1) obtaining from the Southland Corporation, a written acceptance and
continuation of the lease in favor of WWP in form and content satisfactory to BUYER and
...." That did not happen. While Mr. Whatley was able to continue to use the premises, no new
leases in the name of World Wide Photo, as expressly required by the contract, were ever
provided by named defendants.
38.

In short, the business was not as represented, the sellers have not done any of the

material items that are necessary to the sale being concluded and effected, and Mr. Chapman has
continued to treat the business as his own.
39.

Mr. Whatley has worked diligently and zealously attempting to make the

proposed sale work. However, Mr. Chapman has addressed none of the problems listed above in
any meaningful way in spite of all of those items having been brought to Mr. Chapman's
attention previously. Mr. Chapman's sole response has been to argue: either that the written
requirements of the contract were not binding, or that they were not significant. The failure of
the ostensible sellers to even make a good faith effort to perform has damaged Mr. Whatley
considerably. He has expended a year of his time, at only a token salary, working to try and
overcome the obstacles that have been erected by the Chapmans. The value of that lost time is
on the order of $58,462, or more. In addition, because he has been expending 70 to 80 hours a
week trying to overcome the problems concealed or created by the Chapmans, he has been
unable to develop his own business as he otherwise would have done. We estimate that the loss

of income both presently and in the future as a result of that is in the mid- to high-six figure
range. Mr. Whatley has personally advanced funds to World-Wide Photo in the amount of
$27,943, not including property that Mr. Whatley has purchased for himself that World-Wide
Photo has been allowed to use.
40. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below.
Coum TT - Breach of Contract
41. Piainxiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint
as if each were fully set forth in this count.
42. Several of Chapmans5 breaches are such that they cannot be cured. For example, the
failure to transfer bank accounts cannot be cured in arrears. The predominant reason that the
accounts were insisted upon was to provide a business banking history for financing purposes.
Mr. Chapman refused to perform for almost a year, in the face of repeated requests that he do so.
Since the contract has now been found to be void or voidable, no cure is possible.
43. §3,1} b, of the agreement expressly states that Chapmans5 access to the business and
its records were limited to records "as of the date of closing." Mr. Chapman was still talcing
confidential data as of April 2002.
44. Mr. & Mrs. Chapman were obligated by the contractual documents resign as
corporate officers at a date shortly after that agreement's effective date. In spite of that, they
continued to meddle in corporate affairs and even issued and signed stock certificates in their

capacity as officers as late as mid-2002.
45. Chapmans were given notice of their defaults, both orally and in writing. By letter
dated May 2, 2002, Chapmans responded that no cure was necessary. No cure of any of the
defaults was ever tendered by named defendants.
46. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants5 actions in an amount to be
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below.

Quint ITT - Fraut?
47. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint
as if each were fully set forth in this count.
Contractual Fraud
48. The non-compete clause of the subject agreement was probably the most thoroughly
negotiated portion of the entire agreement. Mr. Chapman insisted that he needed to be able to
maintain a hobby business without violating that agreement. Eventually he asked that be
expanded to allow him to do limited commercial work in geographically remote areas that Mr.
Whatley did not desire to pursue. In spite of that, Mr. Chapman and his son (with Chapman's
assistance) promptly began actively soliciting business in Utah County, claiming ownership of
World-Wide Photo's assets (including, without limitation, equipment that was previously
existing in the business and that acquired after the purported sale), etc., and assets owned
personally by Mr. Whatley.

49. The above actions began occurring within a very short time of signing the

agreements. Plaintiff therefore alleges, on information and belief, that Mr. Chapman had no
intention of honoring those promises at the time they were made. Those contractual
representations, warranties, and promises were conveyed and drafted by Mr. Christensen,
assisting Mr. Chapman's fraud.
50. The named defendants absolutely refused to allow Mr. Whatley access to the books
and records of the company before the contract was signed. It was to get around that bizarre
restriction that the minimum monthly cash flow statement was drafted. That statement expressly
and unequivocally requires that for the 12 calendar months immediately proceeding the sale, i.e.,
March 2001 backwards through April 2000, each month had to have AT LEAST $10,000 in
positive cash flow. Having more than $10,000 in each month was permissible, and Chapmans
represented that such a surplus was the norm, but the representation deals strictly with the
minimum of $10,000. In providing documents related to that requirement, named defendants
were careful to provide only summaries, and only those dealing with an average for a nonrelevant time period. After the purported sale, the named defendants kept control of all of the
financial records, stating that they were in the hands of Squire & Co., accountants. Chapmans
maintained control of Squire & Co. and instructed Squire & Co. continue to maintain the books
and records, even though Mr. Whatley supposedly owned the corporation and the corporate
records. Mr. Whatley was not given access to the books and records that allowed him to
discover Mr. Chapman's misrepresentation until approximately 30 days, or fewer, before he left
Mr. Chapman's company. He delayed that long only-because he was attempting to find a way to
make it work anyway and to mitigate damages.

51. Although there was an amendment of the agreement that relates to book value of the
equipment, that amendment was procured by fraud by defendants. It was justified as relating to
Chapman's tax issues. After the sale, when it was discovered that the equipment was incomplete
and non-functional, the named defendants began asserting that the amendment constituted a
waiver of all issues related to equipment. Since Mr. Chapman, at least, had operated the business
on a daily basis, and it was later learned, spent a large amount of his time personally battling to
maintain some operability of the equipment, it is impossible that he did not know the condition
of the equipment.
52. Named defendants not only misrepresented the value of the equipment, they also
represented that it was functional, appropriate, economical, and capable of servicing the business
on an ongoing basis. All of those representations regarding functionality were not eliminated by
the amendment and they are all false.
53. In one case, Mr. Chapman tried to force Mr. Whatley to pay for the equipment
already ostensibly sold, a second time. When Mr. Whatley refused, Mr. Chapman removed the
equipment.
54. The representations and warranties say u all" matters were disclosed. They weren't.
At the very least, the Trans Western Publishing bill, the impending cancellation of health
insurance (related to non-payment and possible fraud by Chapmans), and the fact that Mr.
Rodriquez had a claim to a 15% ownership interest of part of the company ostensibly being sold
in its totality, were all undisclosed by Chapmans prior to the purported sale. The contract does
not say, 'Mr. Chapman has disclosed whatever he thinks is important and Mr. Whatley is just

going to have to absorb all the nasty little surprises that come from things that Mr. Chapman
does not think are important.' Mr. Whatley ended up paying the bills that Mr. Chapman
incurred. Mr. Chapman has not cured, or even offered to cure, the problem by repaying Mr.
Whatley.
55. The company records show no payments for health insurance from at least 1/1/01 to
4/11/01. The representations were made, and were false, as of April 5, 2001.
Stock Fraud
56. The statement that Mr. Whatley was contracting to purchase the "outstanding shares55
of the corporation appears multiple times in the document which Mr. Christensen drafted and
which the Chapmans signed. It is entitled "stock and asset purchase and sale." Mr. Whatley
requested the stock records and corporate records and was initially told they would be produced.
Ultimately Mr. Chapman admitted there were none. On information and belief the named
defendants either knew or should have known that the contractual representation regarding stock
and corporate records were false when made.
57. Although he asked for them on several occasions, no corporate minutes or stock
certificates generated by Defendants were ever produced, identified, or otherwise shown to exist.
Therefore, the corporation which was "sold" by the named defendants is a sham and an alter ego
of Mr. Chapman.
58. Mr. Chapman admitted tcrMrrWhatley that Mr. Rodriquez~was entitled to 15% of the
gross sales of the Pleasant Grove store. Mr. Rodriquez had a key to the store. By purporting to

sell an ownership interest that Chapmans had previously conveyed, the named defendants have
committed securities fraud.
59. The facts as plead herein show that named defendants have employed one or more
devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud, have made untrue statements of material fact or have
omitted to state one or more material facts necessary to make the statements made not
misleading under the circumstances, and/or have engaged in one or more acts, practices, or
courses of business which have operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiff. Named defendants
have therefore violated the Utah Uniform Securities Act (UCA § 61-1-1, etseq.).
60. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants5 actions in an amount to be
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below.

Count IV - Breach of Fiduciary Duties
61. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint
as if each were fully set forth in this count.
62. In a letter dated May 2, 2002, the named defendants asserted that Mr. Chapman is a
bailee of the business that he retook. Since that time, Mr. Chapman, through his agent Mr.
Christensen, has admitted that Mr. Chapman is a "trustee" or "receiver'* of the business. Either
trusteeship or receivership includes fiduciary duties to all interested parties.
63. After donning the responsibilities of "trustee or receiver," Mr. Chapman proceeded to
(1) collect corporate receivables for the time Mr. Whatley was involved in the business, but
refused to pay employees for the work that generated those receivables; (2) used photographic

supplies purchased while Mr. Whatley was associated with the business to generate new cash
and receivables, but refused to pay suppliers for those materials; (3) used office supplies,
furniture and equipment purchased during Mr. Whatley 's association with the business, but
refused to pay for those items or return them to the vendors; (4) and other similar activities.
64. After Mr. Chapman took on his role as "trustee," he immediately began directly
embezzling business receipts from World-Wide Photo to Global Imaging, Chapmans' competing
photographic business. Among other means, Chapmans caused work done by World Wide
Photo employees, using World Wide Photo resources, to be paid and collected into the accounts
of Global Imaging. On information and belief, Global Imaging is an entity owned or controlled
by Chapmans or Chapmans' son and with which Chapmans have some significant affiliation and
participation.
65. In addition, plaintiff has learned that the named defendants have not timely renewed
the corporate registration with the state of Utah. As a result, that registration is at least
delinquent. On information and belief, plaintiff alleges that defendants have allowed the
corporation to expire.
66. It further appears in the records of the state of Utah that after becoming a "trustee" of
the business that the Chapman defendants have stolen corporate opportunities by setting up other
entities and dba's, headquartered in their home, named "World-Wide Imaging" to do the same
work, i.e., "photo-finishing laboratories," as that done by the subject corporation. These other
businesses are parasitic to World-Wide Photo, Inc. and are, on information and belief, being used
to remove all value and viability from World-Wide Photo. On information and belief, Mr.

-18-

Christensen assisted Mr. Chapman in this effort.
67. In addition, defendants, during a hearing on a labor complaint on December 11, 2002
against the subject corporation, stated that they would prefer to incur legal fees equal to or
greater than the amount of the claim, and risk an award of punitive damages of $100,000 or more
rather than settle the claim. They categorically refused to entertain any settlement proposals and
stated that they intended to bankrupt the company if it was advantageous to Chapmans to do so.
68. In light of the above, it is clear that defendants are actively working to injure the
business which, as trustee, Mr. Chapman is obligated to preserve and conserve for the benefit of
Mr. Whatley and any other interested persons.
69. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below.

Cftmit Y - CfWYersifHi/Theft
70. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint
as if each were fully set forth in this count.
71. Chapmans have retained possession of various items of property belonging to
plaintiff. The property over which Chapmans have continued to exercise dominion and control,
in spite of notice or knowledge that it is owned by plaintiff, includes, but is not limited to
accounting software (Quickbooks) and, at least, an Epson flat bet scanner, and a broadband cable
router.
72. Chapmans have also, through false statements, deprived Mr. Whatley of property.
-1Q-

Chapmans have represented to creditors, including without limitation, Fuji Photo Film USA
Office Max, Fuji-Hunt Photochemical, Mackay Envelope Company, Quicksilver Photo/Graphic
Supply, etc., that property purchased by Chapman's company was the sole responsibility of Mr.
Whatley. Those false statements have been made in spite of the fact that Chapmans have the
personalty that was purchased, such as photo paper, desks, chairs, etc. and have refused to return
those goods either to the vendor or to Mr. Whatley. Mr. Whatley has been deprived of thousands
of dollars in cash and property as a result of the creditors' reliance upon Chapmans' false
statements .73. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below.

Cf?nntVT-SlanagrftfTitk
74. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint
as if each were fully set forth in this count.
75. In spite of the fact that the named defendants have been notified that the express
conditions precedent to performance or validity of the ostensible sale contract have not been
performed or were violated by Chapmans, named defendants have proceeded to file documents
in the County Recorder's office of Utah County that are preventing Mr. Whatley from selling his
land.
76. Mr.'JWhatley has received one or more bona fide offers to sell that property, but could—
not do so because of the actions of the named defendants in interfering with Mr. Whatley's title
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in ways that they were on actual notice were unfounded.
77. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below.
Count VTT- Defamation
78. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint
as if each were fully set forth in this count.
79. Bruce Chapman has told Mr. Whatley 5s vendors that he has stolen property, stolen
cash, stripped the business and otherwise behaved in a dishonest and dishonorable fashion.
80. Mssrs. Chapman and Christensen have publicly accused Mr. Whatley of "piling
hundreds of thousands of debt" upon the business and having thereby harmed the business.
81. As a result of those false statements by Mr. Chapman, Mr. Whatley 5s business and his
personal reputation, along with his credit have been severely injured.
82. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below.
Count VTTT - Tortious Interference With Business
83. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint
as if each were fully set forth in this count.
84. Mr. Whatley's business has been interrupted by the wrongful actions of named
defendants.
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85. On information and belief, plaintiff alleges that those wrongful actions were improper
as to means (fraud, misrepresentation, defamation, etc.) as is alleged herein, and as to motive
(desire to deprive Mr. Whatley of property and money as to which Chapmans have no legitimate,
or even colorable claim of right).
86. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be
proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below.

Count IX - Violation of 18 U.S.C S 1030
87. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of the other counts and sections of the complaint
as if each were fully set forth in this count.
88. Plaintiffs ftp server is a computer within the meaning of 18 U. S.C. § 1030 which is
used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication.
89. On information and belief, Chapmans through their son, have intentionally accessed
that computer without authorization or in a manner that exceeded authorized access, and thereby
obtained information from that computer which involved an interstate or foreign communication.
90. Mr. Whatley has suffered loss by reason of defendants" violation of this United States
Code section.
91. This action is commenced within 2 years of the date of the act complained of or the
"date of the discovery of the damage.
92. Mr. Whatley was damaged as a result of defendants' actions in an amount to be

proven at trial, but estimated as specified in the prayer below.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief:
1. Entry of a preliminary injunction preventing defendants from selling plaintiffs property prior
to the resolution of this case;
2. A judgment for monetary damages, in an amount to be proven at trial but estimated, as far as
damages can now quantified, to be not less than the following for the injuries sustained as a
result of the above actions of defendants
Lost Profits Based upon Sale Representations VVvVP

$478,145

Lost Profits Campus Photo Due to WWP Problems

$415,059

Damages to personal and business reputation of Mr Whatley

$100,000

Sale/Move/Purchase Expenses

$63,444

Lost Wages (Bryan Whatley)

$58,462

Qwest Advertising for WWP

$2,730

Replace Signs

$800

Increased Cost of Paper Acquisition (Campus Photo)

$1,183

Leslie Duncan labor claim settlement

$900

Misc. Out of Pocket Expenses

$27,036
Total:

$1,147,759

3. Award of treble damages against defendants where appropriate;
4. Entry of a judgment declaring the trust deed and related documents related to Mr. Whatley* s
property to be void and revesting fee title exclusively in Mr. Whatley.
5. Award of costs and attorney fees as appropriate; and
6. Such other and further relief as the Court deems"]ust

Jury Demand
Plaintiff hereby demands that the facts in this case be found by a Jury.
DATED this

R

day of December, 2002.

• imothy Miguel Willardson
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiffs Address:
166W.4600N.
Provo, UT 84604
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^TOCK AND ASSET PURCHASE AND SALE
A. Identification of parties:
This document constitutes the agreement, made and entered into at Orem, in the State of Utah, on or
about Thursday, April 5tn, 2001, between Bruce E. Chapman acting on behalf of himself and his wife,
Ceri Chapman, both of whom reside at, 1421 S Carterville Rd, Orem UT 84098, (hereinafter referred
to collectively as "SELLERS") party of the first part, and Bryan Whatley, an individual residing at
15265 Del Poniente Court, Poway, CA 92064, (hereinafter referred to as "BUYER") party of the
second part:
B. Recitals
WHEREAS, SELLERS are desirous of having BUYER purchase all of the outstanding stock of
World-Wide Photo, Incorporated ("WWP"), a Utah Corporation with registered offices at 1421 S.
Carterville Rd, Orem UT 84098 and principal place of business at 547 W. Columbia Lane, Provo, UT
84604;
AND WHEREAS, WWP has determined that it is in its own best interest to limit sales of stock to no
more than 35 individuals;
AND WHEREAS, WWP has determined that it is in its own best interest to offer such stock under
one or more of the registration exemptions under the Securities Act of 1933;
AND WHEREAS, WWP has determined that it is in its own best interest to offer such stock under
one or more of the registration exemptions under the Utah Securities Acts;
AND WHEREAS, BUYER has been expressly informed that the stock which he is purchasing is
being sold under one or more registration exemptions under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Utah
Securities Act and therefore may not be resold except pursuant to subsequent registration made or
exemption obtained;
AND WHEREAS, BUYER is willing and able to provide payment in exchange for stock and assets;
AND WHEREAS, SELLERS, being the owner of record of One Thousand (1,000) shares of WWP
stock, which shares constitute One Hundred Percent (100%) of the outstanding shares of WWP (the
"Shares");
AND WHEREAS SELLERS own the following listed equipment [ 1 ea. freezer, 1 ea. paper cutter
20K, 1 ea. Speedmaster densitometer, 1 ea. cardboard slide mounter, 2 ea. Durst 78U printer, 1 ea.
Oscar Fisher mixing tank] which is leased to WWP and which SELLERS are willing and able to sell
and which BUYEPv requires as part of the acquired business;
AND WHEREAS SELLERS have represented that gross sales of WWP for last year (2000)
amounted to at least $800,000, and that level of sales generated sufficient positive cash flow to fund
wages, salaries and other benefits to SELLERS which will be terminated on closing, of at least
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$10.000 each and every month ; The parties acknowledge that SELLERS are not guarantying future
sales or operating expenses at the level enjoyed under SELLERS' management, only that
performance of WWP under SELLERS' management was as described by SELLERS.
C. Terms
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises herein contained, the parties agree as
follows:
1. Stock and Warranties.
SELLERS warrant that SELLERS are the sole and complete owners of the Shares, and that
SELLERS own no other or further shares, and that SELLERS have all of the rights, privileges and
authorities necessary to sell said Shares in WWP to BUYER. SELLERS further warrant that the
Shares are not encumbered in any way, including as security for any purpose, that said Shares are free
from any liens, encumbrances, interest, and judicial processes including but not limited to any marital
or ownership interest in the Shares or its proceeds by any former spouses. SELLERS further warrant
that surrendering the Shares will not violate any court order or requirement, and that the sale of the
Shares v/iil completely extinguish SELLERS' ownership rights of any nature or kind in WWP.
WWP, by and through its current President Bruce Chapman and Vice President Ceri Chapman
warrants that the only issued and outstanding shares authorized by it are the 1,000 shares issued to
SELLERS. WWP further warrants that it is a duly authorized Utah corporation in good standing.
BUYER hereby represents that he is acquiring the Shares for his own account, for investment, and
not with a view to or for resale in connection with any distribution thereof. BUYER acknowledges
that the Shares are subject to the following restriction which will be noted as a legend in substantially
the following form on the face of the certificates representing the Shares:
THE SECURITIES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE HAVE NOT BEEN
REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED (THE "ACT")
OR QUALIFIED UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS OF ANY STATE (THE "LAW").
SUCH SECURITIES HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED FOR INVESTMENT AND NEITHER
SAID SHARES NOR ANY INTEREST THEREIN MAY BE SOLD OR OFFERED FOR
SALE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE REGISTRATION STATEMENT FOR
THE SHARES UNDER THE ACT AND QUALIFICATION UNDER THE LAW OR AN
OPINION OF COUNSEL SATISFACTORY TO THE CORPORATION THAT SUCH
REGISTRATION AND QUALIFICATION ARE NOT REQUIRED AS TO SAID SALE
OR OFFER.
BUYER further represems that he has such knowledge and experience in business and financial
matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of investing in the WWP. BUYER
understands the speculative nature of his investment in the WWP and represents that he has adequate
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This is a material representation because SELLERS will not show WWP financiais to BUYER before closing,
and SELLERS' representation to BUYER (that the positive casn flow of ai leas: 510,000 each month continues to the aate
of ciosmg anc trial SELLERS are selling all assets of tne ousmess that were necessary to acnieving trie sales and cash
flow represented by SELLERS to BUYER) was essentiaj toBT n7I? R , s decision to Durchasp thp hn^np« *r,r? „^~r..

3
net worth and means to provide for his current needs and to sustain a complete loss of his
investment and that BUYER has no need of liquidity of his investment.
BUYER understands that at present no public market exists, and that a public market may never
exist, for the Shares and that WWP is under no obligation to provide a market for the Shares.
SELLERS pledge and warrant to BUYER that the assets of WWP, and the assets of SELLERS that
are being sold hereunder, are unencumbered, free of liens, and not pledged~as collateral to other
parties.
2. Purchase Pries and Payment

a. Price and Payment Terms
BUYER shall pay to SELLERS, at closing, the sum of $400,000, allocated $375,000 to stock,
$25,000 to equipment, plus an additional sum for the mutually agreeable value of inventory in stock
as of the date of closing, as discussed below.
Payment shall be made-by delivery of a promissory note in the amount of the purchase price payable
to Bruce and Ceri Chapman.
SELLERS shall, upon receipt of payment, transfer to BUYER a total of 1,000 shares of stock, which
number of shares is and shall remain through closing, all of the issued and outstanding shares of
WWP. Payment shall be completed, for purposes of this section, by delivery of a promissory note in
the principal amount of the purchase price, bearing interest at 10% per annum, payable in monthly
installments of $5,000 with no prepayment penalty until paid in full. All payments in excess of or in
addition to the minimum monthly payment may be, at BUYER'S election, treated as payments for
succeeding months, or as payment of principal in advance. That election may be made at any time, or
changed to prevent default.
b. Collateral for BUYERS obligations
BUYER shall, at closing, execute in favor of SELLERS, a security agreement and financing
statements pledging all of the tangible assets owned by WWP as of closing to secure the payment of
all indebtedness contemplated in this agreement. After-acquired property and accretions shall not be
so encumbered. In addition, BUYER shall secure the payment of that indebtedness by a deed of trust,
with SELLERS, or either of them at SELLERS election, as beneficiary, covering lots 242 and 243 of
Sherwood Hills subdivision: plat F. Attached hereto are copies of the most recent Utah County real
property tax notices for those two lots, showing valuation of each at over $42,000 and ownership in
BUYER. BUYER represents and warrants the authenticity of those tax notices and that he is the
record owner of the lots described therein, but makes no representation as to the accuracy of any
information contained therein except for his identity and address. SELLERS may, at their option and
their own expense, purchase title insurance to further secure their position.
c. Sale of ctrilHteral
BUYER and WWP may elect to sell any collateral securing obligations hereunder, but any such sale
shall result in payment to SELLERS of the net proceeds of such sale as follows:
Fo- sale of any assets of the business, 100% of the net sale proceeds (with deductions including, bu:

not limited to, any taxes that are incurred as a result of such sale) shall be promptly paid to
SELLERS;
For sale of the realty, SELLERS shall be entitled to receive the entire net sale proceeds as defined
above of either loi sold for a net amount of 250,000 or less, but if the lots or either of them are sold
for a net sale proceeds of more than $50,000, SELLERS shall make no claim upon the net sale
proceeds in excess of $50,000. If the lots are sold through foreclosure due to default of BUYER
hereunder, SELLERS may keep the entire sale price, not to exceed the sum of the principal amount
outstanding on the promissory note, plus reasonable and necessary legal fees that would otherwise be
recoverable under the terms of this agreement. However, if such proceeds equal or exceed the amount
of the arrearage, such a sale will be conclusively deemed to cure BUYER'S default and any sale
proceeds in excess of the arrearage shall be counted as an advance payment hereunder.
d. Sale of Business
If BUYER elects to sell the entire business (WWP), BUYER shall be required to pay off the unpaid
balance of the note referenced above at closing of that sale.
3. Distributions or Changes.
No distributions or changes of any material aspect of the corporation or its condition shall be made,
from the date of execution of this agreement unless approved by BUYER and a fair adjustment of
any effected contract terms is made. All assets and liabilities in the business as of the date of
execution shall remain in WWP except the following:
a.

One Kodak 2711 digital printing lab; one Noritsu V70 C-41 film processor; and one B&W
470 film processor, all of which are under lease, shall be transferred to SELLERS and
SELLERS shall indemnify WWP and BUYER from all costs, loss, liability and/or expense
related thereto which accrues on or after the date of execution of this agreement. Resolution
of this matter to the mutual satisfaction of both BUYER and SELLERS is a condition
precedent to closing.

b.

Accounts Receivable ("A/R") and Accounts Payable ("A/P") as of the date of closing of this
agreement shall be transferred to SELLERS and SELLERS shall indemnify WWP and
BUYER from all costs, loss, liability and/or expense related thereto.

c.

All A/R and A/P after the date of closing of this agreement shall remain in WWP and WWP
shall indemnify SELLERS from all costs, loss, liability and/or expense related thereto which
accrues on or after the date of closing of this agreement.

d.

BUYER and SELLERS shall negotiate a mutually acceptable value amount to compensate
SELLERS or to allow SELLERS to recover a mutually agreeable value of inventory in stock
as of the date of closing. Resolution of this matter to the mutual satisfaction of both BUYER
and SELLERS is a condition precedent to closing. That mutual agreement shall be reduced to
writing and signed by all parties and that document shall be constructed as part of this
document.

e.

SELLERS have represented to BUYER that the business has no outstanding liabilities other
tnan the three equipment leases to be transferred 10 SELLERS as stated above. Tnerefore.
SELLERS shall indemnify and hold BUYF"R ^armless for any claim or liability against that
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arises out of or relates to events prior to the date of closing of this agreement. BUYER shall
indemnify and hold SELLERS harmless for any claim or liability that arises out of or relates
to events prior to the date of closing of this agreement.
f.

SELLERS are to transfer ownership of the following assets out of WW? nrinr to closing of
the sale and such transfer will not effect the purchase price:
The balance of the following checking accounts shall be transferred to SELLERS, but
SELLERS shall allow BUYER to put funds in to leave the accounts open and all signatory
authority for these accounts shall be removed for SELLERS and their agents:
First Security Bank checking account ? 3321016945
First Security Bank savings account # 332-8436715
Oppenheimer money market account # 200 2001319032
Oppenheimer money market account ~ 200 2005689156
Since SELLERS are bound under this agreement to indemnify BUYER for all costs, losses,
and expenses that arise from events prior to closing, SELLERS may, at their option, leave
sufficient funds in those accounts to cover such items in those categories as are known in
advance such as accrued payroll and taxes.

g.

The parties acknowledge that World-Wide Photo Pension, which is not owned by WWP and
which has not been funded for three years, will remain under the ownership and direction of
SELLERS and that SELLERS will remain liable for all aspect of that pension fund.
4, Realty

SELLERS have disclosed to BUYER that the two pieces of real property which are essential to the
operation of the business being sold and purchased have problems with the leases. The Provo location
( 547 W. Columbia Lane) is leased to Bruce Chapman personally, and not to WWP, under a written
lease from Southland Corporation that prevents assignments or subleases. The Pleasant Grove
location is rented from month to month only and the owner of that property has recently died.
Therefore, the sale contemplated hereunder is made expressly contingent upon (1) obiaining from the
Southland Corporation, a written acceptance and continuation of the lease in favor of WWP in form
and content satisfactory to BUYER and (2) obtaining an agreement with both the de facto and de jure
owner(s) regarding the use of the Pleasant Grove location satisfactory in form and content to
BUYER.
5. Confidentiality. Non-Circumvention, Non-Competition
Each-party hereto hereby promises the other party that it will not itself, nor will it allow nor assist a
third party, to circumvent the other party on any opportunity which may reasonably fall within the
scope of this agreement. In furtherance of this mutual promise, the parties acknowledge that BUYER
and the BUYER employees to whom information has been disclosed have previously signed
confidentiality agreements as to information disclosed in connection with the sale contemplated by
this agreement That obligation of BUYER, shall be voided upon closing of the saie contemplated
hereby. Those obligations of BUYER'S employees shall be, upon closing, transferred to BUYER.
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SELLERS agree that by execution of this agreement they are agreeing to be bound to the same
obligation of confidentiality that BUYER incurred prior to closing and that obligation of SELLERS
shall survive the termination of this agreement for a period not less than five (5) years, during which
time SELLERS will not themselves, nor will they assist or allow a third party to, use said confideniial
information for purposes of trade or business competition.
SELLERS agree that, except as provided for, for a period of three (3) years from the closing date
hereof SELLERS will not in the geographical area hereinafter mentioned, directly or indirectly, in
any individual or representative capacity whatsoever, engage in the business of, or, as owner,
employee, stockholder, partner, sole proprietor, joint venturer, or otherwise manage, operate, control,
assist, panicipate, be connected with or render any consultation or business advice, with regard to any
business engaged in photographic processing or finishing. Bruce Chapman, with the prior written
approval of BUYER, may work, as an employee only, for a noncompetitive photo lab in the
geographical area hereinafter mentioned. BUYER acknowledges that SELLERS may, without
violating this agreement, do photographic printing and enlarging, only, for any immediate family
members, including Bruce Chapman's mother, and as payment in kind for the following named
professionals only; Jim Christensen, Gary Mathews, Rdean Clark, Phillip Plothow and Roland
Ivlonson. SELLERS may also, without violating this agreement, sell photographic prints and
enlargements by mail order, as long as such sales are not in competition with WWP and BUYER, i.e.,
the sales are limited to customers of SELLERS who both (i) have not, prior to the date of this
agreement, been a customer of either WWP or Campus Photo and (ii) which have no presence in all
of the following two counties in the state of Uiah: Utah County and Salt Lake Counry. SELLERS
m a y also, without violating this agreement, print Ilfochrorne prints from one individual wildlife and
nature photographer, named B.R. [NAME], The exclusions above for immediate family, out of area
mail order, and in-kind payment, do not allow SELLERS to develop and process photographic film.
However, BUYER shall, for the three (3) year period commencing on the date of closing, develop
and process photographic film, from that excluded group only (immediate family, out of area mail
order, and in-kind payment), for the SELLRS for the cost of materials plus 10%. In doing any
business not proscribed by this portion of the agreement, SELLERS may not use the name of WWP
and shall disclose to anyone who might be aware of SELLERS' former affiliation with WWP that
SELLERS are no longer so affiliated. This requirement of disclosure specifically includes, bur is not
-limited to, dealing with past, present, or future customers or suppliers of WWP.
T h e geographical area to which the preceding covenant refers is all of Utah County and all of Salt
Lake County in the siate of Utah.
SELLERS declare that the foregoing territorial and time limits are reasonable, and are properly
required for the adequate protection of the assets to be acquired by BUYER from SELLERS, and that
In the event that any such territorial or time limitation is deemed to be unreasonable by a court of
competent jurisdiction. SELLERS agrees and submits to the reduction of either said territorial or time
limitation, or both, to such area or a period of time as by said court shall be deemed reasonable.
SELLERS further declare that the foregoing restrictive covenants, limited in time and territory as
aforesaid^re ancillary to sale of WWP, and are necessary to protect BUYER in the enjoyment of and
beneficial use and ownership of the business thereby acquired.
In the event SELLERS, should be in violation of the restrictive covenants herein above set forth, then
the time limitation thereof shall be extended for a period of rime equal to the period of time during
which such breach or breaches should occur; and in the even: BUYER should oe required to seek
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relief from any such breach in any court the restrictive covenant shall be extended for a period of
time equal to the pendency of all proceedings before such court, including all appeals.
SELLERS shall be jointly and severally liable to BUYER and WWP for any and all damages, costs,
and legal fees which are suffered by BUYER or WWP by reason of any violation of this agreement,
including, without limitation, both incidental and consequential damages. In addition, SELLERS
hereby acknowledge that money damages alone would not adequately compensate BUYER in the
event of a breach by SELLERS of the foregoing restrictive covenant, and therefore, SELLERS
hereby covenant and agree that in addition to all other remedies available to BUYER at law or in
equity, BUYER shall be entitled to injunctive relief for the enforcement thereof.
The existence of any claim or cause of action by SELLERS against BUYER shall not constitute: a
defense to the enforcement of the foregoing restrictive covenant, but shall be litigated separately.
BUYER shall have the right to assign the aforesaid restrictive covenant in the event BUYER desires
hereafter to sell all or any part of WWP, whether still operating under the same name or if the name
has been changed, and SELLERS agrees to be bound by the terms of said restrictive covenant to any
and all subsequent purchasers and assigns of said business.
6. Closing
Closing shall occur at a mutually convenient time after SELLERS have made available to BUYER
the sales tax returns for the most recent 12 months of operations of WWP. That disclosure is intended
t o allow BUYER to verify gross sales and trends. SELLERS shall also make available documentation
on positive cash flow and payments to or for the benefit of SELLERS that will cease at closing. The
purpose of these disclosures is to allow BUYER to confirm that, at closing WWP will have had a
positive cash flow of at least $10,000 each and every month for the 12 calendar months preceding
closing. BUYER shall be obliged to close within a period no later than 30 days from the date of
disclosure of the above information by SELLERS unless SELLERS shall have made a material
misrepresentation, a material change not expressly conxemplated by this agreement, or if the business,
as disclosed in WWP's records, is not reasonably capable, as of the date of closing, of supporting the
payment of the obligation incurred by BUYER hereunder. This paragraph shall not be construed to
vitiate any other express contingencies contained in this agreement. If BUYER fails to close for any
reason, the obligation of confidentiality previously undertaken by BUYER shall remain in effect for a
period of five (5) years from the date of refusal or failure to close.
7. Consultation by SELLERS
Bruce E. Chapman will, for a term of 60 days after closing, consult with BUYER regarding any
aspect of the business without additional charge. Such consulting shall be during normal business
hours and shall not exceed 20 hours in any calendar week.
8. Default
Should either party fail to perform its obligations hereunder, the non-defaulting party may notify the
defaulting party of the general nature of the default. The allegedly defaulting party shall then have 45
days from receipt of that notice of default to cure that default. If the default is not cured within that 45
day period, the non-defaulting party may declare this contract in default and shall be entitled to
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pursue any remedy that may be available ai law or equity, including, without limitation, foreclosure
on the collateral provided for hereunder.

9. Miscellaneous Provisions
a.

Integration

This contract contains the entire contract between the BUYER and the SELLERS, and no agent or
representative of the corporation or any other person has any pov/er to change or alter the terms of
tins agreement.
b. Binding effect
This agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the respective heirs, personal representatives,
successors, and permitted assigns of the parties.
c. Dividends and Earnings.
It is agreed that other than those expressly specified herein, SELLERS shall not be entitled to an v
retained earnings of WWP after the date of execution of this agreement, or to any assets of WWP, or
to any shareholder dividends of WWP.
d. Resignation of Employment.
SELLERS hereby resign from WWP and terminates their employment status with WWP, effective as
of the Closing Date. SELLERS have previously retrieved their personal property from the WWP
premises.
e. Execution of Resolution.
SELLERS warrant that each has or will execute, in their respective capacities as shareholders, a
corporate resolution approving tne purchase by BUYER of SELLERS' One Hundred Percent (100%)
interest in WWP.
f.

Resignation as Officer and Director.

SELLERS, and each of them, hereby resign as officers and directors of WWP as of the Closing Date.
SELLERS, if necessary, will execute all of the necessary corporate documents to complete this
transaction, including removal of SELLERS from WWP's bank and other accounts.
g. Release.
SELLERS warrant that neither is aware of any claims or potential claims against WWP, or SELLERS
or either of them. SELLERS, and each of them, herein completely and totally release, quit, and
discharge WWP, its ofrlcersTdirectors, employees, and agents, their successors and assigns, from all
claims, rights of action, and causes of action, arising from, derived from or related to their respective
ownership of WWP stock, employment with WWP, or any other relationship with WWP and the
above-referenced persons. This release of all claims includes with respect to all persons and entities
aDove, all damages including but not limited to actual, inciaental and consequential in all civil,
criminal, and administrative causes, causes and claims including but not limited to unemployment
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compensation, worker's compensation, and personal tax liabilities. SELLERS further agree to hold
WWP, and BUYER, including their agents, attorneys and shareholders harmless from any and all
claims as referenced in this Section.
BUYER warrants that he is neither aware of any claims or potential claims against CAMPUS
PHOTO, or BUYER. BUYER herein completely and totally releases, quits, and discharges
SELLERS, their agents, successors and assigns, from all claims, rights of action, and causes of
action, arising from, derived from or related to BUYER'S ownership of CAMPUS PHOTO,
employment with CAMPUS PHOTO, or any other relationship with CAMPUS PHOTO and the
above-referenced persons. This release of all claims includes with respect to all persons and entities
above, all damages including but not limited to actual, incidental and consequential in all civil,
criminal, and administrative causes, causes and claims including but not limited to unemployment
compensation, worker's compensation, and personal tax liabilities. BUYER further agree to hold
SELLERS, including their agents, and attorneys harmless from any and all claims as referenced in
this Section.
h. Ownership of Claims and Corporate Authorization.
Each party to this agreement warrants and represents that it is the holder and owner of the claims
subject to this agreement that each has not assigned or otherwise conveyed to any person, firnvor
entity any interest and any claim, demand or cause of action covered by the terms of this agreement
and that there are no liens or encumbrances against the claims.
i.

Brokerage.

The parties represent that there are no brokerage or other commissions relative to the sale and transfer
of the Shares by SELLERS.
j.

Acknowledgment

Each party hereby acknowledges that he or she has been given the opportunity to review the terms
and conditions of this Agreement with any legal or other advisor of his or her own choice and that he
or she fully understands and knowingly consents to the terms and conditions hereof.
k. Assignment.
No party shall assign, sublet, or transfer any interest in this agreement withour the prior, express, and
written consent of the others.
I.

Non-liability.

Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as creaiing any persona] liability on the part of an}
officer or agent that may be a party to this agreement, nor shall it be construed as giving any rights or
benefits under this agreement to anyone other than the parties to this agreement.
m. Disputes/ Arbitration
In the event of a dispute under this agreement, the parties agree that any action brought shall be
submitted to binding arbitration ir accordance with the rules o r trie American Arbitration
.Association. Such arbitration need.not be conducted by the American Arbitration Association, even
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though it would follow their rules. Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County, Utah,
and not elsewhere.
n. Authority for Execution
SELLERS represent that they have taken all steps necessary to comply with all corporate
requirements to enter into this agreement. The party signing below on behalf of WWP warrants he
has authorization from WWP to execute this agreement on behalf of WWP. The parties, by their
signatures below, represent and warrani that he or she is competent to enter this agreement, fully
understands the same, and does so agree by his or her own free will and choice.
o. No Waiver.
The failure of any party to this agreement to insist upon the performance of any of the terms and
conditions of this agreement, or the waiver of any breach of any of the terms and conditions of this
agreement, shall not be construed as thereafter waiving any such terms and conditions except as
specifically set forth herein, but the same shall continue and remain in full force and effect as if no
such forbearance or waiver had occurred.
p. Governing Law.
It is agreed that this agreement shall be governed by, construed, and enforced in accordance with the
laws of the State of Utah.
q. Attorney Fees.
In the event that any action is filed in relation to this agreement, the unsuccessful party in the action
shall pay to the successful party, in addition to all the sums that either party may be called on to pay,
a reasonable sum for the successful party's attorneys' fees and costs.
r. Effect of Partial Invalidity.
The invalidity of any portion of this agreement will not and shall not be deemed to affect the validity
of any other provision. In the event that any provision of this agreement is held to be invalid, the
parties agree that the remaining provisions shall be deemed to be in full force and effect as if they had
been executed by both parties subsequent to the expungement of the invalid provision.
s. Entire Agreement.
This agreement shall constitute the entire agreement between the parties and any prior understanding
or representation of any kind preceding the date of this agreement shall not be binding upon either
party except to the extent incorporated in this agreement.
t.

Modification of Agreement.

Any modification of this agreement or additional obligation assumed by either party in connection
with this agreement shall be binding only if placed in writing and signed by each party or an
authorized representative of each party.

11
u

Notices.

Any notice provided for or concerning this agreement shall be m writing and be deemed sufficiently
given when sent by certified or registered mail to the respective adaress of each party as set forth at
the beginning of this agreement
\ . Paragraph Headings.
The titles to the paragraphs of this agreement are solely for the convenience of the parties and shall
not be used to explain, modify, simplify, or aid in the interpretation of the provisions of this
agreement
w. Counterparts
This agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be
an original, but all of which together shall constitute but one and the same instrument.
D. Execution
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement the day and year first
above written.
BUYER.

JiTL
Bry^&n Whailev
SELLERS
Bruce E Chapman, SELEER

Cen Chapman, SELLER

WWP, Inc., a Utah corporation

BV tffiwi f/hmv^
Bruce E Chapman
Its Presidenx

f

STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
On the v^
day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Bryan Whatley, personally known
to me or proven on the basis ox satisfactory evidence, who being b\ me dul} sworn, dfdTacicnowleage
that he executed the Toregoing for its stared purposes.

ARY PUBLIC

/
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STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH)
On the \ ^
day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Bruce E Chapman, personally
known to me or proven on the basis of satisfacto^ evidence, who being by me duly sworn, did
acknowledge_tb4t he_execute.d_the foregoi.ng_for its stated purposes.
r.( vS5®;.' 1323Jcoiv
STATE OFU-XAH-

:o Ifl S"1 NOTARY PUBLIC

X-

J

:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH)
On the
r-6 day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Cen Chapman, personally known
to me or proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, who being by me duly sworn, did acknowledge
that SELLERS executed the foregoing for its stated purposes
~> . U
r
/? /
' ~N

) fffgJK' ^ I ^ ' ^ ' I A -

j NOTARY PUBLIC

STATE OF UTAH

CQr/IM ^ ~ '-:; 2005 j
:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH)
On the
^T~day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Bruce E Chapman, who being by
me duly sworn did say that he is the President of World-Wide Photo, Incorporated, a Utah
corporation, and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed m behalf of said corporation by
authority of its Bylaws or a resolution of its Board of Directors, and Bruce E. Chapman duly
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same

i\f.JV

^.^.-"p^T

I NOTARY PUBLIC

AMENDMEJNT
This Amendment is entered into by and between Bruce E. Chapman, Ori Chapman,
World Wide Photo, Inc. and Bryan Whatley on this j^ELday of April, 2001.
.RECITALS
WHEREAS3 the above-described parties entered into a document entitled, "Stock and
Asset Purchase and Sale" on or about April 5, 2001; and
WHEREAS, the parties desire to clarity certain issues that have arisen
execution of that document.

MUCH-

ii.it'

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual,, promises .herein contained, die parties
agree as follows:
AGREEMENT
1. ' 'Paragraph 2.{c) is" hereby deleted in its entirety-.and replaced with the loll""»w nip
paragraph:
c. Sale of collateral
BUYER and World Wide Phoiu, inc. may elect to sell-any collateral securing obligations
hereunder, bit" any such sale shall result in payment-of'SELLERS of the net proceeds of such
••sale.as follows:
'For sale of any equipment or ass:
•:? uusiness purchased iroiu .SELLERS under this
Agreement, 100% of the,net sale ,
ids (with deductions including, 'bui. not'limited to, any
taxes -.that.are incurred as a result of such sale) shall be proinptly paid to SELLERS:
.For sale of-the realty, SELLERS :shall be-entitled to.receive :the-:entire net ^id proceeds-as
•defined -above .-for .either lot sold for a net amount of $50,000 or lessveach3 'but :'if-the lots or
eitherofthem.are-s^
maiKriio claim upon "the •nst,sale.proceeds-in-excess of $50,000 each. If the lots ..ere,sold
•through/foreclosure due to default of BUYER hereunder, SELLERS m:r/'i:eep'the. entire .sale.
price, not to exceed the sum of the principal -amount outstanding on the promissory note, plus
reasonable .and necessary legal fees that-would otherwise-be recoverable under thetrinis ofthis
."a^resuient.
However, if such:proceeds equal or exceed the amoun
of the arrearage, such a sale will be conclusively deemed to cure BUYER'S default and any sale
proceeds in excess of the arrearage shall be counted as an.advance payment hereunder.

2.
'The parties .acknowledge' and -agree' that BUYER -'lias not "and. '.'does -not rely on
any information, schedules or other representations supplied or made~by Bruce Chapman to
BUYER regarding the value of equipment owned by World Wide Photo, Inc., or being-.sold to
BUYER .under this Agreement. 'BUYER has• inspected the equipment and has .made his own
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independent assessment of the vainc of the equipment and is purchasing World Wide Photo,
Inc. based on his own analysis of tlbe value of the equipment owned by World Wide Photo,
Inc. and Bruce Chapman.
DATED this 2£ day of April, 2001.
BUYER:

bryam ^Whatlcy /
SELLERS.
'/

Bnieehl. caiapmi, SELLER

Chezi Chapman, SELLER

World Wide 'Photo, Iiie.Via Utah .Corpcxratioii
•sn

By:

f)!M

U

£G5f. Chapmai
Its: President

MlBfl
T-

„
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PROMISSORY NOTE
$457,500,00

Aprii (^< - -

, 2001

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned Bryan Whatley (hereafter referred to as "Maker")
promises to pay to the order of Bruce Qiapman, his successors and assigns (hereafter referred to
as "Holder"), at 1421 South Carterville Road? Orem, Utah 84097, or at such otiier place as the
Holder may, from time to time; designate in writing, the principal sum of Four Hundred FiftySeven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($457,500.00) together with interest on the unpaid
.principal balance from the date of this Note at the rate of .1095 per annum, to be paid according,
to the following terms and conditions:
. 1 . . -The first .payment shall he made on June 1, .'2001, .in the amount of $5,000.and
continue xnonttily thereafter on the first day of each month and continuing for 173 months with a
finat 174*\payment of $1,145.25. Brymemof ^
there is aninier\'eniag
•default of .Maker, 'constitute payment in full of Maker's obligation to Holder .hereunder, .Interest
shali.not begin to-accrue until May 1/2001, and shall be calculated as simple ktterest on the basis
of a 30 day month and 360 day year. Payments made within five days before or.after the first of
each -mrmtfr shall be considered neither late nor early and interest shall be calculated for each
'•month.in which payment is made within thai eleven'day window :as. if payment was roade.on'.the
'..first day of each month.
a.

.The payment should be made, to..- Brace Chapman, 1421 South Carterville
Road, Orem, 'Utah 84097. .Payment .-.shall .'be ."deemed: •••.complete upon
mailing..

b,

.No..penalty .shall.'he imposed for early payment ofaay-installment ox "die
remaining balance on the Note, Early payments • including early payments
made-through sale of property-or other .assets shall reduce 'the amount that
must be paid -OR -this note and calculations -shall .he made .-according .to the :
spreadsheet approved by Maker and Holder, a copy of the formulas for
which are appended hereto and incorporated hy reference.

:c.

. Maker.shall pay:alate.charge of.'.$125 fm/addition to..accmea mLsretiti io;
each.and evenr payment-made aitcr .the 6^,of the month.

2.
Eadb payment-sh^
nrsi, to accrued .costs of-collection,
including" reasonable-attorney's .-fees; second, "to payments made by'-.Holder '.to .preserve any
collateral-securing this Note; third,-to any other payments .marie'by 'Holder, and provided'for .below'
in' this Note or in .any trust deeds, -security agreements, -guaranties, -liens, or pledges securing
payment of this "Note;, fourth, to any late charges; -fifth, re prindpalr-'and-sixth/to accracd interest.

IU

J ,
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3.
This Note is secured py two I rust Deeds of even date Herewith. Upon the Minfu
m undersigned to pa}' auj sum due raider this note when due 01 upon occurrence 01 any
unexcused event of default set forth in the Srock and Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement, dated
April 5,2001, or the two trust deeds, the Holder, at its option, and after giving the Maker 45 days
notice of the nature of the default and opportunity to curs, if such default is not cured, may
accelerate payment of the Note and declare the entire indebtedness evidenced by this .note,
including all unpaid principal and accrued interest, immediately due and payable. The Holder may
then foreclose on any security including both or either of the Trust Deeds and apply the entire
sales price towards payment of this note, but not to exceed the sum of the principal amount
outstanding on this note plus reasonable legal fees and costs recoverable under this Promissory
Note and the Trust Deeds If proceeds of the sale of the security sold due to default of Maker
hereunder equal or exceed the amount of the arrearage, such a sale will be conclusively deemed
to cure Buyer's default and any sale proceeds in excess of the arrearage shall be counted as an
advance payment hereunder.
The undersigned agrees, in the event of an uncured dexault by nndjersignsd, to pa,y
all o; the reasonable and necessary costs of collection. inchMing reasonable attorney's tees,
whef ncr <r not suit is filed herein.
5.
AH payments hereof shall be in lawful money of the U xuiecL ia tares oi Am 11 u*. T u L
Note may be prepaid in. full or in part ar any nme without penalty
6.
Any security given DY the undersigned foi subsequent obligations owing from the
undersigned to the Hoider will also be deemed security for tins Note,
7.
The undersigned and an) aureues, guarantors, and endorsers of this Note for
themselves^ their heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns, severally waive demand,
presentment for payment notice of nonpayment, protest and notice of protest, notice of dishonor,
notice of any extensions or renewals, and diligence in taking of any action to collect any amounts
called for hereunder and in the handling of properties, rights, or collateral at any time existing in
connection herewith. They waive any nght to be released b}T reason of any extension of time,
change m terms of paymsni. increase in principal, extension of additional credit, change in interest
rate, renewals, modifications, substitutions or novations of this Note, or anj other maisnal
change. Fiirthenn6fe? They severally consent any renewals or extensions of this Note, whether
made to or in favor of the Undersigned or any other person, and to the release of any security, or
any part thereof, with or without substitution.
8.
failure by iiolacr to declare tut entire balance of this Note due and payaole on
default in the payment of any installment shall no: constitute a waiver of the rigtc to declare said
balance due in case of default in any subsequent mstalimetc
9.
This Nate snail be drnanig upon anc inuxt to tfati bsneiL u, the unasisigaec and
Holder their heirs and personal representatives, successors and assigns.

JUlJi l i : l l
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10.
The provisionsicreof shall be deemed independent ai*d severable, and the invalidity
or panial invalidity or unenforceability of any one provision or ponion hereof shall not aifca the
validity or enforceability of any other provision hereof. This Note will be governed 'by the laws
of the State of Utah.
11.
The undersigned hereby consents to jurisdiction of any court of competent
jurisdiction in the state of Utah, and consents to venue in. Utah €0111113% Utah.
IN WITNESS WHEREO?-' tir muienngntrd iw" ftTieaiied tin;, Nm? ^ of the date first
written,, above.
Maker

*: anWhattey

.l:\2\2lH5\Ptnmiffloty Note #2.wpd,
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World-Wide Photo Payment
Early Payment Example
457,500
10.00%
5,000
Date
6/1/01

8/10/01
9/1/01

Balance
457,500.00
456,312.50
455,115.10
453,907.73
425,168.58
427,530.63
431,093.39
434,685.83
438,308.21
441,960.78
445,643.79
444,357.49
443,060.47
-441,752.64

Interest
3,812.50
3,802.60
3,792.63
1,260.85
2,362.05
3,562.76
3,592.44
3,622.38
3,652.57
3,683.01
3,713.70
3,702.98
3,692.17
3,681.27

Payment
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
30,000.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
.5,000.00

A AC\
AO^n-i
ftu,«ruvj.o i

O.C7D OO
u-,u / u.z.u

c r\nn nr\
J,UUU.UU

3,659.20
.3,648.03
3,636.76
3,625.40
'3,613.95
3,602.40
3,590.75
3,579.01
3,567.16
.3,555.22
3,543.18
3,531.04
3,518.80
: 3,506.46
3,494.01
:3,48i.46
: 3,468.81
3,456.05
3,443.18
3,430.21
'3,417.13
3,403.94
3,390.64
3,377.22
,3,363.70
3,350.07
.3,336.32
.3,322.45
3,308.47
3,294.38
3,280.15
3,265.83
3.2 51.38
3,236.81
'.3,'22?"1"1

5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
.5,000.00
5,000.00
.5,000.00
,5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00..•5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
.5,000.00

439,1 D4.19
437,763.39
436,411,42
435,048.18
433,673.59
432,287.53
430,889.93
429,480.68
428,059.68
426,626.85
425,182.07
423,725.25
422,256.30
•420,775.10.
419,281.55
417,775:57
416,257.04
4.14,725.84
4^3,1.81.B9
411,625:08
410,055.29
408,472.41
406,876.35 •;.
•405,266.99
403,644.21
402,007.91
400,357.98
-393x694.29
397,016.75"
395,325.22
393,61.9.60
391,899.76
390,165.59'•'
386,416.97
386,653.78

:5,ooo.oo
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00
5,00.0.00
•5,000.00
5,000.00
5,000.00

To Princ
1,187.50
1,197.40
1,207.37
28,739.15
-2,362.05
-3,562.76
-3,592.44
-3,622.38
-3,652.57
-3,683.01
1,286.30
1,297.02
1,307.83
1,318.73

Cum Int
3,812.50
7,615,10
11,407.73
12,668.58
15,030.63
18,593.39
22,185.83
25,808.21
29,460.78
33,143.79
36,857,49
40,560.47
44,252.64
47,933.91

A f-fin

"m

££•*. £*r\ A *i r\

i ,0/.S.I

H

D l.,Ol»f. IS

1,340.80
1,351.97
1,363.24
1,374.60
1,386.05
1,397.60
0,409.25
1,420.99
1,432.84'
1,444.78
1,456.82
1,468.96
1,481.20
1,493.54
•1,505.99
1,518.54
••1/531:19'
1,543.95
1,556.82
1,569.79
1,582.87
1,'596.06
1,609.35
1,622.78
1,636.'30
1,649.93
1,663.68
1,677.55
1,591.53
1,705.62 .
1,719.84
1,734.17
1,748.62
1,763.18
1,777.89

55,263.39
58,91142
62,548.18
66,173.'59
69,787.53
73,389.93
76,980.68
80,559.68
84,126.85
87,682.07
,91,225.25
94,756.30
•98,275.10
•1.01,781.56
105,275.57
108,757.04
11.2,225:84
115,681.89
119,125.08
122,555.29
125,97241 •
129,376.35
132,766.99
136,144.21
139,507.91
142,857.98
146,194.29
149,516.75
152,825.22
15.6,11.9.60
159,399.76
162,665.59
155.916.97
169,153.78'
172,375.89
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UTAH DEED TRUST
With. Security Agreement
THIS TRUST DEED, made this g?S^day of /Vf &L-- , 2001, between Bryan Whatlsy, as TRUSTOR,
whose address is 15265 Del. Ponieme CL, Poway, CA920S*-2216aad Bruce Chapman, a; TPJrr T "F. JITU! Bruce
Chapman, as BENEFICIARY,
WITNESSETH: Tnat'Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WJXB. POWER OF
SALE, the fbHowmg described real property, situated in Utah Coiinry, State of Utah:

Lot 242, Plat F* Sherwood HSis Subdiviaii
'TOGETHER •WITH all buildings and improvement-.now or hereafter erecred or used .on the above-described real
property, and allvacated alley* and sceeis abutting the same, and all easement, rights of way, rents, issues, profits,
income*
royalties,--miiie^
water stock, and all fixtures, equipment,
building TnatwiAis ?pp1 ianeesytangThlapersonal pmpeny and goods of every nature whatsoever now. or thereafter
located in or on, or used or intended to be used in connection with, said real .property, including without limitation
those for the purposes of supplying or distritntring hearing, cooling, electricity;, gas., Wflter, air and light; and all
pluinbiug, v/ater heaters* sinks, storm windows and doors, screens, blinds, -shades, •cuitazns.and curtain rods,
mirrors, ..cabinets, panelling, 'rugs,.attached 'floor coverings? telephone.equip.me.Tit,, crees. and plants, fences, ..securiry
systems and outdoor hghthig, and all tenement:, hereditaments, privileges and ajpurtenancerthereunto belonging;
all of which, including replacements for, accessions, modifications, and additions thereto, shall he deemed a part
of said real property and which, '.together with said ieal-property, "are hereafter collectively referred." to herein 'as the
"property."
The foregoing conveyance .in trust shall •also he deemed to be:a.j?amof axecuriry imsrest.in any personal property
interests hereinafter described, and in ail of the foregoing .items which conitituie;ipeTsonal:propszTy or.fhmire& or any
other property which is "Subjea to the Uniform Commercial Cade for the State of Utah or to .any common law with
.respect to pledges, security interests, assignments;, chanel mortgagee and similar rights; saMgrant also creanng such
pledge,, security mtereayassigninmt, chattel .mortgage,- or --similar hen -interest-or rightFOR THE PURPOSE OF .SECURING- (1) .payment of .the indebtedness 'and alTo'ther lawful charges .evidenced by
a promissory note of even .dare (the "Note"), :in 'theprincipal sum of 5457,'5Q0.'0C made by Trustor, -payable .to the
•order .of Jteoenciary, -.in-the ,manncr ..and wiiii interest -.as ..therein set ..forth, 'and .any ..extensions, -renewals,
modificarionfi, -.or .consolidations'thereof; (2). the performance of each agreemem of .Trustor contained in titis Trust
Deed.and the Note; ..,(3) the payment of such-additional loans or advances as":Benefician''.may "hereafter-make'to
Trustor; and.(4) the payment of all sums expended or .advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms of Ms
Trust Deed and .the Note, together-with interest thereon -as herein, provided
Trustor covenants 'and warrants to B«ieiiciary that Trustor is lawfully seized.or the estate.hereby conveyed and has
the right to grant and convey this Trust Deed and the property, that the execution Of this Trust Deed will not result
in the .breach of .any .agreement to which Trustor is a party .ox which.purports to be binding-on-&e Trustor orthe
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jroperry. Trustor further warrants thai ID the bezi of bis knowledge,, Trustor has le^al and physical public access
n the property. The covenants and wiurana.es of rhis paragraph shall survive a foreclosure of this Trust Deed.
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES;
1.
MAINTE-NANCE OF PROPERTY. To Jceep the property in good condition and repair; not to
remove or demolish any building which may exisi or be constructed, thereon; co complex or restore promptly and
n goad and workman! j]fftmanner any building: -which may he constructed, damaged, or destroyed ihercon; to comply
atith ail laws, covenants and restrictions affecting the property; not to commie or permit waste thereof; notto commit,
luffer or Dermit any act upon the property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use
}f the property may be reasonably necessary; the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general,
2
INSURANCE. To provide .and maintain insurance against such casualties as is customarily earned
3n like: properties or as Beneficiary may require, in an amount, not less than the unpaid balance of the Note or the
usurable value, for such form, and written by a-company or companies satisfactory to Beneficiary with loss payable
clauses in favor of and hi a form satisfactory to Beneficiary. In the event of loss or damage, Trusror shall give
jnmecliaic nonce to Beneficiary. Beneficiary may make proof of loss and-settle and adjust all claims thereunder,
•applying the proceeds ar i s option, to reduction of the amouni due hereunder, or to the restoration or repair of the
property damage. Payment of such loss may be made directly to Beneficiary. In the event of the failure of Trustor
:o provide insurance or to maintain same, or to renew same in a manner satisfactory to Beneficiary, then Biwrffctary
rnsy itself procure wi maintain such'.insurance and charge th* cost thereof to Trustor. If Trustor cannot seam:
Insurance to nro vide the reauired coverage^ 'this will constitut?1- an act of defaultTOderthe fgrnw of this TYust Deed,
Beneficiary shall not be required to accept or approve any policy of insurance or any renewal of an existing policy,
which, 'is not delivered to It prior to 30 days before the exph-atioit date of existing coverage eves though the same may
it otherwise satisfactory'.'to '.Beneficiary.
3,
TAXES .AND ..ASSESSMENTS. To pay at .least 10 ..days before ddinqirncy.,.alimes "and
.assessineffla.aSBKiiDg.the.pKwetTy^ including all assessments upon waxer company stock and all rents, assessments
and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in connection with the prqpeny; to pay, when due, all encumbrances,
charges, and liens with interest (including any prior mortgages or trust deeds affecting the property) on hie property
:*r any pan thereof, • which at. any lime appear to be prior or superior henito; to pay all costs, fees, and expenses of
.flais "Trust.
4,
PAYMENTS; CHARGES, 'Should Trustor fail to .-make .any payment or to do-any-act .-as herein
provided, or if any action or proceeding is commenced wtach materia^
in the property (including without limitation thefiling-of any mechanic's or materialmen's liens or any building code
enforcement)/.then Beneficiary or Trustee, hue without obligation ao to do -and without notice ..to. or'-'demand,upon
Trustor and without releasing Trustor.from-any obligation hereof, -may: make or do the same in such manner and
to such extent us either may deem necessary to protect the.sec^
being authorized
to entsr upon the property for such purposes; .commence, appear .in, and defend .any .action or proceeding purporting
to ailect the security h ^
any encumbrance, charge orlien which in /the judgment of either appears ro be-prior or .superior .-heretoi and in
exercising -any such powers, incur .any liability.: expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion as it may-deem
•necessary .therefor, including cost of evidence, of title, 'employ counsel, and pay his reasonable Tees. .Such amounts
shall become additional-priiiqpal-ina^bteto
Trust Deed.
.5.
To pay imm&iiaieiy. and. wimoui demand, all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or' Trustee,
with -interest from dale.of -eApencliinre at the rate-get forth.in the Note until paid, and-thc.rcpayineiit thereof ahall.be
.secured hereby.
6.
TRANSFER. Nor to .maix • any voluntary ;ioier vivos transfer f -conveyance,' or assignmeni of'the
-property. or-any-pan .thereof without first obtaining the written .consent of the Beneficiary, .Any such .'transfer,
conveyance, •& :aBAignD£B&rii the .Beneficiary shall -not so consent, shall constitute a default under 'the- terms of .this
izutrmnsnt :and the indebtedness -it securer, .and Benenciary -may declare all. sums .secured 'by this Trust ...Deed
Utah Deed of Trust , Page ,2
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mnediateiy due and payable ami .may cau&c this Trust Deed co be foreclosed, and tbe premises sold, according to
tw and the provisions hereof
T LS MT T I J A L L Y AGREED TEAT;
7k
Sjiouid the property or any par: thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement
r condemnanon proceeding, or damaged by fire, or eanhquakc, or in any odier manner* Beneficiary snail be entitled
:) all 'compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be enritied at its option to commence,
.ppear in, and prosecute in ics own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in
onnecdon with such taking or damage. All such compemadon, awards, damages, rigbis of action and proceeds,
tichiding the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting the property, are hereby assigned to
ieneftciary, who may, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, apply fbe same on any
odebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to Execute such further assignments of any compensation award, ;r
Lamages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require,
8.
Ac any time and from time to tune upon written request of Beneficiary, payment of its. lees and
iresentatkm of this Trust Deed and the Note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and
txenrkm), without affecting the liability of my person for .the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee
nay (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of the property; (b) join in granting any easement or creating any
'estiiction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed or the lien or cfaarfe
hereof; (d) gran* say csiei^ioner.xrwxiiScationof the tenss of this loan; (e) recorivey, without warranty, aHorairy
•/an of the property. 'Tiifc .grasses hi any reconveyance may be described as' Hths person or person? entitled thereto;" •
trustor, agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's .fees for .any of the services mentioned in this paragraph,
1

"'.RENTS. As. additional security, Trustor hereby assigns to Beneficiary, dining the cuiitiniian.ee of
titan truusui, all rents.* issues, royalties, ,and profits of-the property'.-affected' by this. Trust Deed and of 'any personal
aroperty located tbereotL Until Trustor -.shall default in .the .payment .ofany jndebiedneas-secured.hereby ,orin .fee
•Winn i nance of any agrrnnenr hereunder, Trustor shall have the right p coHecx all such rents, issuer, royalties, and
profits; earned prior to default as tbey become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, Trustor's right
» collect any of such monies shall cease and Beneficiary, shall have the .right, with or without taking possession of
he property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties* issues, and profits. Failure .or;discontinnaDce of
Beneficiary at any .time or from time to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any manner affect the subseqo&ot
•alforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to .collect-the same. Nothing•oontainrf:hfttdn,:;ii!or
".he exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of
any tenancy, lease or option,-nor :an assumption of liabfLiry under, nor .^subordination of the .lien cr charge* of tin*
Trusi Deed '-to any .such tenancy, .lease or option.
10.
POKBEASANCB NOT A" WAIVER. .The M u r e on the part of .Beneficiary .t» premptiy eirfojre
any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such rigtoand the waiver by B e n e f i d ^ of any defaidt aMH not
.ionsutute a waiver of any-other or subaexjuem default.
••11,

~ M E "IS Or THE ESSENCE. Tune.is -of 'the .essence .hereof.

12.
J~ nts\ u _ l . sjpoTi. the. occurrence of'-any default hcreufloer, and'aftcr giving the Trustor- 45 days nonce of'the.namrt o: tne.oeiauit..and oppormnity to cure, if such default is.noreuxed, Beneficiary shall have the
•option to declare ail '-sums secured hereby immediately due and payable. and foreclose tbis 'Trust £eed.in the manner
provided by law for the foreclosure of-mortgages on real.property .and Beneficiary, shall he-entitled • to recover in
such proceedings .ail costi ^-nn AT^^SPI: m^r^nf thpr^rn, m^:mriiT)p; ^ reasonable Btiaineyr& .fee in siichamoufir.as ..shall /^Q) ^ f t
be fixed by tha court. If' proceeds of-the sale of the security sold due TO default of Trusiy- hereunder equal or exceed
^
'th& jfftAiwc of the arrearage, such a sale "will be conclusively deemed to cure ' *W-tt^ default and any sale prcKreeds/T^ /5 £? '£
' in excess .of-the arrearage -shall be counted as --an advance payment hereunder.
^^
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13,
FORECLOSURE. After the laps© of such time as may then be required by law following the
ecordation of said notice of default, and notice of default and notice of sale having been given as then required by
aw, Trustee without demand on Trustor, shall sell the property on the date and at the tzme and place designated in
aid notice of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as itmay determine (but subject to any
tatutorv right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lot$ or parcels,
hall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable m lawftiL money of the United Stares
c the tune of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale in the
manner then prescribed by Utah law. Trustee shall execute and deliver to die purchaser its Deed conveying the
xtoperty so sold, but without any covenant or warraniy, express or implied Any person, including Beneficiary,
nay bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and expenses of
exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and reasonable attorney's foes
ictually incurred by the Trustee and Che Beneficiary with the mrmrrrTTrn total of said fees not to be lass than $250.00 y ^ Apr,
ind not more than 55,000.00; (2) ooot of tmy gvidwiofr of title proeuteri in wmmmimi wMi DUPA mile: (3) all sums \$y ^
impended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, T*ifti accrm*! iiaume from date »f croejoditurtti (4) all other sinnfrTjn ft £ is
hen secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto.
^
14.
Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale,
rnmediarely after such sale, in the event; such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor.
15.
SUCCESSOR. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the
office of the Counsy Recorder of ssds Bounty in which she property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution
ji trustee. From the umc the substiTution isfiledfor record, the new trustee shall succeed to *H the powers- duties,
authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee, Each such substitution shall be executed
nod acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner pnraded by law16.
This Trust D^d shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs,
legatees, devisees, administrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint
and several. The torn HBeneficiaty,1 shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the Note secured
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context so requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
17.
Trustee accepts this Trust when this TrustDeed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public
record as pfovided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any pasiy hereto of pendm^ sale lmder a
Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor* Beneficiary, or Trustee shall b& a party, unless brought by
Trustee.
18.
NOTICE* Any notice re Trustor provided for io this Trust Ds^d shall Ite given by dftMveiin£ it
or by mailing it by first class mail unless applicable law requires use of another method. The notice shall be directed
to the property addnws unless Trustor designates another address in either this Trust Deed or by separate wncen
notice to Beneficiary, Any notice to Beneficiary $hall be given "by first class mail,to Beneficiary's address stated
herein or any other address Beneficiary designates by notice to Trustor. Any ncrtke provided,far in this Trust Deed
shall "be deemed to have"been given to Truatcr or Beneficiary when given as provided in this paragraph.
19.

This Trust Deed shall be construed and governed according to the laws of the Stare of UtaL

20.
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any nonce of default and of any notice of sale
hereunder be mailed to him ai the address hereinabove set forth.
21.
In the event any portion of this TnistDeed is declared invalid by a court of law or by legislative
enactment all other provisions sot so affected shall be valid and binding upon the parties hereto.
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WITNESS THEREOF THE Tiunor ius caused these prtacnis co be executed the day and yearfirstabove written.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF,

ilkk

COUNTY OF.

'UzAI

ss.
)

nnfbr.J^Anvoi LMJJAJ.
2001, personally appeared before me Bryan Wbailey, the signer
f ine above instrument, -who duly acknowledged to mc that they executed uie swrssrx
/./ / /

S0C?-9-* dXS-Wwo,
. BSCHrS m 'W3HO ^

X ^ i X ;

jjvossny T Kiy0r^mS&
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When Recorded, Mail To:
Bruce Chapman
347 West Columbia Lane
Provo. UT 84604
TSpace Above Tb^ r.ms F^r Recorder s Use)
Serial £52.136:0036

UTAH DEED TRUST
With Securiiy Agreement
THIS TRUST DEED, made tins 2^day

of

/VPign- , 2001, b e t w e e a B i ^ Whaiiey. as TRUSTOR,

whose address is 15265 Del Ponicnte CL, Poway, CA 92064-2216 and Bruce Chapman, as TRUSTEE, and Bruce
Chapman, as BENEITCXARY,
WITNESSETE: Thai Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF
SALE, the following described real property, situated in Utah County, State of Utah:

Lot 241, Plat F, Sherwood BSlk Subdivision

TOGETHER WITH all buildings and improvements now or hereafter erected or used on the above-described real
property „ and all vacated alleys and streeis abumng the same, and all easements, rights of way, rents, issues, profits,
income, royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and profits, water rights, water stock, and all Fixtures, equipment,
ouildxog materials, appliances, tangible personal property and goods of every nature whatsoever now or hereafter
located in or on, or used or intended to be used in connection with said real property, including without limitation
those for the purposes of supplying or distributing heating, cooling, eiectneiry, gas, water, air and light; and all
plumbing, water heaters, sinks, storm windows and doors, sheens, blinds, shades, curtains and curtain rods,
mirrors, cabinets, panelling, rugs, attached floor coverings, telephone equipment, trees and plants, fences, security
systems and outdoor lighting, and all tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging;
all of which, including replacements for, accessions, modifications, and additions thereto > shall be deemed a part
of said real property and which, together with sold real property, are hereafter collectively referred to herein as the
"property/
The foregoing conveyance in trust shall also be deemed to be a, grant of a security interest in any personal property
interests hereinafter described, and in all of the foregoing HBULS which constitute per$onai property or fixtures or any
other property which iYXubJ£ct to die Uniform Commercial Code for the State of Utah or to any common law with
respect to pledges, security interests, assjgmnents, chattel mortgages and similar rights; said grant also creating such
pledge, security jmerest, assignment chattel mortgage, or similar lien interest ocr right
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtcdncfis and all other lawful charges evidenced by
a promissory note of even date (the "Note"), to. the principal sum of $457,500.00 made by Trustor, payable to the
order of Beneficiary, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and any extensions, renewals,
modrjicanons, or consolidations" thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor contained in this Trust
Deed and toe Note; {3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as Beneficiary may hereafter make to
Trustor; and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms of this
TrustJDeed and the Note, togetherjwiiii interest thereon as herein provided.
Trustor covenants and warrants to Beneficiary that Trustor is lawfully seiied of the estate hereby conveyed and has
the right to grant and convey this Trust I>eed and the propeny, that the execution of tint Trust Deed will not xesuii
in the breach of my agreement to which Trustor is a party or which purports to be binding on the Trustor or the

y * -o

JUUI

11

11

IAJL

41013

jropmy Irusior mrtiicr warrants ihac IO the bwt of ins knowledge, Trustor has iegai and physical public access
o trie property The covenants and warranties oi this paragraph shall survive a foreclosure of tiafl Trust Deed
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES
1
MAINTENANCE OF PROPERTY To keep trie property in good condition and repair, not CD
•emove orflemomsbany building whicn may exist or be constructed, thereof to complete orrestorepromptly and
n good and workmanlike manner any building which.may be constructed, damaged, or destroyed tncreon, to comply
?ith all law*, covenants and restrictions affecting the property; not to commit ar permit waste thereof, not to commit^
.uifer or permit any act upon the property m violation of law, to do all other acts which from trie character or use
jf the property may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general
2.
INSURANCE To providerodmaintain insurance against such rjsualties as » customarily earned
>n like properties or as Beneficiary may require, in an amount, not less than the unpaid balance of the Note or the
nsurable vaiue, for such form, and written by a company or companies sausfactory to Beneficiary with loss payable
clauses in ravor of and in a form satisfactory to Beneficiary. In the event of los$ or damage, Trustor shall give
immediate nonce io Beneficiaiy Beneficiary ma> make proof of loss and settle and adjust all claims thereunder,
ippiying the proceeds ai ns option, to reduction of the amount due hereunder, or to therestorationor repair of the
property damage. Payment of such ioss may be made directly to Beneficiary, In the event of the failure of Trustor
JO provide insurance or toragnnramsame, or to renew same in «. maimer satisfactory to Beneficiary, then Beneficiary
•nay ^self procure and Tnarnfrmt such insurance and charge the cost thereof to Trustor If Trustor cannot secure
assurance to provide the required covstege, this ^ill constitute an act of default under the terms of this Thrust Deen.
Beneficiary shall not be required to accept or approve any policy of insurance or any renewal of an cxistmgpolicy,
which i$ not delivered to it prior to 30 days before the expiranon date of existing coverage even though the same may
3e otherwise satisfactory to Beneficiary.
3.
TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and
assessments affecting the property, including all assessments upon water company stock and all reuis, assessments
and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in connection with, the property; to pay, when due, all encumbrances,
charges, and bens with interest {including any prior mortgages or trust: deeds affecting the property) oil the property
or any part thereof, which at any time: appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, feesr and expenses of
this Trust
4.
PAYMENTS; CHARGES. Should Trustor fell to make any payment or to do any act a* herein
provided, or if any acuoa or proceeding is commenced which materially or adversely affects Beneficiary's interest
in fhepropeny (including without bnutanon thefilingof any mechanic's or materialmen's hens or any building code
sntorcemenO, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to ox demand upon
Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, may- make or do the same m sueh manner and
co such exient as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized
to ^Tpr upon me property for such purpose commence, appear m. and defend any action or proceeding purporting
to affect the security hereof or the rights or power? of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest* or compromise
anj encumbrance, cnaf gfc oriien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hersto; and in
exercising any such powers, incur any liability, errpend whatever amounts m its absolute discretion as it may deem
necessary therefor, including cast of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable feefi Such amounts
shall become additional principal indebtedness of Trustor secured by this Trust Deed.
5.
To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiaiy or Trustee,
with interest rrom aate of expenditure a: the rate sex fortnm theftote until paid, and merepaymentthereof snail be
secured hereby.
6.
TRANSFER Not to mike any vohintary mier vivos transfer, conveyance, or assignment of the
property or any part thereof without firs: obtaining tnc written consent of the Beneficiary. Anj such transfer,
conveyance, or assignment it the Beneficiary shall not so consent, snail conautute^rWauli: under the terms of this
instrument and the macotednsss it secures, and Bcncficuiry may oeclare all sums secured by this Trust Deed
Utah Deed of Trust, Page 2
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mmcdiaiciy due and payable and may cause this Trust Deed to be foreclosed, ajad the premises sold, according ID
aw and the provisions hereof,

T IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT:
7.
Should the property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvemenr
ir conriemnahortproceeding, or damaged Dy fire* or earthquake, or in any otto manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled
o all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at us option 10 commence,
ppear m> and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in
onnccoon with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action and proceeds,
nciuding the proceeds of any policies of fee and other insurance affecting the property, are hereby assigned to
ieneficiary, who may, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, apply tfce same on any
ndebtedness secured hereoy. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any compensation, award,
lamages, and rights of action sad proceed? as Beneficiary or Trustee may require.
8.
At any time and from time to time upon written request of Beneficiary, psrymsnt of its fees and
nesentatioii of this Trust Deed and the Note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and
ctention), without affecting the liability of any person for Che payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee
nay (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of the property; (b) join m granting any easement or creating any
'esTxicnon thereon; (c) joni in any subordination or other agreerneor affecung tins Trust Deed or the lien or charge
hereof; {d> grant any extension or modification of the terms of this loan; (e) recorrvey, without warranty, all or any
jartof the property. The grantee m any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto."
Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in tins paragraph.
9.
RENTS. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns to Beneficiary, during the continuance of
hese trusts, all rents, issues, royalnes, and profits of the property affected by this Trust; Peed and of any personal
)roperty located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the
performance of any agreeEO^i hereunder, Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, and
irofits earned prior to default as they become due and.payable- If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, Trustor's right
o collect any of such monies shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without taking possession fff
he property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issue?, and profits. Failure or discontinuance of
beneficiary at any b*^ or from time to nine to collect my such moneys shall not tn any manner affect the subsequent
mforcemeni by Beneficiary of the nghty power, and aonhoiity to collect the same. Nothing coniamed herein, nor
iue exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of
my tenanqyi lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this
Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option.
10.
FORBEARANCE NOT A WAIVER. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce
my right hereunder shall not operaie as a waiver of suchnght and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not
ionsutute a waiver of any other or subsequent ctefault,
11.

TIME'S OF THE .ESSENCE. Time is of the essence hereof.

12.
DEFAULT. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, and after giving the Trustor 45 days
nonce of the nature of the default aim opportunity to cure, if such default is not cured, Beneficiary shall have the
option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner
Dronded by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in
nick proceedings all costs and expenses incident tnereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall rY) n /
be fixed oy me court* If proceeds of the sale of trie security Bold due to aefault of 7^sx»r hereunder equal or exceed ^
^ ^
the amount of the airsarage, such a sale will be coocliwively deemed to cure Jr^0xr delanfc and an}" sale proceeds^) $/*£
in excess of the arrearage shall oe counted as an advance payment hereunder.
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13.
PORECLOSUBE. After the Ispae ot such tnnc as may then be required by law following the
scordation of said nonce of defcaift. and notice of default and nonce of wde having been given as then .required by
aw. Trustee without demand on Trustor, shall sell the property on the date and at the rime and place designated m
aid nonce of sale, tuber as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as amay determine (bur subject to any
tannery light of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several kncnvn lots or parcels*
hall be sold}, ar public auction to the highest bidder T the purchase price payable m lawful money of the United State
.t the time of aak. The person conducting the saiemay, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone Che sale in the
nanner then prescribed by Utah law. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying the
>ropeny so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. Any person, including Beneficiary,
nay bid at the sale* Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and expenses of
ixercifiing the power of sale and of the salt, including the payment of the Trustee's and reasonable attorney's fees
icaiaHy incurred by the Trusiee and the Beneficiary with the rrrminmrn total of said fees not to be less than $250.00 /
uod not more than S5,000.00; (2) east of any evidence of tide procured in eenneeriflp wtik meh ifllor (3) all sums '
upended imriffr the terms hereof, not thenrepaid,with aoorood urtwriftfroin dnt» of WCTMIIAIMW!! (4> all other sums 6
hen secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, .if any, to the person or persons legaBy entitled thereto,
14.
Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the Trustproperty to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale,
xnmediately after such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor.
15.
SUCCESSOR, Beneficiary may a ^ i i i t a successor trusieefitany tnnc b^
office of tte County Becorder of each county m which the property or some pan thereof is situated, a substitution
2i trustee. iiram the time ^substitution is & ^
duties,
authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such siibsttotion shall be executed
and adasowledged, and notice thereof shall be gxven and proof thereof made5 in the manner provided by law.
16
This Trust Deed shall apply to, mure to the benefit o t and bmd all parties hereto* their hears,
legatees, devisees, administrators, executors,, successors and assigns. AH obhgaaom of Trustor hereondftr are joint
and several. The term nB^nefbiary>T shall mean the owner and bolder, mriiKhng any pledgees of die Noce secured
hereby. In tills Trust Deed, whenever the context so requires, the wrcnhjy gender inc.ftiries the feminine and/or
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
17.
Trustee accepts tins Trust when this TrustDeed, duly execnfftl and aclrnnwledgad> is marie a public
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Trust
Deed or of any action or prcK^tiling in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Ttuatee shaE be a party, unless brought by
Trustee.
18.
NOTICE. Any notice to Trustor provided for in tins Trust Beed shall be given by delivering it
or by mailing it by fim class m ^
The nonce shall be directed
to the property address unless Trustor designates another address m either this TrustDeed or by separate written
notice to Beneficiary. Any notice to Beneiiciary sbail be given oy first class mail to Beneficiary's address stated
berem or any other address Bendociary designates by nonce to Trustor. Any nonce provided far in this Trust Deed
shall be deemed to have"bccn given to Trustor or Beneficiary when given as provided in this paragraph.
19.

This Trust"Dt&dshall be construed and governed according to the Laws of the State of Utah.

20.
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of deiault and of any nonce of sale
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinabove set forth.
21.
In the event any portion of this Trust Deed is declared invalid by a court of law or by legislative
enactment all other provisions not so afected shall oe valid and binding upon the parties hereto.
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James L. Christensen, USB No. A0639
Christopher G. Jessop, USB No. 8542
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705
Telephone: 801/534-0909
Fax: 801/534-1948
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
PROVO DEPARTMENT. STATE OF UTAH
BRYAN J. WHATLEY, an individual,

AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE CHAPMAN

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 020405636
V.

Judge #5
BRUCE E. CHAPMAN, CERI
CHAPMAN, JAMES L. CHRISTENSEN,
and DOES I-V,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Bruce Chapman, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that:

herein.

1.

I am a resident of Orem, Utah.

2.

I am over the age of eighteen years and have personal knowledge of the facts stated

3.

In 1980, my wife Ceri Chapman and I formed a corporation called World-Wide

Photo, Incorporated, opened a photo finishing store in Provo, Utah, and began doing business as
World-Wide Photo.
4.

World-Wide Photo was a successful business from the start. After several years

of doing business in its Provo store, World-Wide Photo expanded and opened a new store in
Pleasant Grove, Utah.
5.

After approximately 20 years in the photo-finishing business, my wife and I decided

to sell World-Wide Photo.
6.

In early 2001, I began negotiating the sale of World-Wide Photo with Bryan

Whatley ("Mr. Whatley"), who had expressed an interest in purchasing the business.
7.

On April 5, 2001, Mr. Whatley and I executed a Stock and Asset Purchase an Sale

Agreement ("Agreement"). Pursuant to paragraph 6 of that Agreement, I delivered to Mr.
Whatley all of World-Wide Photo's sales tax returns for the most recent 12 months and
documentation on positive cash flow for his review and to allow him "to verify gross sales and
trends" and positive cash flow of $10,000 a month. (Agreement, ^ 6.) A true and correct copy
of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
8.

Pursuant to the Agreement, Mr. Whatley was obligated to close his purchase of

World-Wide Photo "no later than 30 days from the date of disclosure" unless, in his estimation
I had "made a material misrepresentation, a material change not expressly contemplated by [the]
[A]greement, or if the business,"""arttisclosed in [World-Wide Photo's] records, [was] not

2

reasonably capable, as of the date of closing, of supporting the payment of the obligation incurred
by [Mr. Whatley]." (Id.)
9.

The Agreement also provides, in relevant part, "Should either party fail to perform

its obligations hereunder, the non-defaulting party may notify the defaulting party of the general
nature of the default. The allegedly defaulting party shall then have 45 days from receipt of that
notice of default to cure that default. If the default is not cured within that 45 day period, the nondefaulting party may declare this contract in default and shall be entitled to pursue any remedy
available at law or equity, including, without limitation, foreclosure on the coiiaterai provided
hereunder." (See Exhibit A, f 8.)
10.

Mr. Whatley demanded that the Agreement contain the following arbitration clause.

In the event of a dispute under this agreement, the parties agree that any action
brought shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. Such arbitration need not be conducted by the
American Arbitration Association, even though it would follow their rules.
Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County, Utah, and not elsewhere.
(See Exhibit A, 1[9(m).)
11.

Mr. Whatley pledged two parcels of real property as collateral for the Agreement:

Lots 241 and 242, Plat F, Sherwood Hills Subdivision.
12.

Prior to closing, my wife and I approved the sale of World-Wide Photo to Mr.

Whatley and resigned from our positions at World-Wide Photo. Later, we formalized this action
by executing a corporate resolution made effective April 10, 2001.

3

13.

On April 25, 2001, Mr. Whatley closed the transaction and executed the following

documents:
a.

An Amendment that modifies paragraph 2(c) of the Agreement and

acknowledges that Mr. Whatley has inspected the company's equipment;
b.

A promissory note in the amount of $457,500 in favor of me and my wife;

c.

A "Utah Deed Trust" in favor of Bruce Chapman in the amount of

$457,500, which was recorded against Lot 241, Plat F, Sherwood Hills Subdivision as Entry
^tUJ^O.LUUi
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d.

^UUi,

A "Utah Deed Trust" in favor of Bruce Chapman in the amount of

$457,500, which was recorded against Lot 242, Plat F, Sherwood Hills Subdivision as Entry
40597:2001 in the Utah County Recorder's Office on April 27, 2001.
14.

I agreed to stay on as a consultant to Mr. Whatley after the sale of World-Wide

Photo was complete. After the sale of World-Wide Photo Mr. Whatley was in contact with me
on a regular basis.
15.

On June 22, 2001, Mr. Whatley and I executed an Assignment, Assumption,

Consent Agreement for Mr. Whatley's assumption of the Provo store lease.
16.

On April 2, 2002, Mr. Whatley entered into a lease agreement with MM Property

for new space located at 300 N., State Street in Orem, Utah.
17.

On April 23,2002, Mr. Whatley, through his attorney Timothy Miguel Willardson,

sent a four-page notice4e-me that I was essentially in default under the Agreement and that he

4

(Mr. Whatley) would permanently close the doors to World-Wide Photo on Saturday, April 27,
2002.
18.

Although the Agreement requires a 45 day cure period, Mr. Whatley demanded that

I respond to his April 23, 2002, letter on or before April 25, 2002 and gave me no chance to cure
any of the alleged defaults.
19.

Not wanting to see World-Wide Photo go out of business due to Mr. Whatley's

unwillingness to continue with the company, I took possession of the business and began operating
ii as a gratuitous^oailee and/or receiver for Mr. Whatley on Monday, April 29, 2002. I have been
operating the business in that capacity ever since.
20.

Mr. Whatley stopped making his monthly payments for the business as required in

the Agreement on or about April 23, 2002.
21.

On May 2, 2002, I sent a notice of default and demand to cure to Mr. Whatley

through my attorney, James L. Christensen, for Mr. Whatley's breach of the purchase Agreement.
22.

On May 3, 2002, Mr. Willardson responded to the May 2, 2002 letter and alleged

that his client was not in default and that there was no need to give Mr. Chapman 45 days to cure
any alleged defaults.
23.

On May 31, 2002, I directed Mr. Christensen sent a letter to Mr. Willardson

requesting an accounting of World-Wide Photo's finances while under the control of Mr. Whatley.
No such accounting has ever been given to either myself or my attorney.

5

24.

On June 7, 2002, I sent another letter to Mr. Whatley through my attorney

indicating that I had cured each of the defaults alleged in Mr. Whatley's April 23, 2002 letter.
25.

On December 5, 2002, I directed my attorney to file a demand for the arbitration

of this matter with the American Arbitration Association, which my attorney did. A true and
correct copy of the demand for arbitration is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
26.

In response to my demand for arbitration, Mr. Whatley, through his attorney, filed

a complaint in the above-captioned court on or about December 19, 2002.
27.

At no lime has my aitorney, James L. Chrisiensen ("Mr. Chrisiensen"), ever been

a shareholder of, or in any way affiliated with World-Wide Photo.
28.

The Stock and Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement was not drafted by Mr.

Christensen; it was drafted by Timothy Willardson, counsel for Mr. Whatley. After Mr.
Willardson drafted the Agreement, I showed it to Mr. Christensen, who suggested that a few
revisions be made to it. Mr. Willardson incorporated some of the suggested revisions into the
Agreement and refused to make others.
29.

All of the terms of the Agreement were negotiated directly between myself and Mr.

Whatley. I did not involve Mr. Christensen in any of the negotiations between myself and Mr.
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Whatlev, but asked him to become involved in discussing the structure and wording of the
Agreement with Mr. Willardson.
DATED this j t ^ d a y of J anuar) , 2003.

Bruce Chapman
Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me this
day of January, 2003 by
Chapman, signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed
'.»me

/? *

Notary Public
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid,
to the following at the address(es) indicated o;. :n-«. /^_

cllv of-W^lAfi/l^il/li

j

^LU^J^)

1 aiiuthy Miguel Willardson
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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Exhibit A
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STOCK AND ASSET PURCHASE AND SALE
A. Identification of parti es i
This document constitutes the agreement, made and entered into at Orem, in the State of Utah, on or
about Thursday, April 5th, 2001, between Bruce E. Chapman acting on behalf of himself and his wife,
Ceri Chapman, both of whom reside at, 1421 S Carterville Rd, Orem UT 84098, (hereinafter referred
• to collectively as ''SELLERS") party of the first part, and Bryan Whatley, an individual residing at
15265 Del Poniente Court, Poway, CA 92064, (hereinafter referred to as "BUYER") party of the
second part:

B. Recital^
WHEREAS, SELLERS are desirous of having BUYER purchase all of the outstanding stock of
World-Wide Photo, Incorporated ("WWP"). a Utah Corporation with registered offices at 1421 S.
Carterville Rd, Orem. UT 84098 and principal place of business at 547 W, Coli imbia I ane, Provo, UT
84604;
AND WHEREAS, WWP has determined that it is in its own best interest to limit sales of suck K n<;
more than 35 individuals;
AND WHEREAS, WWP has determined that it is in its own best interest to offer such stock under
one or more of the registration exemptions under-the Securities Act of 1933;
AND WHEREAS, WWP has determined that it is in its own best interest to offer such stock under
one or more of the registration exemptions under the Utah Securities Acts;
WHEREAS, JbUYER has been expressly informed that the stock which he is purchasing is
being sold under one or more registration exemptions under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Utah
Securities Act and therefore may not be resold except pursuant to subsequent registration made or
exemption obtained;
. •

J^-^J^
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and able to provide pnvment in exchange for stock and assets;

AND WHEREAS, SELLERS, oeing the owner of record of One I housand (1,000) shares of WWP
stock, which shares constitute One Hundred Percent (100%) of the outstanding shares of WWP (the
"Shares");
AND WHEREAS SELLERS own the following listed equipment [ 1 ea. freezer, 1 ea. paper cutter
20K, 1 ea. Speedmaster densitometer, 1 ea. cardboard slide mounter, 2 ea. Durst 78U printer, 1 ea.
Oscar Fisher mixing tank] which is leased to WWP and which SELLERS are willing and able to sell
and which BUYER requires as part of the acquired business;
AND WHEREAS SELLERS have rep resentecLthaLgross sales of WWP for last year (2000)
amounted to at least $800,000, and that level of sales generated sufficient positive cash flow to fund
wages, salaries and other benefits to SELLERS which will be terminated on closing, of at least
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Si 0,000 each and every month ; The parties acknowledge that SELLERS are not guaranty in 7 future
sales or operating expenses at the level enjoyed under SELLERS' management, on I}' that
performance of WWP under SELLERS' management was as described by SELLERS.
C. Terms

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises herein contained, the parties agree as
follows

1. Stock and Warranties,
SELLERS warrant that SELLERS are the sole and complete owners of the Shares, and that
SELLERS own no other or further shares, and that SELLERS have all of the rights, privileges and
authorities necessary to sell said Shares in WWP to BUYER. SELLERS further warrant that the
Shares are not encumbered in any way, including as security for any purpose, that said Shares are free
from any liens, encumbrances, interest, and judicial processes including but not limited to any marital
or ownership interest in the Shares or its proceeds by any former spouses. SELLERS further warrant
that surrendering the Shares will not violate any court order or requirement, and that the sale of the
Shares will completely extinguish SELLERS' ownership rights of anv nature or kind in WWP.
WWP, by and through its current President Bruce Chapman and Vice President Cen Chapman
warrants that the only issued and outstanding shares authorized by it are the 1.000 shares issued to
SELLERS WWP furtner warrants that it is a riulv authorized Utah corporation in good standing.
BUYER hereby represents that he is acquiring the Shares for his own account, for investment, and
noi with a view to or for resale in connection with any distribution thereof. BUYER acknowledges
that the Shares are subject to the following restriction which will be noted as a legend in substantially
the following form on the face of the certificates representing the Shares:
THE SECURITIES REPRESENTED BY THIS CERTIFICATE HAVE NOT BEEN
REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED (THE "ACT")
OR QUALIFIED UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS OF ANY STATE (TPIE "LAW").
SUCH SECURITIES HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED FOR INVESTMENT AND NEITHER
SAID SHARES NOR ANY INTEREST THEREIN MAY BE SOLD OR OFFERED FOR
SALE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE REGISTRATION STATEMENT FOR
THE SHARES UNDER THE ACT AND QUALIFICATION UNDER THE LAW OR AN
OPINION OF COUNSEL SATISFACTORY TO THE CORPORATION THAT SUCH
REGISTRATION AND QUALIFICATION ARE NOT REQUIRED AS TO SAID SALE
OR OFFER.
BUYER further represents that he has such knowledge and experience in business and financial
matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of investing in tne WWP. BUYER
understands the speculative nature of nis investment in the WWP and represents that he has adeqiidt-
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Tnis is a materia] representation because SELLERS will not show WWP f mancials to BUYER before closing,
and SELLERS' representation tc BUYER (tnat tne positive cash flow of at least $10,000 each month continues to trie date
of closing ana tnat SELLERS are selling all assets of tne business tnar were necessary to achieving tne sales and casn
flow represented by SELLERS to BUYER) was essential to BUYER'S decision to purcnase tne business anu assets.

net worth and means to provide for his current needs and to sustain a complete loss of his
investment and that BUYER has no need of liquidity of his investment.
BUYER understands thai at present no public market exists, and that a public market ma) never
exist, for the Shares and thai WWP is under no obligation to provide a market for the Shares.
SELLERS pledge and warrant to BUYER: tnat the assets of WWP, and the assets of SELLERS that
are being sold hereunder, are unencumbered, fret of liens, and not pledged as collateral to other
parties.
2, Purchase Price and Payment
a. Price and Payirtrnl J e r n t s
BUYER shall pa\ to SELLERS, at closing, the sum of $400,000, allocated $375,000 to stock,
$25,000 to equipment, plus an additional sum for the mutual!} agreeable value of inventory in stork
as of the date of closing, as discussed below.
Payment shall be made by deliver} of a promisson ncue in the amount of the purchase price payable
to Bruce and Ceri Chapman.
SELLERS shall, upon receipt of payment, transfer to BUYER a total of 1,000 shares of stock, which
number of shares is and shall remain through closing, all of the issued and outstanding shares of
WWP. Payment shall be completed, for purposes of this section, by delivery of a promissory note in
the principal amount of the purchase price, bearing interest at 10% per annum, payable in monthly
installments of $5,000 with no prepayment penalty until paid in full. All payments in excess of or in
addition to the minimum monthly payment may be, at BUYER'S election, treated as payments tor
succeeding months, or as payment of principal in advance. That election ma} be made at any time, or
changed to prevent default.
b

t r i l a t e r a l for BUYER'S obligations

BUYER shall, ai closing, execute in favor ot SELLERS, a security agreement and financing
statements pledging all of the tangible assets owned by WWP as of closing to secure the payment of
all indebtedness contemplated in this agreement. After-acquired proper!} and accretions shall not be
so encumbered. In addition, BUYER shall secure the payment of that indebtedness by a deed of trust,
with SELLERS, or either of them at SELLERS election, as beneficiary, covering lots 242 and 243 of
Sherwood Hills subdivision; plat F. Attached hereto are copies of the most recent Utah County real
property tax notices for those two lots, showing valuation of each at ewer $42,000 and ownership in
BUYER. BUYER represents and warrants the authentic]!} oi those tax notices and that he is the
record owne r of the lots described therein, but makes no representation as to tne accuracy of any
information contained therein except for his identity and address. SELLERS ma}', at their option and
their own expense, purchase title insurance to further secure their position.
c.

Sale of collateral

BUYER ana WWP ma) elect to sell an} collateral securing obligations hereunder, but am such sale
shall result in payment to SELLERS of the net proceeds of such sale as follows:
For sale of any assets of the business. 100% of the ne: sale proceeds (with deductions inducing, but
.^e;-

not limited to, any taxes that are incurred as a result of such sale) shall be promptly paid to
SELLERS;
For sale of the realty, SELLERS shall be entitled to receive the entire net sale proceeds as defined
above of either lot sold for a net amount of $50,000 or less, but if the lots or either of them are sold
for a net sale proceeds of more than $50,000, SELLERS shall make no claim upon the net sale
proceeds in excess of $50,000. If the lots are sold through foreclosure due to default of BUYER
hereunder, SELLERS may keep the entire sale price, not to exceed the sum of the principal amount
outstanding on the promissory note, plus reasonable and necessary legal fees that would otherwise be
recoverable under the terms of this agreement. However, if such proceeds equal or exceed the amount
of the arrearage, such a sale will be conclusively deemed to cure BUYER'S default and any sale
proceeds in excess of the arrearage shall be counted as an advance payment hereunder.
d. Sale of Business
If BUYER elects to sell the entire business (WWP), BUYER shall be required to pay off the unpaid
balance of the note referenced above at closing of that sale.
3. Distributions or Changes.

No distributions or changes of any material aspect of the corporation or its condition shall be made,
from the date of execution of this agreement, unless approved by BUYER and a fair adjustment of
any effected contract terms is made. All assets and liabilities in the business as of the date of
execution shall remain in WWP except the following:
a.

One Kodak 2711 digital printing lab; one Noritsu V70 C-41 film processor; and one B&W
470 film processor, all of which are under lease, shall be transferred to SELLERS and
SELLERS shall indemnify WWP and BUYER from all costs, loss, liability and/or expense
related thereto which accrues on or after the date of execution of this agreement. Resolution
of this matter to the mutual satisfaction of both BUYER and SELLERS is a condition
precedent to closing.

b.

Accounts Receivable C'A/R") and Accounts Payable ("A/P") as of the date of closing of this
agreement shall be transferred to SELLERS and SELLERS shall indemnify WWP and
BUYER from all costs, loss, liability and/or expense related thereto.

c.

All A/R and A/P after the date of closing of this agreement shall remain in WWP and WWP
shall indemnify SELLERS from all costs, loss, liability and/or expense related thereto which
accrues on or after the date of closing of this agreement.

d.

BUYER and SELLERS shall negotiate a mutually acceptable value amount to compensate
SELLERS or to allow SELLERS to recover a mutually agreeable value of inventory in stock
as of the date of closing. Resolution of this matter to the mutual satisfaction of both BUYER
and SELLERS is a condition precedent to closing. That mutual agreement shall be reduced to
writing and signed by all parties and that document shall be constructed-as-part of this
document.

e.

SELLERS have represented to BUYER that the business has no outstanding liabilities other
than the three equipment leases to be transferred to SELLERS as stated above. Therefore.
SELLERS shall indemnify and hold BUYER harmless for any claim or liability against that

5
arises out of or relates to events prior to the date of closing of this agreement. BUYER shall
indemnify and hold SELLERS harmless for any claim or liability that arises out of or relates
to events prior to the date of closing of this agreement.
f.

SELLERS are to transfer ownership of the following assets out of WWP prior to closing of
the sale and such transfer will not effect the purchase price:
The balance of the following checking accounts shall be transferred to SELLERS, but
SELLERS shall allow BUYER to put funds in to leave the accounts open and all signatory
authority for these accounts shall be removed for SELLERS and their agents:
First Security Bank checking account # 3321016945
First Security Bank savings account* 332-8436715
Oppenheimer money market account # 200 2001319032
Oppenheimer money market account # 200 2005689156
Since SELLERS are bound under this agreement to indemnify BUYER for all costs, losses,
and expenses that arise from events prior to closing, SELLERS may, at their option, leave
sufficient funds in those accounts to cover such items in those categories as are known in
advance, such as accrued payroll and taxes.

g.

The parties acknowledge that World-Wide Photo Pension, which is not owned by WWP and
which has not been funded for three years, will remain under the ownership and direction of
SELLERS and that SELLERS will remain liable for all aspect of that pension fund.
4.

Realty

SELLERS have disclosed to BUYER that the two pieces of real property which are essential to the
operation of the business being sold and purchased have problems with the leases. The Provo location
( 547 W. Columbia Lane) is leased to Bruce Chapman personally, and not to WWP, under a written
lease from Southland Corporation that prevents assignments or subleases. The Pleasant Grove
location is rented from month to month only and the owner of that property has recently died.
Therefore, the sale contemplated hereunder is made expressly contingent upon (1) obtaining from the
Southland Corporation, a written acceptance and continuation of the lease in favor of WWP in form
and content satisfactory to BUYER and (2) obtaining an agreement with both the de facto and de jure
owner(s) regarding the use of the Pleasant Grove location satisfactory in form and content to
BUYER.
5. Confidentiality. Non-Circumvention, Non-Competition

Each party hereto hereby promises the other party that it will not itself, nor will it allow nor assist a
third party, to circumvent the other party on any opportunity which may reasonably fall within the
scope of this agreement. In furtherance of this mutual promise, the parties acknowledge that BUYER
and the BUYER employees to whom information has been disclosed have previously signed
confidentiality agreements as to information disclosed in connection with the sale contemplated by
this agreement. That obligation of BUYER shall be voided upon closing of the sale contemplated
hereby. Those obligations of BUYER'S employees shall be. upon closing, transferred to BUYER.

6
SELLERS agree that by execution of this agreement they are agreeing to be bound to the same
obligation of confidentiality that BUYER incurred prior to closing and that obligation of SELLERS
shall survive the termination of this agreement for a period not less than five (5) years, during which
time SELLERS will not themselves, nor will they assist or allow a third party to, use said confidential
information for purposes of trade or business competition.
SELLERS agree that, except as provided for, for a period of three (3) years from the closing date
hereof SELLERS will not in the geographical area hereinafter mentioned, directly or indirectly, in
any individual or representative capacity whatsoever, engage in the business of, or, as owner,
employee, stockholder, partner, sole proprietor, joint venturer, or otherwise manage, operate, control,
assist, participate, be connected with or render any consultation or business advice, with regard to any
business engaged in photographic processing or finishing. Bruce Chapman, with the prior written
approval of BUYER, may work, as an employee only, for a noncompetitive photo lab in the
geographical area hereinafter mentioned. BUYER acknowledges that SELLERS may, without
violating this agreement, do photographic printing and enlarging, only, for any immediate family
members, including Bruce Chapman's mother, and as payment in kind for the following named
professionals only; Jim Christensen, Gary Mathews, Rdean Clark, Phillip Plothow and Roland
Monson. SELLERS may also, without violating this agreement, sell photographic prints and
enlargements by mail order, as long as such sales are not in competition with WWP and BUYER., i.e.,
the sales are limited to customers of SELLERS who both (i) have not, prior to the date of this
agreement, been a customer of either WWP or Campus Photo and (ii) which have no presence in all
of the following two counties in the state of Utah: Utah County and Salt Lake County. SELLERS
may also, without violating this agreement, print Ilfochrome prints from one individual wildlife and
nature photographer, named B.R. [NAME]. The exclusions above for immediate family, out of area
mail order, and in-kind payment, do not allow SELLERS to develop and process photographic film.
However, BUYER shall, for the three (3) year period commencing on the date of closing, develop
and process photographic film, from that excluded group only (immediate family, out of area mail
order, and in-kind payment), for the SELLRS for the cost of materials plus 10%. In doing any
business not proscribed by this portion of the agreement, SELLERS may not use the name of WWP
and shall disclose to anyone who might be aware of SELLERS' former affiliation with WWP that
SELLERS are no longer so affiliated. This requirement of disclosure specifically includes, but is not
limited to, dealing with past, present, or future customers or suppliers of WWP.
The geographical area to which the preceding covenant refers is all of Utah County and all of Salt
Lake County in the state of Utah.
SELLERS declare that the foregoing territorial and time limits are reasonable, and are properly
required for the adequate protection of the assets to be acquired by BUYER from SELLERS, and that
in the event that any such territorial or time limitation is deemed to be unreasonable by a court of
competent jurisdiction, SELLERS agrees and submits to the reduction of either said territorial or time
limitation, or both, to such area or a period of time as by said court shall be deemed reasonable.
SELLERS further declare that the foregoing restrictive covenants, limited in time and territory as
aforesaid, are ancillary to sale of WWP, and are necessary to protect BUYER in the enjoyment of and
beneficial use and ownership of the business thereby acquired.
In the event SELLERS, should be in violation of the restrictive covenants herein above set forth, then
the time limitation thereof shall be extended for a period of time equal to the period of time during
wnich such breach or breaches should occur; and in the event BUYER should be required to seek
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relief from any such breach in any court the restrictive covenant shall be extended for a period of
time equal to the pendency of all proceedings before such court, including all appeals.
SELLERS shall be jointly and severally liable to BUYER and WWP for any and all damages, costs,
and legal fees which are suffered by BUYER or WWP by reason of any violation of this agreement,
including, without limitation, both incidental and consequential damages. In addition, SELLERS
hereby acknowledge that money damages alone would not adequately compensate BUYER in the
event of a breach by SELLERS of the foregoing restrictive covenant, and therefore, SELLERS
hereby covenant and agree that in addition to all other remedies available to BUYER at law or in
equity, BUYER shall be entitled to injunctive relief for the enforcement thereof.
The existence of any claim or cause of action by SELLERS against BUYER shall not constitute: a
defense to the enforcement of the foregoing restrictive covenant, but shall be litigated separately.
BUYER shall have the right to assign the aforesaid restrictive covenant in the event BUYER desires
hereafter to sell all or any part of WWP, whether still operating under the same name or if the name
has been changed, and SELLERS agrees to be bound by the terms of said restrictive covenant to any
and all subsequent purchasers and assigns of said business.
6. Closing
Closing shall occur at a mutually convenient time after SELLERS have made available to BUYER
the sales tax returns for the most recent 12 months of operations of WWP. That disclosure is intended
to allow BUYER to verify gross sales and trends. SELLERS shall also make available documentation
on positive cash flow and payments to or for the benefit of SELLERS that will cease at closing. The
purpose of these disclosures is to allow BUYER to confirm that, at closing WWP will have had a
positive cash flow of at least $10,000 each and every month for the 12 calendar months preceding
closing. BUYER shall be obliged to close within a period no later than 30 days from the date of
disclosure of the above information by SELLERS unless SELLERS shall have made a material
misrepresentation, a material change not expressly contemplated by this agreement, or if the business,
as disclosed in WWP's records, is not reasonably capable, as of the date of closing, of supporting the
payment of the obligation incurred by BUYER hereunder. This paragraph shall not be construed to
vitiate any other express contingencies contained in this agreement. If BUYER fails to close for any
reason, the obligation of confidentiality previously undertaken by BUYER shall remain in effect for a
period of five (5) years from the date of refusal or failure to close.
7. Consultation by SELLERS

Bruce E. Chapman will, for a term of 60 days after closing, consult with BUYER regarding any
aspect of the business without additional charge. Such consulting shall be during normal business
hours and shall not exceed 20 hours in any calendar week.
8. Default

Should either party fail to perform its obligations hereunder— the-non-defaulting party may notify the
defaulting party of the general nature of the default. The allegedly defaulting party shall then have 45
days from receipt of that notice of default to cure that default. If the default is not cured within that 45
day period, the non-defaulting party may declare this contract in default and shall be entitled to
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pursue any remedy that may be available at law or equity, including, without limitation, foreclosure
on the collateral provided for hereunder.
9. Miscellaneous P r o v i s i o n s
a.

Integration

This contract contains the entire contract between the BUYER and the SELLERS, and no agent or
representative of the corporation or any other person has any power to change or alter the terms of
this agreement.
h. Binding effect
This agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the respective heirs, personal representatives,
successors, and permitted assigns of the parties.
c. Dividends and Earnings.
It is agreed that other than those expressly specified herein, SELLERS shall not be entitled to anyretained earnings of WWP after the date of execution of this agreement, or to any assets of WWP, or
to any shareholder dividends of WWP.
d. Resignation of Employment.
SELLERS hereby resign from WWP and terminates their employment status with WWP, effective as
of the Closing Date. SELLERS have previously retrieved their personal property from the WWP
premises.
e. Execution of Resolution.
SELLERS warrant that each has or will execute, in their respective capacities as shareholders, a
corporate resolution approving the purchase by BUYER of SELLERS' One Hundred Percent (100%)
interest in WWP.
f

Resignation as Officer and Director.

SELLERS, and each of them, hereby resign as officers and directors of WWP as of the Closing Date.
SELLERS, if necessary, will execute all of the necessary corporate documents to complete this
transaction, including removal of SELLERS from WWP's bank and other accounts.
g. Release.
SELLERS warrant that neither is aware of any claims or potential claims against WWP, or SELLERS
or either of them. SELLERS, and each of them, herein completely and totally release, quit, and
discharge WWP, its officers, directors, employees, and agents, their successors and assigns, from all
claims, rights of action, and causes of action, arising from, derived from or related to their respective
ownership of WWP stock, employment with WWP, or any other relationship with WWP and the
above-referenced persons. This release of all claims includes with respect to all persons and entities
above, all damages including but not limited to actual, incidental and consequential in all civil,
criminal, and administrative causes, causes and claims including but not limited to unemployment
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compensation, worker's compensation, and personal tax liabilities. SELLERS further agree to hold
WWP, and BUYER, including their agents, attorneys and shareholders harmless from any and all
claims as referenced in this Section.
BUYER warrants that he is neither aware of any claims or potential claims against CAMPUS
PHOTO, or BUYER. BUYER herein completely and totally releases, quits, and discharges
SELLERS, their agents, successors and assigns, from all claims, rights of action, and causes of
action, arising from, derived from or related to BUYER'S ownership of CAMPUS PHOTO,
employment with CAMPUS PHOTO, or any other relationship with CAMPUS PHOTO and the
above-referenced persons. This release of all claims includes with respect to all persons and entities
above, all damages including but not limited to actual, incidental and consequential in all civil,
criminal, and administrative causes, causes and claims including but not limited to unemployment
compensation, worker's compensation, and personal tax liabilities. BUYER further agree to hold
SELLERS, including their agents, and attorneys harmless from any and all claims as referenced in
this Section.
h. Ownership of Claims and Corporate Authorization.
Each party to this agreement warrants and represents thai ii is the holder and owner of the claims
subject to this agreement, that each has not assigned or otherwise conveyed to any person, firm, or
entity any interest and any claim, demand or cause of action covered by the terms of this agreement
and that there are no liens or encumbrances against the claims.
i.

Brokerage.

The parties represent that there are no brokerage or other commissions relative to the sale and transfer
of the Shares by SELLERS.
j.

Acknowledgment.

Each party hereby acknowledges that he or she has been given the opportunity to review the terms
and conditions of this Agreement with any legal or other advisor of his or her own choice and that he
or she fully understands-and knowingly consents to the terms and conditions hereof.
k.

Assignment.

No party shall assign, sublet, or transfer any interest in this agreement without the prior, express, and
written consent of the others.
1.

Non-liability.

Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as creating any personal liability on the part of any
officer or agent that may be a party to this agreement, nor shall it be construed as giving any rights or
benefits under this agreement to anyone other than the parties to this agreement.
m. Disputes/ Arbitration
In the event of a dispute under this agreement, the parties agree that any action brought shall be
submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration
Association. Such arbitration need not be conducted by the American Arbitration Association, even
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though it would follow their rules. Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County, Utah,
and not elsewhere.
n. Authority for Execution
SELLERS represent that they have taken all steps necessary to comply with all corporate
requirements to enter into this agreement. The party signing below on behalf of WWP warrants he
has authorization from WWP to execute this agreement on behalf of WWP. The parties, by their
signatures below, represent and warrant that he or she is competent to enter this agreement, fully
understands the same, and does so agree by his or her own free will and choice.
o. No Waiver.
The failure of any party to this agreement to insist upon the performance of any of the terms and
conditions of this agreement, or the waiver of any breach of any of the terms and conditions of this
agreement, shall not be construed as thereafter waiving any such terms and conditions except as
specifically set forth herein, but the same shall continue and remain in full force and effect as if no
such forbearance or waiver had occurred.
p. Governing

Law.

It is agreed that this agreement shall be governed by. construed, and enforced in accordance with the
laws of the State of Utah.
q. Attorney Fees.
In the event that any action is filed in relation to this agreement, the unsuccessful party in the action
shall pay to the successful party, in addition to all the sums that either party may be called on to pay,
a reasonable sum for the successful party's attorneys' fees and costs.
r.

Effect of Partial Invalidity.

The invalidity of any portion of this agreement will not and shall not be deemed to affect the validity
of any other provision. In the event that any provision of this agreement is held to be invalid, the
parties agree that the remaining provisions shall be deemed to be in full force and effect as if they had
been executed by both parties subsequent to the expungement of the invalid provision.
s.

Entire Agreement.

This agreement shall constitute the entire agreement between the parties and any prior understanding
or representation of any kind preceding the date of this agreement shall not be binding upon either
party except to the extent incorporated in this agreement.
t.

Modification of Agreement.

Any modification of this agreement or additional obligation assumed by either party in connection
with this agreement shall be binding only if placed in writing and signed by each party or an
authorized representative of each party.
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u. Notices,
Any notice provided for or concerning this agreement shall be in writing and be deemed sufficiently
given when sent by certified or registered mail to the respective address of each party as set forth at
the beginning of this agreement.
v. Paragraph Headings.
The titles to the paragraphs of this agreement are solely for the convenience of the parties and shall
not be used to explain, modify, simplify, or aid m the interpretation of the provisions of this
agreement.
w. Counterparts.
This agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be
an original, but all of which together shall constitute but one and the same instrument.
D. Execution
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement the day and year first
above written.
BUYER:

SELLERS

r^
Bruce E. Chapman, SELLER

Ceri Chapman, SELLER

WWP. inc., a Utah corporation
\JL

Bruce E. Chapman
Its: President
STATE OF UTAH
:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
On the ^J day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Bryan Whatley, personally known
to me or proven on the basis of satisf-actory evidence, who being by me duly sworn, did acknowledge
that he executed the foregoing for its stated purposes.

PUBLIC
\ HVTWyp*

OR EMS UTAH ':\09JL

V
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STATE OF UTAH

)

.ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
On the \ 1 day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Bruce E Chapman, personally
known to me or proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, who being by me duly sworn, did
acknowledging he^exegutedjhe foregoing^for its stated purposes
f

i

1

4 v » ; > -0WPUBLIC-SmofITM , J^fasl'Tlu
1
?( vi^BA323SOUT' s:o-AS', NOTARY PUBLIC
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«'fAH^4097
MfAH
"54097 4I

OPE-'
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COUNTY OF UTAH )
On the £
day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Cen Chapman, personally known
to me or proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, who being by me duly sworn, did acknowledge
that SELLERS executed the foregoing for its stated purposes
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COUNTY OF UTAH )
On the
o day of April, 2001, personally appeared before me Bruce E Chapman, who being by
me duly sworn did say that he is the President of World-Wide Photo, Incorporated, a Utah
corporation, and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by
authority of its Bylaws or a resolution of its Board of Directors, and Bruce E Chapman duly
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same
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AMENDMENT
This Amendment is entered into by and between Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman,
World Wide Photo, Inc. and Bryan Whatley on this 3S day of April, 2001.
RECITALS
WHEREAS, the above-described parties entered into a document entitled, "Stock and
Asset Purchase and Sale" on or about April 5, 2001; and
WHEREAS, the parties desire to clarify certain issues that have arisen since the
execution of that document.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises herein contained, the parties
agree as follows:

1.
paragraph:

Paragraph 2.(c) is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following

c. Sale of collateral
BUYER and World Wide Photo, Inc. may elect to sell any collateral securing obligations
hereunder, but any such sale shall result in payment of SELLERS of the net proceeds of such
sale as follows:
For sale of any equipment or assets of the business purchased from SELLERS under this
Agreement, 100% of the net sale proceeds (with deductions including, buL not limited to, any
taxes that are incurred as a result of such sale) shall be promptly paid to SELLERS:
For sale of the realty, SELLERS shall be entitled to receive the entire net sale proceeds as
defined above for either lot sold for a net amount of $50,000 or less, each, but if the lots or
either of them are sold for a net sale proceeds of more than $50,000 each, SELLERS shall
make no claim upon the net sale proceeds in excess of $50,000 each. If the lots are sold
through foreclosure due to default of BUYER hereunder, SELLERS m:iy keep the entire sale
price, not to exceed the sum of the principal amount outstanding on the promissory note, plus
reasonable and necessary legal fees that would otherwise be recoverable under die terms of this
agreement
However, if such proceeds equal or exceed the amount
of the arrearage, such a sale will be conclusively deemed to cure BUYER'S default and any sale
proceeds in excess of the arrearage shall be counted as an advance payment hereunder.

2.
The parties acknowledge and agree that BUYER has not and does not rely on
any information, schedules or other representations supplied or made by Bruce Chapman to
BUYER regarding the value of equipment owned by World Wide Photo, Inc., or being sold to
BUYER under this Agreement. BUYER has inspected the equipment and has made his own

04/25/2001 14:OS FAX
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independent assessment of the value of the equipment and is purchasing World Wide Photo,
Inc. based on his own analysis of the value of the equipment owned by World Wide Photo,
Inc. and Brace Chapman.
DATED xhis i ^ d a y of April, 2001.
BUYER:

Bryan/Whattey
SELLERS:

A
SI I
A
Bruce JE, Chapman. SELLE
/\

yU/)W
Cheri Chapman, SELLER

World Wide Photo, Inc., a Utah Corporation

By: / JM

I.

&

BriicVlL* Chapman
Its: President
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Exhibit B

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES
D E M A N D FOR A R B I T R A T I O N
MEDIATION is a nonbinding process. The mediator assists the parties in working out a solution that is acceptable to them. If you
wish for the AAA to contact the other parties to ascertain whether they wish to mediate this matter, please check this box
(there is no additional administrative fee for this service).
Name of Representative (if known)
Name of Firm (if applicable)
Timothy W i l l a r d s o n , e s q .
n/a
Address
Representative's Address
10885 S. S t a t e S t r e e t
10885 S. S t a t e S t r e e t
Zip Code
City
State
Zip Code
City
State
Sandy
84070
Utah
Sandy
Utah
84070
Phone No
Fax No.
Phone No.
Fax No.
801-576-1400
801-576-1960
801-576-1960
801-576-1400
The named claimant, a party to an arbitration agreement contained in a written contract, dated
A p r i l 5, 2001
a n c j providing for arbitration under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association, hereby demands arbitration thereunder.
TO: Name

B r i a n Whatley

Is THIS A DISPUTE BETWEEN A BUSINESS AND A CONSUMER?

0

iNo

Y es

THE NATURE OF THE DISPUTE Mr. Whatley 1 s b r e a c h o f a S t o c k and A s s e t Purchase and
S a l e Agreement f o r t h e p u r c h a s e of World-Wide P h o t o , I n c o r p o r a t e d ; and Mr. Whatley T s
abandonment of t h e b u s i n e s s .
THE CLAIM OR RELIEF SOUGHT (the Amount, if Any) Damages i n t h e amount of n o t l e s s
$ 2 9 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , p l u s a t t o r n e y 1 s f e e s and c o s t s .

DOES THIS DISPUTE ARISE OUT OF AN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP?

than

D Yes £] No

TYPES OF BUSINESS
Claimant P h o t o d e v e l o p i n g / p r o c e s s i n g

Respondent

Photo

developing/processing

HEARING LOCALE REQUESTED
You are hereby notified that copies of our arbitration agreement and this demand are being filed with the American
Arbitration Association at its F r e s n o > C A
office, with a request that it commence administration of the
arbitration. Under the rules, you may file an answering statement within fifteen days after notice from the AAA.
Signature (may bg sigrfedly$a rep^sentatK

Title
Attorney

Date
December 5 ,

2002

Name of Representative
Name of Firm (if Applicable)
^faaas^f Claimant
James L / C h r i s t e n s e n
I C o r h r i d g e Baird & C h r i s t e n s e n
B ru c e Ch apman
Address (to Be Used in Connection with This Case)
Representative's Address
39 Exchange P l a c e , S u i t e 100
39 Exchange P l a c e , S u i t e 100

Zip

sat

ZipF Code
^ ,
, State
84111
Lake C i t y
Utah
Phone No.
Fax No.
Phone No.
Fax No.
801-534-0909
801-534-1948
801-534-0909
801-534-1948
TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, PLEASE SEND TWO COPIES OF THIS DEMAND AND THE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT, WITH TFIE FILING FEE AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE RULES, TO THE AAA. SEND THE
nPTHTMAT DEMAND TO THE RESPONDENT.

£& Lake

City

State

Utah

8?ft]

Jllh U
Timothy Miguel Willardson (4443)
10 8 8 5 S outh State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400

I 2o pjj '03
Q^J

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRYAN J. WHATLEY,
Plaintiff.
vs.

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' J M O T I O N S TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION AND TO DISMISS
Civil No. 020405636

Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman, James L.
Christensen, and Does I - V,
Defendants.

Judge: #5
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

COMES NOW Plaintiff by and through his attorney of record and opposes Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint, and Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration as
follows:
Disputed Material Facts

Rule 12 provides that, upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted where matters beyond the pleadings are presented, that uthe motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."
Because Defendants have elected to supply an affidavit of Mr, Chapman, their motion to dismiss
clearly falls within that provision and this motion is governed by Rule 56 As is set forth more

fully in the accompanying motion for relief under Rule 56(f), Mr. Whatley cannot fairly meet all
of the assertions of alleged fact without discover}' in this matter.
In addition, Defendant's "Introduction" contains a number of disparaging comments about Mr.
Whatley which are unsupported and which are not referenced in the "facts'* proposed.
Gratuitous disparagement is inappropriate argumentation and should be stricken. To the extent
that it is not, Mr. Whatley is entitled to discovery to determine what he is being accused of and
time to rebut the accusation,
Nevertheless, to assist the Court and parties in framing the issues in this matter, where some of
the bases of factual disputes are already known, those disputes are set forth below in numbered
paragraphs that correspond, in subject matter, to the correspondingly numbered paragraphs of
Defendants' memorandum in support of their motions.
1.

Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation. Discovery is needed.

2.

Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation. Discovery is needed.

3.

Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation. Discovery is needed.

4.

MR. WHATLEY did not initiate contact as is implied by Defendants, nor had

MR. WHATLEY communicated with anyone, prior to Mr. Chapman's solicitation, that MR.
WHATLEY had interest in purchasing World-Wide Photo. Mr. Chapman approached Mr.
Whatley in early February 2001. While MR. WHATLEY^as in Orlando at the 2001 PMA
show one of his employees gave Mr. Whatley a message that Mr. Chapman had called him, and

wanted to talk to me. The employee gave Mr. Whatley Mr. Chapman's telephone number and
MR. WHATLEY returned his call. In this initial conversation. Chapman stated that he knew
MR. WHATLEY was at the PMA show, and that before MR. WHATLEY made any significant
purchases, he wanted to let Mr. Whatley know that he was interested in selling World-Wide
Photo, and wanted to know if MR. WHATLEY was interested in meeting with him to see if
something could be worked out. (Note that (1) he knew MR. WHATLEY was in Orlando and
(2) he knew MR. WHATLEY was considering buying a large printer and processor.) MR.
WHATLEY met with Chapman soon after returning from Orlando. During this first meeting,
Chapman represented that he wanted to sell the business for $400,000.00, and that he would
finance such a sale. His justification for valuation of the business was that the value of the
equipment and assets were in excess of $400,000.00 and that the annual sales were twice that
(i.e. $800,000.00). MR. WHATLEY told him that that was interesting, but that MR.
WHATLEY wanted to look at his fmancials to see cash flows and trends. He said that he would
not show any fmancials or company operations information, because we were competitors. MR.
WHATLEY told him he was not interested, if he could not see company records/fmancials.
After this first meeting, MR. WHATLEY continued forward with his separate plans for Campus
Photo. At this time MR. WHATLEY was in the process of looking for a new, larger location
and was actually reviewing a proposed lease. The day before MR. WHATLEY was to make an
offer on a property MR. WHATLEY was considering, he received another telephone call from
Chapman asking if Mr. Wliatley had thought further about buying World-Wide Photo. Mr.
Whatley asked Chapman if he had rethought his position and would allow Mr. Wliatley to review
his business fmancials and operations. He said no, he would not show company records or

operations. Mr, Whatley simply stated that, then, he was not interested. Later, discussions were
renewed about whether there was a way to insure the company's value and cash flow without
such an examination.
5.

Mr. Whatley did not receive sales tax returns for the most recent 12 months

(relative to April 5, 2001) either before April 5, 2001, nor since, as required by paragraph 6 of
this agreement. Mr. Whatley received 12 months sales tax returns from January 2000 to
December 2000. Mr. Whatley was never given by Chapman or by Squire & Co. sales tax returns
from January 2001, February 2001 and March 2001. The documentation "on positive cash flow
for his review" that Chapman refers to was a single page letter from Squire & Co., stating that
they were not guaranteeing anything, but accompanying was a page with a six (6) line Schedule
of Payments for the Benefit of Bruce Chapman, (Copy attached.) This schedule did not show
monthly information, but was an annual average summary, for 2000. Again, this did not include
January 2001, February 2001 and March 2001. Mr. Whatley learned months later that even that
non-conforming information was falsely inflated by incorrectly including monthly loan payments
that were not to the benefit of Chapman. There was no monthly breakdown and there was no
further description of what the line items were. Mr. Whatley was not able to review these
payments to Chapman until after March 15B 2002, when Mr. Whatley received a copy of the
2000 World-Wide Photo, Inc. tax returns. These tax returns had been prepared by Squire & Co..
under the direction of Chapman. After receiving these tax returns, and seriously questioning
what had been represented in April 2001, Mr. Whatley carefully aakedJiquire & Co. for further
details of the expenses, as represented in the 2000 tax returns. By carefully asking for these
expense details in the context of review of corporate tax filings, Mr. Whatley was able, for the

first time, to get the wages, salaries and benefits, as paid to Chapman for July 2000 through
March 2001. At that point (late March through mid-April 2002), and not until this point, did Mr.
Whatley have the actual financial records from World-Wide Photo which showed that the
guaranteed representation by Chapman in paragraph 6 of the agreement that "at closing WWP
will have had a positive cash flow of at least $10,000 each and every month for the 12 calendar
months preceding closing" was false. While Mr. Whatley never received details of April 2000,
May 2000 and June 2000, it was clear that the nine (9) months July 2000 through March 2001
did not meeL this requirement. This guarantee thai the company had "generated sufficient
positive cash flow to fund wages, salaries and other benefits to SELLERS which will be
terminated on closing, of at least $10,000 each and every month" was a key element of the
STOCK AND ASSET PURCHASE AND SALE and was specifically listed in paragraph B.
Recitals. The contract further documented in footnote 1 that 'This is a material representation
because SELLERS will not show WWP fmancials to BUYER before closing, and SELLERS5
representation to BUYER (that the positive cash flow of at least $ 10,000 each month continues
to the date of closing and that SELLERS are selling all assets of the business that were necessary
to achieving the sales and cash flow represented by SELLERS to BUYER) was essential to
BUYER'S decision to purchase the business and assets/9 (Emphasis by holding and underline
added. All other emphasis is in original.)

6.

Here Chapman is stating that Mr. Whatley was ''obligated to close his purchase of

World-Wide Photo "no later than 30 days from the date of disclosure". The sum total of
''disclosure" was as Mr. Whatley represented in #5, above. Within this 30 day period, it was not
assumed, agreed or allowed for Mr Whatley to review the financial records of the business The

''disclosure" was copies of nine (9) months sales tax returns, out of a required most recent twelve
(12) months, and six (6) lines of a calendar year 2000 benefits average and summary, of a
required $10,000.00 each and every month for the most recent twelve months. If making the full
disclosure required is the key to requiring closure, there is to this date not requirement to close
because Chapmans have still not provided all of the financial records. Mr. Whatley have merely
been able to piece together sufficient information to demonstrate that Chapmans' representations
were false and should have been known by them to be false at the time they were made.
7',

No present objection,

8.

Mr. Whatley did not demand that the agreement contain the arbitration clause.

Mr. Whatley did not object to it, but Mr. Whatley did not ask for or require the referenced
arbitration clause.
9.

Chapman demanded collateral for the Agreement. Mr. Whatley signed the

documents, incorrectly prepared by Chapman and Christensen, for the Trust Deeds. Chapman
requested his personal home as collateral That demand Mr. Whatley refused.
10.

If this statement by Chapman is saying that on April 10th, 2001 they executed this

corporate resolution, this statement is false. Bruce Chapman told Mr. Whatley that there were no
such corporate minutes, and Bruce Chapman and Ceri Chapman signed a document, around May
1st, 2001, which was titled minutes of DIPJECTOR'S MEETING, dated April 24th, 2001. If this
statement #10-wer&true, there would be no reason for them to sign another document on May 1st,
2001 related to control and ownership of the business. Because Chapman had not transferred the

existing World-Wide Photo checking account #3321016945, as required in the Agreements
paragraph 3.f.5 Mr. Whatley was attempting to open a temporary business checking account.
This temporary account was opened on May 7th, 2001. After April 25th, 2001 but before May 7th,
2001 while trying to open this account at Wells Fargo, the banlc requested that Mr. Whatley give
them copies of the corporate bylaws and minutes authorizing the action. Mr. Whatley asked
Chapman for company minutes and bylaws. He provided a copy of the bylaws, but said that
there were not any minutes. By Chapman's own admission, they had not gone through the
necessary meetings and did noi have the minutes that the bank was requesting. On or about May
1st, 2001, Mr. Whatley quickly created minutes for a DIRECTOR'S MEETING, dated April 24th,
2001, which Bruce Chapman and Ceri Chapman signed. By providing the bylaws and the
referenced documents, among other things, Mr. Whatley was finally able to open the temporary
checking account on May 7th, 2001. If Chapmans had done what #10 asserts, none of that effort
would have been necessary

11.

The first part of this statement is unequivocally false. Mr. Whatley did not

inspect any of World-Wide Photo's books on April 25th, 2001. No closing documents or
statements were evei presented to me. As is stated above, the full financial disclosure required
was never made.
a. In the initial meeting in February 2001 Chapman represented that the equipment
and assets of the business, World-Wide Photo, Inc. were in excess of
$400,000.00. Again, during the meeting on March 10th, 2001, when we outlined
the "intent of the agreement" he set the purchase price of World-Wide Photo, Inc

at $400,000.00 because this was, according to Chapman's emphatic insistence,
less than the value of the equipment and assets and less than 1/2 of the past year's
annual sales. Between March 10th and April 25 th , while I was working with his
accountant, Doug Child, to determine how much of the purchase price would be
allotted to assets and how much would be considered goodwill, Child requested
the company's "book value" of the equipment and assets. In the later part of
April, before the 25th, Chapman finally provided this "book value" as being
below $250,000.00. Mi. Whatley was very surprised and found this inconsistent
to what Chapman had verbally represented. His attorney, Mr. Willardson, spoke
to Chapman's attorney, Mr. Christensen. and indicated the misrepresentation.
Mr. Whatley then received and saw the Amendment, mentioned in statement
#11 .a., for the first time on April 23rd, 2001. This amendment was to protect
Chapman from his earlier misrepresentation as to the value of the equipment and
assets. Mr. Whatley was given a cursory tour of the business and the company's
equipment on March 10tb, 2001. Neither before nor after this disagreement on
stated value of $400,000.00 and book value of $250,000.00, was Mr. Whatley
invited to inspect the company's equipment. Mr. Whatley took Chapman's
statement in the footnote ai the bottom of page 2 of the Agreement, "that
SELLERS are selling all assets of the business that were necessary to achieving
the sales and cash flow represented by SELLERS to BUYER'' to be true and
relied upon it. to his considerable detriment. The reliance was not upon the value
of the equipment, which was completely irrelevant, but upon the representation

that the equipment was sufficient to support the sales and profits represented and
warranted by Chapmans, Those representations were false and Chapmans knew
or should have known they were false when they made them.
b. Mr. Whatley agreed to a PROMISSORY NOTE in the amount of $457,500.00
was executed [$400,000,00 for the STOCK AND ASSETS of the company
(Agreement page 3, paragraph 2.a) and $57,500.00 as the "mutually agreed upon
value of the inventory" (as outlined in Agreement page 4, paragraph 3.d.)].
However, Chapman did not agree to this amount as inventory value and he was
constantly changing the amount up until Mr. Whatley finally left. As late as
March 20025 Chapman demanded payment, as outlined in a "Summary for Sale
of WWP" of $66,744.41 for the inventory. He also had added to the note
$565.05 reimbursement for Worker's Compensation payments, and $431.25 for
postage reimbursement, neither of which were ever previously discussed or
agreed upon. After this March demand, Mr. Whatley argued with Chapman that
he had agreed on $57,500.00 value for the inventory. He indicated that we had
"said'" $57,500.00, and that he thought Mi". Whatley was taking a risk because he
did not think the value of the inventory was high as $57,500.00, but it was now
more, Chapman insisted that if the value had been less than $57,500.00 he would
have adjusted the note down, but the value was higher. He would not agree that
the value of the note was $57,500.00.
c. Mr. Whatley signed a *'Utah Deed Trust'5, which was incorrectly prepared by

Chapman/Christensem against Lot 241.
d.

Mr. Whatley signed a "Utah Deed Trust", which was incorrectly prepared by
Chapman/Christensen, against Lot 242.

12.

The Agreement required Chapman "for a term of 60 days after closing, consult

with BUYER regarding any aspect of the business without additional charge. Such consulting
shall be during normal business hours and shall not exceed 20 hours in any calendar week".
(Agreement page 7, paragraph 7) A^ staled above, there never was a closing at which all of
Chapman's required performance was tendered. After the signing of the documents referenced
b}T Defendants5, Chapman continued, through April, 2002, to work on the premises and
continually attempted to renegotiate the deal. Chapman continued to remove property of the
business as if it was his On one occasion Mr. Whatley caught him on a Sunday, when the
business is closed, taking 20 rolls of Kodak film for his personal use. Upon seeing me, Chapman
said he was leaving on a vacation and didn't think Mr. Whatley would mind if he took this film.
Surprised, and not wanting to accuse him of stealing, Mr, Whatley asked that he "ring it through
or write it down3* so that we could make sure he was charged for it. Mr. Whatley doe& not know
whether he did so, however. Chapman continued to occupy what had previously been his office,
despite numerous requests that he leave. Chapman also continued to remove equipment from the
business and premises, well after April 25th, 2001. Some of the other items which Chapman took
and/or were removed included: multiple deck video editing equipment, a Pentax 6x7 copy
camera, 6 or 7 filing cabinets, a Sony video editing mirror box, an Agfa film splicing block.
Some of the items were removed as late as December 2001. When confronted, Chapman

insisted that these were his personal items and that they were ''not on a list of equipment that the
business owned". The Agreement does not include such a list. Personal items were to be
removed before April 25 th , 2001. Chapman also continued to come in and access company
confidential computers and records, without asking and without permission. On April 17th, 2002,
Chapman came into the business and indicated that he was contacting his accounts receivable.
Mr. Whatley told him that Mr. Whatley was uncomfortable with customers being contacted for
collections from two different sources. He then produced a report which he had run on March
" 18 u \ 2002. listing A/R. Mr. Whatley asked where he had obtained the report. He indicated that
he had run it on the computer, and that he regularly ran such reports. Mr. Whatley told him that
he absolutely did not have permission to use company confidential records. This computer holds
customer files, pricing, inventory, and sales. If he would just ask, we would provide such reports
for him. Mr. Whatley was very surprised that he said that he still did not see a problem with it,
and he did not say that he would not access the computer again. Throughout the entire time Mr.
Whatley was working on the business, his continued contact with Chapman was to request that
he complete the terms of the agreement and that he return items removed. He never did so.
13.

On June 22nd, 2001 Chapman and Mr. Whatley signed an ASSIGNMENT,

ASSUMPTION, CONSENT AGREEMENT with The Southland Corporation for the 547 W.
Columbia Lane store lease. The April 5th, 2001 STOCK AND ASSET PURCHASE AND SALE
agreement explicitly indicated on page 5, paragraph 4 that "the two pieces of real property...
-have-problems with the leases. The Provo location (547 W. Columbia Lane) is leased to Bruce
Chapman personally, and not to WWP, under a written lease from Southland Corporation that
prevents assignments or subleases, ... Therefore, the sale contemplated hereunder is made

expressly contingent upon (1) obtaining from the Southland Corporation, a written acceptance
and continuation of the lease in favor of WWP in form and content satisfactory to BUYER..."
Southland Corporation did not assign the lease to WWP, but instead insisted, according to
Chapman, that it be in an individual's name.
14.

This statement is irrelevant It makes no difference if Mr. Whatley signed a lease.

Mr. Whatley's persona] obligations to others are not at issue. Even if Defendants had alleged
that the lease was done on behalf of the ostensible corporation, such a lease is unrelated to the
supposed "'agreement" between Defendants and Plaintiff The statement as made, is false,
however.
15.

Chapmansf characterization of the letter is, at least, misleading. The letter clearly

states that Chapmans never had performed the items necessary to close, and that the
representations whose truth was a condition precedent to closing were false. The letter also
contains a long list of items for which as much as 45 WEEKS of cure notice had been given but
which had been ignored. The conclusion of that letter states:
In short, the business is not as represented, the sellers have not done any of the
material items that are necessary to the sale being concluded and effected,
and Mr, Chapman has continued to treat the business as his own.
My client has worked diligently and zealously attempting to make the
proposed sale work. However, the anniversary of thai attempt is almost upon us
and none of the problems listed above have been addressed in any way by
Mr. Chapman in spite of all of those items having been brought to Mr.
Chapman's attention previously. The failure of the ostensible sellers to even
make a good faith effort to perform has damaged my client considerably. He has
expended a year of his time ... working to try and overcome the obstacles

that have been erected by the putative sellers. The value of that lost time is on
the order of $70,000.00, or more. In addition, because he has been expending 70
to 80 hours a week trying to overcome the problems created by the putative
sellers, he has been unable to develop his own business as he otherwise would
have done. We estimate that the loss of income both presently and in the future as
a result of that is m the six figure range. My client has personally advanced funds
to World-Wide Photo m the amount of $27,000.00, not including property that my
client has purchased for himself that World-Wide Photo has been allowed to use.
The rental value of that equipment is approximately $6,000.
In light of the above and foregoing this letter constitutes a demand that
Mr. and Mrs. Chapman execute a document acknowledging that the contract
above is void, and releasing Mr. Whatiey and his property from ail liability and
refunding Mr. Whatiey the amounts paid out of pocket ($33,000.00). The
foregoing demand actually constitutes an offer of settlement. If that demand is
not complied with we will have no choice but to go forward with litigation
seeldng damages which we presently estimate to be between $250,000.00 and
$1,000,000.00. Please respond to this letter in writing no later than 4:00 p.m.
MDT, April 25, 2002. Please be advised that my client is not continuing to
pour money into your client's business and will not be paying any more bills,
including payroll. Time is therefore of the essence. In order to constitute
timely response the letter needs to be received in my office by the deadline stated.
Receipt by fax will be considered sufficient.
16.

This is also false as is shown immediately above.

17.

Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation. Discovery is needed.

18.

Payments were made as contemplated by the "agreement" for April 2002.

According to promissory note. ''Payments made within five days before or after the first of each
month shall be considered neither late nor early..." so Mr. Whatiey could not have been
considered to having "stopped making his monthly payments" until after May 6th, 2002. In
addition, we are informed and believe that Mr. Chapman is talcing $5,000 or more per month

from the business and has done so since Mr, Whatley left. Discover)7 is needed on this matter.
19.

At the time of the alleged notice to cure, no default had occurred. Furthermore, as

is alleged above, it appears that Mr. Chapman is still getting his money so that no default has
subsequently occurred. Discovery is needed.
20.

Defendants5 statement is again, a significant distortion of the truth, this time by

omission. The letter stated, among other things, "Your assertion that no cure is necessary
eonsiiiuies an anticipatory repudiation of the obligation to cure which obviates the need for us to
wait the 45 days." As is pointed out above, Chapman had already had the 45 days with weeks or
months to spare. The statement was merely that if there were any umioticed items in the list, that
Christensen's anticipatory breach eliminated the need to give such notice.
21.

The assertion that no "accounting" has been provided is false on at least three

levels. First, Mr. Chapman never left the business and regularly reviewed its fmancial records
during the entire time as is discussed above. Second, Mr. Whatley did provide financial
information pursuant to Christensen's request and even updated the same Third, all of the
financial records related to the company, except for the temporary checldng account checkbook
and statements, were left with the company when Mr. Whatley left.
22-

The Christensen letter referenced asserts that all matters are cured, but in fact the

"cure" was mostly argument, the key documents were not actually provided, and the false
representations were not made true. While Defendants do consistently call-b-lack-white, and the
referenced letter did so, the black was still black.

23.

The statement as made is true. The implications which Defendants are trying to

make, however, are false.
24.

While it is true that a complaint was filed, the filing was in no way in response to

the arbitration filing. As is stated above, the suit was contemplated since April, and Defendants
were given notice of that intention, Mr. Christensen was asked on at least two occasions if he
would accept service of process. Instead of answering that request, Defendants filed their
arbitration demand in an attempt to trump the impending lawsuit.
25.

The records of the state of Utah show that the registered office for World-Wide

Imaging, part of Defendants' scheme to defraud Mr. Whatley, is the office of Mr. Christensen.
(See attached.) Mr. Christensen has been the prime mover in all of the activities of Defendants.
Discovery is needed, however, on the precise extent of his involvement.
26.

Defendants" statement of how the documents came into existence is again

distorted. After much discussion with Mr. Chapman, with every "agreement" changing at every
meeting, Mr. Whatley finally recounted to Mr. Willardson what the issues and what Mr. Whatley
thought we had agreed upon and asked him to reduce that to writing. He did so and Mr. Whatley
presented the result to Chapman. Chapman said that it was completely unacceptable and that he
would have his own lawyer write the contract. From then on Mr, Christensen was responsible
for the drafting. Mr, Christensen requested, and received, the word processing document that
Mr. Willardson generated. Mr. Christensen did choose to use a lot of what was originally
written, but it was Mr. Christensen, wilting on behalf of defendants, who actually had the
responsibility for all drafting There were several revisions of the document, including the final

one, that Mr. Willardson did not even see before they were signed and Mr. Willardson did not
receive a copy of the final document until shortly before this litigation was filed.
27.

This is false or misleading for the same reasons stated above. Christensen may

not have met with or spoken with Mr. Whatley directly, but he did the drafting and it was his
changes that Chapman discussed with Mr. Whatley and insisted upon implementing.
As can be readily seen, the *'facts" asserted without evidence by Mr. Chapman's affidavit, are
disputed and that dispute is supported by documentary evidence.
Motion to Compel Arbitration

The motion is moot, because plaintiff is already participating in arbitration of all matters
covered by the arbitration agreement

1. Defendants' motion seeks to have this court order plaintiff to participate in an
arbitration proceeding commenced by Defendants. Plaintiff is so paiticipating. Plaintiff and his
counsel have filed all required documents in that action, including without limitation, selection
of arbitrators and disclosure of involved parties (for conflict checks). Plaintiffs counsel has
participaxed with Defendant Christensen in a telephone conference on how the arbitration is to be
managed. Defendants' assertion that plaintiff is not participating in arbitration is, at least,
grossly misleading.]

See affidavits of Bryan Whatley and Timothy Miguel Willardson.

The arbitration clause is inapplicable to the matters plead in the complaint

2. Paragraph 9.m. of the agreement states, in its entirety:
In the event of a dispute UNDER this agreement, the parties agree that any
action brought shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the
rules of the American Arbitration Association. Such arbitration need not be
conducted by the American Arbitration Association, even though it would follow
their rules. Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County, Utah, and
not elsewhere. (Emphasis added.)
3. The subject complaint contains nine separate counts. Those are: 1) Void
Contract/Rescission, 2) Breach of Contract, 3) Fraud (both contractual and securities fraud), 4)
Breach of Fiduciary Duties, 5) Conversion/Theft, 6) Slander of Title, 7) Defamation, 8) Tortious
Interference with Business, and 9) Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (anti-hacking statute).
4. The first count alleges that the contract is a nullity. Therefore that matter is not a
"dispute UNDER" the agreement.
5. The second count alleges that the contract has been breached. Therefore, under the
doctrine of United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), and myriad other cases is
that a breach of contract does not "arise under" a contract. Logically, since a contract is broken
by the breach, the dispute is, definitional]y, about something not within, or "under" the contract.
6. The third count alleges both pre-contractual and extra-contractual fraud. Since the
contract contains no provisions authorizing fraud, and since fraud renders the contract void or
voidable, this is not a matter uunder"TKe~cohtract.
7. Similarly, the fourth count, Breach of Fiduciary Duties, camiot be "under" the

contract because there is no authorization to breach such duties contained therein.
8. The contract is not one that authorizes conversion or theft of property and therefore
the fifth count cannot be said to 'arise under5 the contract. All of the tort claims; fraud,
conversion, theft, slander of title, defamation, tortious interference; are, by their nature as tort
claims, unavoidably non-contractual. Therefore, counts six through nine cannot be covered by
the arbitration clause.
9. Count nine, Violation of 18 U.S;C. §_1030 (anti-hacking statute) alleges that a Federal
Crime has been committed. That is also a tort claim, but it should be clear even to defendants
that a claim which arises under a Federal criminal statute is not one which 'arises under' the
contract.

The Utah Arbitration Act is Expressly not Applicable to Cases Involving Fraud
and other issues here.

10. Defendants cite the Utah Arbitration Act, but apparently did not bother to read it.
UCA % 78-3 la-3 specifically and expressly says that a "written agreement to submit any existing
or future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds
existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provide din the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.'5 (Emphasis added.)
11. As is stated above, fraud of two different-types is alleged in the complaint. The
arbitration agreement therefore cannot be enforced.

12. The counts alleging breach, voidness of contract and rescission all constitute bases, at
law and/or equity7, for not enforcing that portion of the agreement, even if the Act itself did not
specifically state that allegations of fraud make it non-enforceable.

Bargaining for Arbitration is Irrelevant

13. Defendants' argumentative strategy appears to have been to find a case whose
statements and holding they liked and then to build an argument to fit. Unfortunately, the case is
non-binding precedent (10 1 Circuit, nut Utah), and nont of the issues in that case are involved
here.
14. As is discussed above, Mr. Whatley is appropriate for Mr. Chapman's claim and is
cooperating in that arbitration fully. However, Mr. Whatley's position is that the "contract" is
void or must be rescinded so that there is no binding agreement to arbitrate, and even if there
were, none of Mr. Whatley5 s nine counts are within the scope of the arbitration clause.
15. Pacific Development v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, 23 P.3d 1035, 10384040 (Utah 2001)
contains the following holding:
f 9
We have previously held that only written arbitration agreements are
enforceable under the Act. See Jenkins v. Peraval, 962 P.2d 796, 799-800 (Utah
1998).[fn4] Further, the written agreement defines the scope of the
arbitrator's authority. "An arbitration award purporting to resolve
questions beyond [the] jurisdictional boundary [of the agreement] is not
valid. For a court to find that an arbitrator has exceeded his or her delegated
authority, the court must deterrmne^thatrthe arbitrator's award covers areas not
contemplated by the submission agreement,'" Intermountam Power v. Union
Pacific R.R., 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998) (quoting Buzas Baseball 925 P.2d at

949) As noted above, the arbitration agreement in this case limited the
arbitrator's authority to issuing an award for the Plat C dispute and also
specifically precluded an award for the Plat B dispute. The arbitrator
nevertheless issued an award for both plats. Therefore, the arbitrator
exceeded his delegated authority unless the agreement was modified to allow
an award for Plat B.
f 13 The scope of the arbitration is a governing standard that is
fundamental to the expectations of the parties to the arbitration The parties must
know the boundaries of the subject matter of the dispute submitted and the
potential liabilities flowing therefrom befoie they are able to intelligently waive
their rights to submit their disputes to formal litigation And because the
authority of the arbitrator derives from the arbitration agreement itself, see
Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 949, it follows that the scope of an agreement to
arbitrate cannot be modified except by proper concurrence of the parties to
the arbitration.
f 14 The court of appeals concluded that a written arbitration agreement
may be implicitly modified merely by the parties' actions m bringing evidence of
matters outside the scope of the agreement We disagree The decision of the
court of appeals is contrary to the statutory criteria governing arbitration and to
our decisions construing those criteria Where the statute and our case law have
held that arbitration agreements must be in writing, the preference for an
explicit expression of the intent of the parties regarding the scope of
arbitration is well-established. To allow modification of an express written
agreement by less than a similarly explicit intent would simply circumvent
the statutory requirements and the policies they vindicate. In this case, no
express written agreement to modify the scope of the arbitration has been
alleged, let alone proven We therefore reverse and hold that the arbitrator
exceeded the authority granted to him when he issued an award foi Plat B
(Emphasis added,)
16 Even though both parties presented evidence on the mattei outside the scope of the
arbitration agreement, the Utah Supreme Court held thatihejdefiision was void It is clear that
the Supreme Court will not countenance ustietching" arbitration clauses beyond their actual
woids

Waiver of Arbitration

is Irrelevant

17. Since there is no agreement to arbitrate matters that do not arise "under55 the contract,
and since none of the matters complained of here are "under55 the contract, as is discussed above,
Defendant's entire argument about "waiver55 is a straw man and must be ignored.

Substantial Participation
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in Litigation is Irrelevant

Defendants are arguing facts and issues that have nothing to do with this case.

Prejudice by Litigation is Irrelevant

19.

Defendants are arguing facts and issues that have nothing to do with this case.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is Improper in Form, Inadequate as to Substance, and
Premature as to Timing
2Q. Defendants5 motion is styled as one under 12(b)(6), but by adding Mr. Chapman's
affidavit they have made it a Summary Judgment motion. A motion for summary judgment must
be supported by admissible evidence. (URCP 56(e)). It is clear that Mr. Chapman's statements
about what Mr. Chiistensen said are hearsay and therefore not admissible. In addition, although
many documents are referenced, and the Court is asked to accept Defendants5 representations
about them, only the arbitration demand, the "contract"5 and the "amendment55 are actually
provided. All of the assertions about other documents are therefore inadmissible, absent a
showing that the)7 are unavoidably unavailable are therefore also inadmissible.

21. As is shown above, while plaintiff has facts related to many matters, there are
numerous material matters about which discovery must be had before summary judgment can be
appropriately decided.
22. Defendant's motion is therefore inappropriate and must be stayed if it is not denied.

Mr. Whatley does have a claim against Mr. Christensen because Mr. Christensen
is the mastermind behind the Chapman's fraudulent and abusive acts.

23. Defendants acknowledges (although mostly in footnotes) that allegations related to
Christensen exist in complaint paragraphs 49, 50, 51, 52, 56, 58, and 59. In fact, allegations
concerning Mr. Christensen exist in paragraphs 14, 18, 25, 37, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56-60, 62,
65-68, 75, 76, 80 and 84. Those allegations are in counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 6. 7, and 8. In addition, each
count references every allegation of every other count and section of the complaint.
Required Fraud Allegation:

Made in Complaint:

(1) that a representation was made

49, 50, 52, 56,

(2) concerning a presently existing material

50, 52, 56

fact
(3) which was false and

18,52,56

(4) which the representor either
(a) knew to be false or

18,56

(b) made recklessly, knowing that there was

56

insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representation.
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party

18, 56, contract footnote 1, appended to

to act upon it and

complaint and referenced therein.

(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and

13,20,72

in ignorance of its falsity,
13, 20, 72, contract footnote 1, appended to

(7) did in fact rely upon it

complaint and referenced therein.
(8) and was thereby induced to act

13,20,72

(9) to that party's injury and damage.

60

24. As is shown, all of the elements of the prima facie case for fraud have been alleged
against Mr. Christensen.
25. Defendants5 brief argues that an attorney cannot be held liable for his actions on
behalf of his client. Unfortimately for them, that is a false statement. The quote from their own
source, 7 Ana. Jur. 2d5 Attorneys at Law y 249 says, "If an attorney is actuated by malicious
motives or shares the illegal motives of his or her client, the attorney may be personally liable
with the client for damage suffered by a third person as a result of the attorney's action."
Paragraph 68 of the complaint specifically alleges that Mr. Christensen is actively working to
injure the business

That is an allegation, incorporated by reference in all other parts of the

. m i .

complaint, that Mr. Cliristensen has the malicious motive to injure the business and Mr. Whatley.
Furthermore, several of the paragraphs allege that Mr. Christensen assisted in the fraud and bad
actions of the other named defendants.
26. Even Defendants5 own authority does not say that being an attorney baptizes you
from torts you commit. The quoted authority merely says that an attorney's duty under the
cannons of ethics do not create an independent liability if no conventional tort can be alleged.
Here, several conventional torts have been alleged. The only one attacked directly by
Defendants' memorandum isfraud,which is shown above to have been plead.
27. Defendants do not argue that sufficient allegations have not been made as to the other
seven counts involving Mr. Christensen so those counts must stay.

The "cure" provision of the contract cannot possibly apply to eight of the nine
counts in the complaint, and Chapmans were given months to cure the curable
breaches.

28. "Cure" is a contractual concept. Seven of the nine counts in the complaint are torts.
The concept of "cure" is meaningless in that context. Those counts cannot, therefore, be
dismissed on the basis of Defendants' motion and memorandum.
29. The remaining two counts are voidness/rescission of the contract and breach. If the
contract is breach, or if the conditions for rescission exist, that cannot be cured. There is a fatal
defect in contract formation that cannot be retroactively smoothed over, Any contract made

• 109-

would be a new one and courts will not make contracts that do not exist for parties.
30. Therefore, the "cure" argument can only be relevant to the 'breach5 count. As is
discussed above, notice and opportunity to cure were given. Even if notice had not been given,
defendants' letter stating that no cure was necessary was an anticipatory repudiation, eliminating
that requirement.

Summary and

Conclusion

31. Defendants have made a significant effort to throw sufficient negative matter into the
air that the issues and legal standards will be obscured, in the hope of benefiting from injustice.
While that is consistent with Defendants' conduct throughout, it is not a basis for granting the
relief they request.

32. The Rules of Procedure, as well as the substantive law, prevent the result that
Defendants' are requesting.

DATED: Thursday, January 23, 2003.

Timothy Miguel Willardson
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Timothy Miguel Willardson (4443:
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone (801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRYAN J WHATLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs

MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER RULE
56(F)
CIVIL NO 020405636

Bruce E Chapman, Cen Chapman, James L
Chiislensen, and Does I - V,
Defendants

JUDGE #5
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

COMES NOW the Defendant pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and moves the Court for an order continuing the time to resolve Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
until thirty (30) days aftei discovery is completed
In support of this Motion Defendant shows the Court
1,

Plaintiffs motion to dismiss urges the Court to find certain facts Plaintiff has

shown by affidavit that while some of the facts necessary to lebut Defendants' assertions are m
plaintiff's possession, that some are incomplete and some cannot be answered without discovery
2

The probable facts not available go directly to the contentions of plaintiffs motion

to dismiss and would defeat that motion eithei by establishing materia] controverted facts or by
showing that defendant Spencer is entitled to judgment as a mattej of law
3

Defendant has taken all possible steps to obtain these facts,

4

Additional time will enable Defendant to rebut Plaintiffs buiden that there is no set

of facts that will entitle defendant to pievail.

In light of the above, Defendant respectfully request the Court to issue the order descnbed
above
DATED Thursday, January 23, 2003

Timothy Miguel Willaroson
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Timothy Miguel Willardson (4443)
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN WHATLEY

BRYAN J. WHATLEY,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 0204Q5636
VS.

Judge; #5
Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman, James L.
Christensen, and Does I - V,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
:ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH

)

BRYAN WHATLEY, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1. Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation. Discovery is needed.
2. Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation. Discovery is needed.
3.

Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation, Discovery is needed.

4. I did not initiate contact as is imphed by Defendants, nor had I communicated with
anyone, prior to Mr. Chapman's solicitation-rthat I had interest in purchasing World-Wide Photo.
Mr. Chapman approached me in early Februaiy 2001. Wliile I was in Orlando at the 2001 PMA

show one of my employees gave me a message that Mr. Chapman had called him, and wanted to
talk to me. The employee gave me Mr. Chapman's telephone number and I returned his call. In
this initial conversation, Chapman stated that he knew I was at the PMA show, and that before I
made any significant purchases, he wanted to let me know that he was interested in selling
World-Wide Photo, and wanted to know if I was interested in meeting with him to see if
something could be worked out. (Note that (1) he knew I was in Orlando and (2) he knew I was
considering buying a large printer and processor,) I met with Chapman soon after returning from
Orlando. During this first meeiing^Chapman represented that he wanted to sell the business for
$400,000.00, and that he would finance such a sale. His justification for valuation of the
business was that the value of the equipment and assets were in excess of $400,000.00 and that
the annual sales were twice that (i.e. $800,000.00) I told him that that was interesting, but that I
wanted to look at his fmaneials to see cash flows and trends. He said that he would not show any
fmaneials or company operations information, because we were competitors. I told him I was
not interested, if I could not see company records/financials. After this first meeting, I continued
forward with my separate plans for Campus Photo. At this time I was in the process of looking
for a new, larger location and was actually reviewing a proposed lease. The day before I was to
make an offer on a property I was considering, I received another telephone call from Chapman
asking if I had thought further about buying World-Wide Photo. I asked Chapman if he had
rethought his position and would allow me to review his business fmaneials and operations. He
said no, he would not show company records or operations. I simply stated that, then, I was not
interested. Later, discussions were renewed about whether there was a way to insure the
company's value and cash flow without such an examination.
2

5. I did not receive sales tax returns for the most recent 12 months (relative to April 5,
2001) either before April 5, 2001, nor since, as required by paragraph 6 of this agreement. I
received 12 months sales tax returns from January 2000 to December 2000 I was never given
by Chapman or by Squire & Co. sales tax returns from January 2001, February 2001 and March
2001. The documentation "on positive cash flow for his review" that Chapman refers to was a
single page letter from Squire & Co., stating that they were not guaranteeing anything, but
accompanying was a page with a six (6) line Schedule of Payments for the Benefit of Bruce
Chapman. (Copy attached.) This schedule did not show monthly information, but was an annual
average summary, for 2000. Again, this did not include January 2001, February 2001 and March
2001. I learned months later that even that non-conforming information was falsely inflated by
incorrectly including monthly loan payments that were not to the benefit of Chapman. There
was no monthly breakdown and there was no further description of what the line items were. I
was not able to review these paymenxs to Chapman until after March 15, 2002, when I received a
copy of the 2000 World-Wide Photo, Inc. tax returns. These tax returns had been prepared by
Squire & Co., under the direction of Chapman. After receiving these tax returns, and seriously
questioning what had been represented in April 2001,1 carefully asked Squire & Co. for further
details of the expenses, as represented in the 2000 tax returns. By carefully asking for these
expense details in the context of review of corporate tax filings, I was able, for the first time, to
get the wages, salaries and benefits, as paid to Chapman for July 2000 through March 2001. At
that point (late March through mid-April 2002), and not until this point, did I have the actual
financial records from World-Wide Photo which showed that the guaranteed representation by
Chapman in paragraph 6 of the agreement that

"at closing WWP will have had a positive cash
3

flow of at least $1 Q?0Q0 each and every month for the 12 calendar months preceding closing"
was false. While I never received details of April 2000, May 2000 and June 2000, it was clear
that the nine (9) months July 2000 through March 2001 did not meet this requirement. This
guarantee that the company had "generated sufficient positive cash flow to fund wages, salaries
and other benefits to SELLERS which will be terminated on closing, of at least $10,000 each and
every month" was a key element of the STOCK AND ASSET PURCHASE AND SALE and
was specifically listed in paragraph B. Recitals. The contract further documented in footnote 1
that "This is a material-representation because SELLERS will not show WWP financials to
BUYER before closing, and SELLERS' representaiion to BUYER (that the positive cash flov/ of
at least $10.000 enph mtmth continues to the date of closing and that SELLERS are selling all
assets of the business that were necessary to achieving the sales and cash flow represented by
SELLERS to BUYER) was essential to BUYER'S decision to purchase the business and assets."
(Emphasis by holding and underline added. All other emphasis is in original.)
6. Here Chapman is stating that I was "obligated to close his purchase of World-Wide
Photo "no later than 30 days from the date of disclosure". The sum total of "disclosure" was as I
represented in #5, above. Within this 30 daj period, it was not assumed, agreed or allowed for
me to review the financial records of the business. The ''disclosure55 was copies of nine (9)
months sales tax returns, out of a required most recent twelve (12) months, and six (6) lines of a
calendar year 2000 benefits average and summary, of a required $10,000,00 each and every
-month for the most recent twelve months. If making the full disclosure required is the key to
requiring closure, there is to this date not requirement to close because Chapmans have still not
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provided all of the financial records. I have merely been able to piece together sufficient
information to demonstrate that Chapmans5 representations were false and should have been
known by them to be false at the time they were made.
7. No present objection,
8. I did not demand that the agreement contain the arbitration clause. I did not object to
it, but I did not ask for or require the referenced arbitration clause.
9. Chapman demanded collateral for the Agreement. I signed the documents,
incorrectly prepared by Chapman and Christensen, for the Trust Deeds. Chapman requested my
personal home as collateral That demand I refused.
10. If this statement by Chapman is saying that on April 10th, 2001 they executed this
corporate resolution, this statement is false. Bruce Chapman told me that there were no such
corporate minutes, and Bruce Chapman and Ceri Chapman signed a document, around May 1st,
2001, which was titled minutes of DIRECTOR'S MEETING, dated April 24th, 2001. If this
statement #10 were true, there would be no reason for them to sign another document on May lsl?
2001 related to control and ownership of the business. Because Chapman had not transferred the
existing World-Wide Photo checking account #3321016945, as required in the Agreements
paragraph 3.f.? I was attempting to open a temporary business checking account. This temporary
account was opened on May f\ 2001. After April 25th. 2001 but before May 7th, 2001 while
trying to open this-aeseuni at Wells Fargo, the bank requested that I give them copies of the
corporate bylaws and minutes authorizing the action. 1 asked Chapman for company minutes
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and bylaws. He provided a copy of the bylaws, but said that there were not any minutes. By
Chapman's own admission, they had not gone through the necessary meetings and did not have
the minutes that the bank was requesting. On or about May 1st, 2001,1 quickly created minutes
for a DIRECTOR'S MEETING, dated April 24th, 2001, which Bruce Chapman and Ceri
Chapman signed. By providing the bylaws and the referenced documents, among other things, I
was finally able to open the temporary checking account on May 7lh, 2001. If Chapmans had
done what #10 asserts, none of that effort would have been necessary
11, The first part of this statement is unequivocally false. I did not inspect any of WorldWide Photo's books on April 25th, 2001. No closing documents or statements were ever
presented to me. As is stated above, the full financial disclosure required was never made.
12. In the initial meeting in February 2001 Chapman represented that the equipment and
assets of the business, World-Wide Photo, Inc. were in excess of $400,000.00. Again, during the
meeting on March 10th, 2001, when we outlined the ^intent of the agreement" he set the purchase
price of World-Wide Photo, Inc. at $400,000,00 because this was, according to Chapman's
emphatic insistence, less than the value of the equipment and assets and less than 1/2 of the past
year's annual sales. Between March 10th and April 25th, while I was working with my
accountant, Doug Child, to determine how much of the purchase price would be allotted to assets
and how much would be considered goodwill, Child requested the company's "book value5' of
the equipment and assets. In the later part of April, before the 25th, Chapman finally provided
this "book v a l u e r s being below $250,000.00. I was very surprised and found this inconsistent
to what Chapman had verbally represented. My attorney, Mr. Willardson, spoke to Chapman's
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attorney, Mr. Christensen, and indicated the misrepresentation. I then received and saw the
Amendment, mentioned in statement #1 i .at, for the first time on April 23rd, 2001. This
amendment was to protect Chapman from his earlier misrepresentation as to the value of the
equipment and assets, I was given a cursory tour of the business and the company's equipment
on March 10th, 2001. Neither before nor after this disagreement on stated value of $400,000.00
and book value of $250,000.00, was i invited to inspect the company's equipment. I took
Chapman's statement in the footnote at the bottom of page 2 of the Agreement, "that SELLERS
are selling all assets of the business thai were necessary to achieving the sales and cash flow
represented by SELLERS to BUYER'5 to be true and relied upon it, to my considerable
detriment. The reliance was not upon the value of the equipment, which was completely
irrelevant, but upon the representation that the equipment was sufficient to support the sales and
profits represented and warranted by Chapmans. Those representations were false and
Chapmans knew or should have known they were false when they made them.
13. 1 agreed to a PROMISSORY NOTE in the amount of $457,500.00 was executed
[$400,000.00 for the STOCK AND ASSETS of the company (Agreement page 3, paragraph 2.a)
and $57,500.00 as the ''mutually agreed upon value of the inventory" (as outlined in Agreement
page 4, paragraph 3.d.)]. However, Chapman did not agree to this amount as inventor}7 value
and he was constantly changing the amount up until I fmall}7 left. As late as March 2002,
Chapman demanded payment, as outlined in a "Summary for Sale of WW?'* of $66,744.41 for
the inventory.-He-also had added to the note $565.05 reimbursement for Worker's
Compensation payments, and $431.25 for postage reimbursement, neither of which were ever
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previously discussed or agreed upon. After this March demand, I argued with Chapman that he
had agreed on $57,500.00 value for the inventory. He indicated that we had "said" $57,500.00,
and that he thought I was taking a risk because he did not think the value of the inventoiy was
high as $57,500.00, but it was now more. Chapman insisted that if the value had been less than
$57,500.00 he would have adjusted the note down, but the value was higher. He would not agree
that the value of the note was $57,500.00.
14. I signed a "Utah Deed Trust", which was incorrectly prepared by
Chapman/Christensen, against Lot 241.
15. I signed a "Utah Deed Trust", which was incorrectly prepared by
Chapman/Christensen, against Lot 242.
16. The Agreement required Chapman "for a term of 60 days after closing, consult with
BUYER regarding any aspect of the business without additional charge. Such consulting shall
be during normal business hours and shall not exceed 20 hours in any calendar week".
(Agreement page 7, paragraph 7) As stated above, there never was a closing at which all of
Chapman's required performance was tendered. After the signing of the documents referenced
by Defendants5, Chapman continued, through April, 2002, to work on the premises and
continually attempted to renegotiate the deal. Chapman continued to remove property of the
business as if it was his. On one occasion I caught him on a Sunday, when the business is
closed, taking 20 rolls of Kodak film for his personal use. Upon seeing me, Chapman said he
was leaving on a vacation and didn't think I would mind if he took this film. Surprised, and not

8

wanting to accuse him of stealing. I asked that he "ring it through or write it down55 so that we
could make sure he was charged for it. I don't know whether he did so, however, Chapman
continued to occupy what had previously been his office, despite numerous requests that he
leave. Chapman also continued to remove equipment from the business and premises, well after
April 25th, 2001. Some of the other items which Chapman took and/or were removed included:
multiple deck video editing equipment, a Pentax 6x7 copy camera, 6 or 7 filing cabinets, a Sony
video editing mirror box, an Agfa film splicing block. Some of the items were removed as late
as December 2001. When confronted, Chapman insisted that these were his personal items and
that they were "not on a list of equipment that the business owned". The Agreement does not
include such a list. Personal items were to be removed before April 25lh. 2001. Chapman also
continued to come in and access company confidential computers and records, without asking
and without permission. On April 17th, 2002, Chapman came into the business and indicated that
he was contacting his accounts receivable. I told him that I was uncomfortable with customers
being contacted for collections from two different sources. He then produced a report which he
had run on March 18th, 2002. listing A/R. I asked where he had obtained the report. He
indicated that he had run it on the computer, and that he regularly ran such reports. I told him
that he absolutely did not have permission to use company confidential records. This computer
holds customer files, pricing, inventory, and sales. If he would just ask, we would provide such
reports for him. I was very surprised that he said that he still did not see a problem with it, and
he did not say that he would not access the computer again. Throughout the entire time I was
working on the business, my continued contact with Chapman was to request that he complete
the terms of the agreement and that he return

items removed. He never did so.
9

17. On June 22nd, 2001 Chapman and I signed an ASSIGNMENT, ASSUMPTION,
CONSENT AGREEMENT with The Southland Corporation for the 547 W. Columbia Lane store
lease. The April 5th, 2001 STOCK AND ASSET PURCHASE AND SALE agreement explicitly
indicated on page 5, paragraph 4 that "the two pieces of real property... have problems with the
leases. The Provo location (547 W. Columbia Lane) is leased to Bruce Chapman personally, and
not to WWP, under a written lease from Southland Corporation that prevents assignments or
subleases. .. .Therefore, the sale contemplated hereunder is made expressly contingent upon (1)
obtaining from the Southland Corporation, a written acceptance and continuation of the lease in
favor of WWP in form and content satisfactory to BUYER,.." Southland Corporation did not
assign the lease to WWP, but instead insisted, according to Chapman, that it be in an individual's
name.
18. This statement is irrelevant. It makes no difference if I signed a lease. My personal
obligations to others are not at issue. Even if Defendants had alleged that the lease was done on
behalf of the ostensible corporation, such a lease is unrelated to the supposed "agreement"
between Defendants and Plaintiff. The statement as made, is false, however.
19. Chapmans' characterization of the letter is, at least, misleading. The letter clearly
states that Chapmans never had performed the items necessary to close, and that the
representations whose truth was a condition precedent to closing were false. The letter also
contains a long list of items for which as much as 45 WEEKS of cure notice had been given but
which had been ignored. The conclusion of that letter states;
In short, the business is not as represented, the sellers have not done any of the
10

material items that are necessary to the sale being concluded and effected,
and Mr. Chapman has continued to treat the business as his own.
My client has worked diligently and zealously attempting to make the
proposed sale work. However, the anniversary of that attempt is almost upon us
and none of the problems listed above have been addressed in any way by
Mr. Chapman in spite of all of those items having been brought to Mr.
Chapman's attention previously. The failure of the ostensible sellers to even
make a good faith effort to perform has damaged my client considerably. He has
expended a year of his time ,.. working to try and overcome the obstacles
that have been erected by the putative sellers. The value of that lost time is on
the order of $70,000.00, or more. In addition, because he has been expending 70
to 80 hours a week trying to overcome the problems created by the putative
sellers, he has been unable to develop his own business as he otherwise would
have done. We estimate that the loss of income both presently and m the future as
a result of that is in the six figure range. My client has personally advanced funds
to World-Wide Photo in the amount of $27,000.00, not including property that my
client has purchased for himself that World-Wide Photo has been allowed to use.
The rental value of that equipment is approximately $6,000.
In light of the above and foregoing this letter constitutes a demand that
Mi", and Mrs. Chapman execute a document acknowledging that the contract
above is void, and releasing Mr. Whatley and his property from all liability and
refunding Mr. Whatley the amounts paid out of pocket ($33,000.00). The
foregoing demand actually constitutes an offer of settlement. If that demand is
not complied with we will have no choice but to go forward with litigation
seeking damages which we presently estimate to be between $250,000.00 and
$1,000,000.00. Please respond to this letter in writing no later than 4:00 p.m.
MDT, April 25, 2002. Please be advised that my client is not continuing to
pour money into your client's business and will not be paying any more bills,
including payroll. Time is therefore of the essence. In order to constitute
timely response the letter needs to be received m my office by the deadline stated.
Receipt by fax will be considered sufficient,
20. This is also false as is shown immediately above.
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21. Plaintiff has no knowledge of this allegation Discovery is needed.
22. Payments were made as contemplated by the "agreement" for April 2002. According
to promissory note, "Payments made within five days before or after the first of each month shall
be considered neither late nor early..." so J could not have been considered to having ^stopped
making his (my) monthly payments" until after May 6th, 2002. In addition, we are informed and
believe that Mr. Chapman is taking $5,000 or more per month from the business and has done so
since I left. Discovery is needed on this matter.
23. At the time of the alleged notice to cure, no default had occurred. Furthermore, as is
alleged above, it appears that Mr, Chapman is still getting his money so that no default has
subsequently occurred. Discovery is needed.
24. Defendants' statement is again, a significant distortion of the truth, this time by
omission. The letter stated, among other things, "Your assertion that no cure is necessary
constitutes an anticipatory repudiation of the obligation to cure which obviates the need for us to
wait the 45 days." As is pointed out above, Chapman had already had the 45 days with weeks or
months to spare. The statement was merely that if there were any unnoticed items in the list, that
Christensen's anticipatory7 breach eliminated the need to give such notice.
25. The assertion that no ^accounting" has been provided is false on at least three levels.
First, Mr. Chapman never left the business and regularly reviewed us financial records during the
entire time as is discussed above. Second. I dlffprovide financial information pursuant-to—
Christensen's request and even updated the same. Third, all of the financial records related to the
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company, except for the temporary checking account checkbook and statements, were left with
the company when I left.
26. The Christensen letter referenced asserts that all matters are cured, but in fact the
"cure" was mostly argument, the key documents were not actually provided, and the false
representations were not made true. While Defendants do consistently call black white, and the
referenced letter did so, the black was still black.
27. The statement as made is true. The implications which Defendants are trying to
make, however, are false.
28. While it is true that a complaint was filed, the filing was in no way in response to the
arbitration filing. As is stated above, the suit was contemplated since April, and Defendants
were given notice of that intention. Mr. Christensen was asked on at least two occasions if he
would accept service of process. Instead of answering that request, Defendants filed their
arbitration demand in an attempt to trump the impending lawsuit.
29. The records of the state of Utah show that the registered office for World-Wide
Imaging, part of Defendants5 scheme to defraud me, is the office of Mr. Christensen. (See
attached.) Mr. Christensen has been the prime mover m all of the activities of Defendants.
Discovery is needed, however, on the precise extent of his involvement.

30. Defendants' statement of how the documents came into existence is again distorted.
After much discussion with Mr. Chapman, v/ith every ''agreement3* changing at ever}7 meeting, I
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finally recounted to Mr. Willardson what the issues and what I thought we had agreed upon and
asked him to reduce that to writing. He did so and 1 presented the result to Chapman. Chapman
said that it was completely unacceptable and that he would have his own lawyer write the
contract. From then on Mr. Christensen was responsible for the drafting. Mr, Christensen
requested, and received, the word processing document that Mr. Willardson generated. Mr.
Christensen did choose to use a lot of what was originally written, but it was Mr. Christensen,
writing on behalf of defendants, who actually had the responsibility for all drafting. There were
several revisions of the document, including the final one", that Mr. Willardson did not even see
before they were signed and Mr. Willardson did not receive a copy of the final document until
shortly before this litigation was filed.
31. This is false or misleading for the same reasons stated above. Christensen may not
have met with or spoken with me directly, but he did the drafting and it was his changes that
Chapman discussed with me and insisted upon implementing,
32. Defendants' motion seeks to have this court order plaintiff to participate in an
arbitration proceeding commenced by Defendants. Plaintiff is so participating. Plaintiff and his
counsel have filed all required documents in that action, including without limitation, selection
of arbitrators and disclosure of involved parties (for conflict checks). Plaintiffs counsel has
participated with Defendant Chiistensen in a telephone conference on how the arbitration is to be
managed. Defendants' assertion that plaintiff is not participating in arbitration is, at least,
grossly misleading.
DATED: Thursday, January 23, 2003.
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Timothy Miguel Willardson (4443)
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRYAN J. WHATLEY,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF TIMOTHY MIGUEL
WILLARDSON

vs.

Civil No. 020405636

Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman, James L.
Christensen, and Does I -v,
Defendants.

Judge: #5

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

)
:ss.
)

TIMOTHY MIGUEL WILLARDSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

Defendants5 motion seeks to have this court order plaintiff to participate in an

arbitration proceeding commenced by Defendants. Plaintiff is so participating. Plaintiff and his
counsel have filed all required documents in that action, including without limitation, selection
of arbitrators and disclosure of involved parties (for conflict checks). Plaintiffs counsel has
participated with Defendant Christensen in a telephone conference on how the arbitration is to be
managed. Defendants5 assertion that plaintiff is not participating in arbitration is, at least,
grossly misleading,
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DATED Thursday, Januaiy 23, 2

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to befon me this £3

Notary Public
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Timothy Miguel Willardson (4443)
10885 South State Street
Sand}, UT 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRYAN J. WHATLEY,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF TIMOTHY MIGUEL
WILLARDSON REGARDING 56(F)

vs.

Civil No. 020405636

Bruce E. Chapman, Cen Chapman, James L
Chnstensen, and Does 1 - V,
Defendants

Judge- #5

County of Salt Lake
State of Utah

)
) SS
)

Timothy Miguel Willardson, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am counsel for plaintiff Bryan Whatley m the above styled matter I have direct

personal knowledge of all matters affirmed herein.
I.

Why facts precluding summary judgment for dismissal) cannot be presented.
2.

As is discussed m the accompanying motion and memorandum, no discovery has

yet been taken, nor could any have been taken m conformance with the rules
II.

Probable facts not available.
5

We expect that discovery will allow us to further document the malfeasance plead m

the complaint and to show that defendants Chapman and Gmstensen-were-working cugether to
harm and/or defraud Mr. Whatley,

120C

III. Steps I taken to obtain missing facts.
7

Because the case has just commenced and no discovery is permitted, plaintiff has

done all that|he reasonably can do to discovei the necessary additional information at the present
time
IV. Why Additional time will enable Defendant to rebut movant's allegations.
8

To date the entire program of discovery which is an essential part of the light to

adjudication has been impossible Discovery is essentia] to fully meet the allegations of
Defendants' motion

Timothy Miguel Willardson
SUBSCRIBBD AND SWORN to this. Thursday, January 23, 2003.

wfestir**

Notary Public!

}

\^%fJ! ^
Hr'l

n
V

120D

norm PUBLIC>sm *fm
r>un\,n
ROVO in&h
U U h 8460*
84 60*
COM? 5X»- 12 27-2003

M Li 3 2b fH '03
Timothy Miguel Willardson (4443)
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRYAN J. WHATLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RELIEF UNDER RULE
56(F)
Civil No. 020405636

Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman, James L.
Christensen, and Does I - V,
Defendants.

Judge: #5

COMES NOW the Defendant and support his motion for relief under Rule 56(f) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as follows:
Facts
1.

Plaintiffs complaint was filed within the last month, No answer was filed but a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) was filed by defendants, along with additional information
in the form of an affidavit. That additional information, beyond the pleadings, is consistent with
the requirement of Rule 12(b) that such motion shall be treated as a motion for summary judgment
under Rule 56.
2.

Neither party has been allowed to conduct discovery in this matter. Defendants

desire to prevent plaintiff in this matter from having his day in court and has proposed facts which
cannot be fully answered without discovery as the facts are uniquely in the possession of
defendants.

Argument
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) states;
... If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading ro state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as ont for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. (Emphasis added.)
In other words, Utah Rule 12(b)(6) is written expressly with the idea in mind that it is not
inappropriate to put in matters beyond the "pleading," upon the motion depends. In fact,
defendants have, by referring to Mr. Chapman's affidavit, done so. The motion must therefore be
considered and resolved as one for summary judgment.
The Rule also provides that all parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present "all
material made pertinent to such a motion." In this instance, Defendants are seeking to bring in
items (such as Mr. Chapman's affidavit) which are beyond the pleadings and are seeking to
prevent plaintiff from being fully heard.
The United States Supreme Court has stated the purpose and reasoning behind Federal
Rule 56(f). In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986), the Court stated that, "Rule
56(f) ... allows a summary judgment motion to be denied, or the hearing on the motion to be
continued, if the nonmoving party has not had an opportunity to make full discovery. (Emphasis
added). A recent Federal Circuit case, Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center, Inc. v. U.S., 985
F.2d 1575, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993), interpreted the Supreme Court's position on Rule 56(f) as
follows:
"The Supreme Court has made clear that summary judgment is inappropriate
unless a tribunal permits the parties adequate time for discovery." Dunkin'
Donuts of America v. Metallurgical Exoproducts Corp., 840 F.2d 917, 919 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) . . . Indeed, summary judgment should "be refused where
the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover
information that is essential to fits! opposition." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 250 ne5 (1986). (Emphasis added,)

The Utah Supreme Court, in Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984), also stated that
Rule 56(f) motions should be liberally granted. The Court stated, "Where, however, the party
opposing summary judgment timely presents his affidavit under Rule 56(f) stating reasons why he
is presently unable to proffer evidentiary affidavits he directly and forthrightly invokes the trial
court's discretion. Unless dilatory or lacking in merit, the motion should be liberally treated."
The Court in that case discussed another Utah case, Strand v. Associated Students of University of
Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977), in which Rule 56(f) relief was granted, according to the Court in
Cox, because "[TJhere had not been sufficient time since the inception of the lawsuit for plaintiff to
utilize discovery procedures, and thereby have an opportunity to cross-examine the moving parly."
Both the Federal and Utah Courts, as well as other jurisdictions, are liberal in granting
relief under this rule. In Patty Precision v. Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing, 742 F.2d 1260, 1264
(10th Cir. 1984), the court held that courts must rule on the Rule 56(f) motion before ever granting
a summary judgment, to do otherwise would be failure to exercise discretion and unfair prejudice
against the party filing a Rule 56(f) motion.1
The First Circuit held, in Resolution Trust v. North Bridge Assoc, 22 F.3d 1198, 1203
(1st Cir. 1994), that, "[consistent with the salutary purposes underlying Rule 56(f), district courts
should construe motions that invoke the rule generously, holding parties to the rule's spirit rather
than its letter." (Emphasis added, citations excluded.) The Court further stated, "when a party
claims an inability to respond to an opponent's summary judgment motion because of incomplete
discovery or the like, [Rule] 56(f) looms large." Id. at 1202.
Rule 56(f) is so favored that many jurisdictions have granted the motion despite the
movant's failure to meet all requirements of the Rule. In Snook v. Trust Co. of'Ga. Bank of

Id. at 1265.

Savannah N.A , 859 R2d 865, 871 (11th Cn 1988), the Eleventh Circuit held that, "a party
opposing a motion for summary judgment need not file an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f),. m
order to invoke the protection of that Rule " The court justified that position by stating that courts
must use "an abundance of caution and to prevent a possible injustice "2 Summarizing the law m
this area, the court also stated "that the interests of justice will sometimes require a district court to
postpone its ruling on a motion for summary judgment even though the technical requirements of
Rule 56(f) have not been met."3
The Fifth Circuit stated that the purpose of Rule 56(f) "is to provide non-movants with a
much needed tool to keep open the doors of discovery m order to adequately combat a summary
judgment motion/' Wichita Falls Office Assoc, v Banc One Corp., 978 R2d 915 (5th Cir,
1992) Many courts, m fact, have held that, "such continuance of a motion for summary judgment
for purposes of discovery should be granted almost as a mattei of course unless the non-movmg
party has not diligently pursued discovery of the evidence "4
Here the case has barely commenced and plaintiff has been unable to use any of the rights
to discovery provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure
Accordingly, the Rule 56(f) motion is required and a continuance appropriate
Conclusion

D

Id Sec also Sames\ Gable, 732 F 2d 49. 52 (3d Cn 1989) (even when it was the plaintiffs fault that
summary judgment was enteied against them, the court still granted Rule 56(0 saying that it is en or to giant
defeiiaant's motion for summary judgment while peitment discoveiy requests wei e outstanding)
4

Id a t n 4 See also, Beikelev A Home Ins Co 5 68 F.3d 14Q9 (D C Cn 1995), Imemanonal Snonstop
Inc \ Rally's, lr\c , 939 F.2d 1257, 1267 (5th Cn 1991)

Defendants are seeking to block discovery through the stratagem of moving for dismissal.
The discovery proposed is directly relevant to defeating plaintiffs motion to dismiss. Defendant
respectfully request the Court to issue the order requested above.
DATED: Thursday, January 23, 2003

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - PROVO COURT
UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

BR\ANJ W H A T L E Y ,

A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E S
FOR PLAINTIFF
TIMOTHY M WILLARDSON, ESQ
NELSON SNUFFER DAHLE &. POULSEN
10SS5 SOUTH STATE
SANDY UT 84070

) MOTIONS HEARING

)
Plaintiff

)

FOR DEFENDANTS
JAMES L CHRISTENSEN ESQ
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
39 EXCHANGE PLACE * 100
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

BRUCE E CHAPMAN, et ai,
) Case 020405636
) Appeal 20030481-CA

)
Defendant
9
10"

) Judge Claudia Laycock
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BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing
belore the above-named court on February 26 2003
WHEREUPON the parties appearing and represented bv
14 counsel, the following proceedings were held
15
16
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CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
19
(From Electronic Recording)
20
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1
P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2
(February 26, 2003)
3
THE JUDGE We re on the record in the matter
4 ofBrvanJ Whatlev versus Bruce E Chapman, etal This
5 is case number 020405636 And we are here on the motion
0 to compel arbitration and the motion to dismiss that were
7 filed bv the detendants m this matter And tnen the
8 plaintiffs responded with a Rule 56(f) motion for further
9 discovery
10
All right And I guess part and parcel of that is
1 1 the issue as to whether or not the motion to dismiss is
12 reallv a 12(b)(6) motion or wnether its a motion for summary
13 judgment
14
Okay Counsel, will you go ahead and put your
15 appearances on the recordn
16
MR WILLARDSON Tim Willardson appearing on
17 behalf of plaintiff
IS
MR CHR1STENSEN Jim Chnstensen on behalf of the
19 defenaants I aiso have Chris jessop nere from my office
20 with me I also have the two detenaants Mr and Mrs
21 Chapman with me
22
THE JUDGE Okay And Mr Willardson, you have
23 with you7
24
MR WILLARDSON Mr Bryan Whatlev, the
25 plaintiff
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1
THE JUDGE Okay All right Mr Chnstensen
2 why dont vou go ahead
3
ARGUMENT BY MR CHRISTENSEN
4
MR CHRISTENSEN Your Honor, what I m going to do
5 is take a few minutes andjust give vou some factual
6 background I know that some of this is in tne pleadings
7 But I've gone ahead and spent some time ana put together a
8 timeline that might assist you in understanding what I'll be
9 e\plaming
10
I have a copy of the same timeline in some of our
11 other exhibits here, Your Honor, for vou
12
THE JUDGE Oh, that would be great lean
13 basically read it but it might be easier
14
MR CHRISTENSEN It might be helpful In fact
15 if you'd like I ve given a copy of this to opposing counsel
16 also
17
THE JUDGE All right
18
MR CHRISTENSEN So maybe I can even move this up
19 a little bit—
20
THE JUDGE That would be great
21
MR CHRISTENSEN -- so you can see it a little
22 bit
23
Mr Chapman started a photo processing business
24 aoout 30 vears ago and a he s been running that business
25 here as World Wide Photo in, in Provo for the last 30
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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2
Z
-r
5
6

Back in September of or in February of 2001
Mr ChaDman and Mr Whatlev Degan discussing the possible
sale of World Wide Photo Mr Whatlev was a competitor here
in town owned a couDie of his own stores ana was interested
m bu\ mg Mr Chapman s business And so tney began talking
in Feoruarv of 2001
S
On April 5th Mr Whatlev and and the Chapmans
9 executed a stock ana asset purchase and saie agreement
10 At that time Mr there was a period of time in which after
11 thev signea the agreement that Mr Whatlev had the
12 opportunity to look at certain financial records ana
13 determine whether or not he wanted to close on the sale
14 And so he was given certain tax returns for the most recent
15 12 months to determine whether or not there was the cash flow
16 that a he needed and that M J Chapman had represented to him
17 in the agreement After receiving these tax returns and
1S making his own individual assessment of whether or not he
19 wanted to close thev went ahead and closed on April 25th oi
20 2001 about 20 days later
21
In that transaction or in that final closing
22 document there was an amendment that modified paragraph 2C ot
23 the agreement where Mi Whatlev acknowledged that he had
24 inspected the equipment And a at that same time he signed
25 a promissory note m the amount ot $457 500 in favor of the
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1
2
3
4
^
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE JUDGE Okav Before you go into this next
section, you re not on camera at all Wh} don t you switch
it to the voice activated One more Oka> Lets keep
going No"? Thatstheone No Yes, that s the one
All right Thank vou
And speak up because you re—
MR CHRISTENSEN I m probably in the worst place
m the courtroom ior cameras
THETUDGE ^res
MR CHRISTENSEN But I won t be here that often
THE JUDGE Oka\
MR CHRISTENSEN After approximately almost a
year, about 11 monthsWait Stop
THE JUDGE Oka
THE CLERK Is it recording?
THE JUDGE Yes I think it is now
THE CLERK Because mv Okay
THETUDGE "V es It showed video loss for a
minute but I think its back on Oka\ Sorr>
MR CHRISTENSEN 0 1 ^
THE JUDGE Tne woTld of technology
MR CHRISTENSEN All right On April 2nd, 2002
Mr Whatlev entered into a lease agreement with M &. M
Prooem for tne purchase of a. or a new space in Orem
Again Mr Chapman was unaware of that when ne did it But
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1 Chapmans
2
Also m addition to the business which was given
3 as security for this promissory note there were two trust
4 aeeos that were given as additional secunn against the
5 purchase price And Your honor will recall mat we had
6 a neanng on the telephone ior a TRO to stop the foreclosure
7 of those two trust deeds And that s what these two trust
S deeds were meant to do was to act as additional secuntv
Q
against the purchase of this against the promissory note
10
On April 2no 2002 this was almost a vear
11 later And let me and let me talk to just a minute for
12 this period of time of approximately 11 months
13
During that 11 months Mr Whatlev ran the
14 business He stepped in he hired, brought m some of his
15 own people he took over the office had all of the vou
'6 know had access to all of the records of the business and
17 a, and ran the business for approximately a year
1S
At his request and and certainlv consistent with
19 mutual agreement between him and Mr Chapman, Mr Chapman
20 was oftentimes down there at the store helping, helping with
21 the store Because he, of course, was interested in making
22 sure that this purchase was going to work He wanted to get
23 paid the money that was coming to him under tne promissory
24 note
25
On April 2nd 2002-COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1 that occurred
2
And then approximately one month later on Mav 2nd,
3 I take it back, on April 23rd, 2002 Whatley through his
4 attomev Mr Willardson sent a four page notice to
5 Mr Chapman telling him that he was going to permanently
6 close the doors of World V/ide Photo This was witnout am
7 without any land of a, a notice or without anv kind of
8 warning to Mr Chapman It was a total surprise to him when
9 Mr Whatlev sends this letter through his attorney saving I m
10 going to just close the business down, I m going to shut i*
11 down
12
At that time the letter also demanded a response
13 from Mr Chapman an or before April 25th two davs later
14
On April 29th, of course, not wanting to see World
15 Wide Photo go out of business, Mr Chapman stepped up ana
16 said I will come back in and I will run the business, but
17 I m going to run it as a gratuitous bailee meaning that he
18 would act essentially as a trustee or a receiver for the
19 business and run it continue to run it for the benefit of
20 Mr Whatle)
21
Mr Chapman back, back m on April 29th and dio
22 just that And he s been running the business ever since
23 then
24
THE JUDGE Does ne give mm notice"7 Ididnt
25 ever see anything in the, the pleading or anv of the
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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i attachments or exnibits that when he comes in and takes it
2 u\er as a gratuitous bailee that he iets the otner party know
^ that Does he 9
4
MR CHRISTENSEN Well what happens is is
^ there s actually telephone calls between me and
6 Mr Willardson where we arrange and I make it clear, I said
7 we will come in but we re not coming in talcing this business
5 back Tnis is not some land ot a a ioreclosure or vou re
9 not paving us off in doing this We 11 come back in and run
10 the business But we will do so And then v,e and we oo in
11 fact send a formal notice on Mav 2nd wnere we sent a notice
12 or default and demand a cure from Mr Wnatle\ ior
3 Mr Whatley s breach of the purchase agreement A.na we make
14 it \erv clear in that notice that Mr Cnapman is onlv running
15 the business as a gratuitous bailee or as a reserve tor the
16 business
P
THE JUDGE Yes
1S
MR CHRISTENSEN And so its its clear at that
1° time both through our our conversations and through the
20 letter that Mr Chapman then sends that we re taking over
21 the business, or Mr Chapman is taking over the business for
22 that purpose alone that in no way does this constitute
23 pavment or does it constitute in some wav a foreclosure or a
2d taking back of the business ror any other purpose other than
25 this
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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agreement the parties agree that any
action brought shall be submitted to
binding arbitration in accordance with
the rules of the American Arbitration
Association Such arbitration need not
be conducted bv the Amen can Arbitration
Association even though it would follow
tne rule Arbitration proceedings shall
be brougrt in Utah Count), Utah and not
elsewnere
When I was sitting down with Mr ChaDman as his
attorney determining wnat we needed to do because there had
been a default under this agreement by Mr bv the plaintiff
we looked at this line hard and determined that we we were
bound If we were to go after the Dlamtiffm this case
for their breach of me agreement we needed to bring it
unoer the arbitration clause because the arbitration clause
makes it very clear that if there s any land of a dispute
unoe r this agreement oi any u n a that anv acnon that
would tnen occur as a result of the dispute under this
agreement, any action needed to be submitted to binding
arbitration
The section 78-31 a-41 of the Utah Arbitration Act
makes it very clear It savs
"The court upon motion of anv parrv
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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Several months later on December 5th tne ChaDmans
file a demand for arbitration with the Triple AAA consistent
with paragraDh 9M of the stock asset ourchase, purchase and
saie agreement
And then on December 19th a couole weeks later
trus lawsuit gets filed by Mr Whatley wherein he files a
n
complaint alleging several different causes of action against
S the Chapmans and against me as counsel for the Chapmans
9 Which onngs us to the moH^-tnats beiore the Court
10 toda\
11
We re here, Your Hono r because we believe that
12 this provision is emorceable and that this provision that
13 requires a an arbitration of this matter needs to be
14 entorceo and that this is essentially is an an eno run
ID around the compliance with the contract
16
So today I m here essentially arguing through botn
17 our motion to compel arbitration and the motion to dismiss
18 that it is the arbitration agreement that snould control
19
This is the arbitration clause in the agreement
20 paragraph 9M Thats a little bit bigger you should be able
21 to read that I think
22
THE JUDGE Uh-huh (affirmative)
23
MR CHRISTENSEN Paragraph 9M of the agreement
24 reads
25
"In the event of a dispute under this
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1
showing the existence of an arbitration
2
agreement shall order the parties to
3
arbitrate
4
And that s whv we re here today, Your Honor, is
5 that there is an existence of an arbitration agreement and it
6 is now the dutv of this Court to order arbitration
7
There is a, a case called tne Central Florida
8 Investments, lnc versus Park West Associates It s a 2002
9 Utah case that reads
10
"We interpret
and I m quoting
11
"We interpret the agreement keeping in
12
mmd our policy of encouraging
13
arbitration IT IS the policy of the
14
law m Utah to interpret contracts in
15
favor of arbitration m resolution of
lb
disputes when the parties have agreed not
17
to litigate
18
Because the parties have agreed to arbitrate, tnis
19 Court \ our Honor should compei arbitration
20
Nov. Mr Whatley s response to this really simple
21 I think, straightforward argument is that under Utah Code
22 Annotated Section 7S-31 a-j it states that parties are to
23 pursue tne arbitration obligation unless iraud has beer
24 allegeG And a ana we certamn don t disagree witn tha^
25 Your Honor That is in fact what tne statute savs
COURT-PROeEEDINGS
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'
Whatlev goes on also and argues that none of his
2 causes of action arise unaer the agreement which we we agree
." vith, or disagree with
4
We believe Your Honor that altnough fraud har
5 oeen allegea m this case, that realiv what we have oetore
o the Court is nothing more than a series of breach of contract
7 causes of action that nave been recharacterized as fraud
S And that the Court even though fraud has oeen alleged that
9 the Court still should cause both of thf^r pnmes to pursue
10 the binding arbitration requirement
11
Let me go through eacn of these causes of action
12 "erv briefly just to help the Court understana where we re
13 coming from
14
The rirst cause oi action that a, that has been
15 alleged is a void contract asking for rescission or a breach
I o of contract cause of action Certainlv a breach of contract
17 cause or action would be subject to the arbitration clause
18 That would be a, a cause of action that would arise under a
19 dispute unaer this agreement
20
The second cause of action is a conversion or a
21 theft cause of action And the agreement specifically does
22 m fact allege under paragraph three that there was to be
23 certain assets transrerred with the agreement
24
Again Your Honor although thev use the words
25 conversion or theft, it's essentially a breach of contract

1 cause of action It is a reference to paragraph three of
2 the agreement that requires that assets be transrerrea Ana
3 us their position that we didn t transfer certain assets
-i nence tney ve would up with tne characterization o f
5 conversion or theft
6
Tne third cause of action is a slander of title
7 cause of action and this has to do with a the, the real
8 property that was given as additional securm And this
o again, Your Honor, goes to paragraph 2(b) of the agreement
10 that specifically obligates Mr Whatlev to give the Cnapmans
11 a secunn interest m lots 242 and 243 of Sherwood Hills
12 subdivision Again specifically goes to certain
13 requirements under the contract which would be a contract
W cause of action agair
15
The fourth cause of action is a tortious
lo interference with business cause of action Again this
17 this flows airectlv out of paragraph five in the agreement
18 where Mr Whatlev says the Chapmans are competing and
19 interfering with his business and he again, savs that tne\
20 can t do that because they have agreed mat they wouldn t do
21 that under the agreement
22
The next cause of action is a, a cause of action
23 under 18 USC Section 1030 which is a computer fraud cause of
24 action This, again aiso goes to the noncompete clause in
25 paragraph five of the agreement which Your Honor, again,
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would be a, a clear breach of contract cause of action
recharacterized as a, a federal 18 USC Section 1030 cause of
action
The next cause of action is a breach of fiduciary
duties Again, Your Honor, we would argue that this cause
oi action would not exist but for the existence of the
contractual obligations under the contract Hence, it too
would be a contract cause of action
There s also a defamation cause of action We're
not clear on tnis one Your Honor, as to what defamation has
been realiv complained of But again it s our argument
that any defamation cause of action would have arisen because
of this contract between the parties
Finally, and tins brings me to the fraud cause of
action Mr Whatlev nas alleged fraud, m our opinion he has
alleged fraud m an attempt to get out of his obligation to
aroitrate And we believe that the fraua cause of action
ought to be looked at carefully here
in his memorandum m opposition Mr Whatlev argues
that there are essentially four misrepresentations, or rour
representations that would rise to tne level of fraua And
tnose representations appear m paragraphs 4Q 50, 52 ana
56 And what I'd like to do is go through eacn of those
representations here just bnefh
First of all, paragraph 49 of the complaint In
COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE 15

COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

this paragraph the allegation is made that Mr Chapman and
his son with Mr Chapman s assistance, promptly began
actively soliciting business in Utah County And they
allege that this is a fraud cause of acuon
Again, Your Honor, I think it s clear that what
they're really referring to here is, is a breach of the
paragraph five obligation to not compete under the
agreement
THE JUDGE Is this really paragraph 48?
MR CHRISTENSEN Well, its paragraphs 48 and
49THE JUDGE Okay
MR CHRISTENSEN - of the complaint Those
two taken together essentially say and again this is an
allegation being made bv tne plaintiffs, but thev re saying
that Chapman and his son began soliciting business in Utah
Counts, which would be of course, a direct violation of the
noncompete clause found m paragraph five of the agreement
And our position again is Your Honor that that s
not a fraud cause of action thats really a oreach of
contract cause of action There was an obligation set fortn
in paragraph five of the agreement to not compete and thev
are alleging that they did But they re calling it a fraud
cause ot action
Paragraph 50 states and this is m the complaint
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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2
Tfte named defendants absolutely ^etused
3
to allow Mr Whatlev access to the
4
books
5
And thev call this a rraud cause of action
o
Again in paragraphs 49 and 50 of the complaint all
7 Mr Whatlev is stating is that we or is that Mr Chapman did
S not activeh, well mat Mr Chapman dia not hand the books
9 over and he s calling tnat a fraud cause of action when in
! 0 tact 1 think its clear that that is anotner breach of
11 contract cause of action
12
Paragraph 52 states
13
'Named aerendants not only
14
misrepresented the value of the
15
equiDment thev represented that it was
16
functional
17
And again it is their position that in tact it was
1S not functional Again this representation flows out of
19 paragraph three of the agreement that states
20
' All assets and liabilities m the
21
business as ot the date of execution
22
shall remain in World Wide Photo except
23
the following'
24
And then there follows a list of equipment
25
They're claiming that they didn't get that
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1 action
2
And our argument again Your Honor, is that it is a
3 dispute It s one of the disputes no question But anv
4 dispute under this agreement, any action thats brought shall
5 be submitted to binamg arbitration and it need not go to the
6 courts for determination
7
Now, Your Honor, 1 would like to leave that for
8 just a minute and move onto our motion to dismiss The
9 motion to dismiss is actually a motion to not onlv dismiss
10 because ot tne arbitration clause, but we're also moving the
11 Court to dismiss the action against me personal!}, and the
12 action against Mr and Mrs Chapman I've already argued
13 essentially why it ought to de dismissed because of the
14 aroitration clause I'd like to move on to why it ought to
15 be dismissed witn regard to the allegations that have been
16 brought against me
17
Y our Honor, 1 would remind the Court that an
18 attorney owes no duty to an opposing parr,, esDecialiy one
19 who is represented by counsel My Hence, I would be
20 immune rrom anv lawsuit tnat might be brought m connection
21 with the preparation of contracts in connection with the sale
22 of this Dusiness except where their might have been
23 personal fraua on my pan In other words if I actually
24 detrauaed the defendants personall\ m some way here tnen
25 certainly they would be able to bring a cause of action
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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i equipment, or that it wasn't as they thought it was And
2 our Dosition again Your Honor is that that is a breach of
3 contract cause of action not a fraud cause of action
4
Finally paragraph 56 in their comDiaint states
5 that, or Mr Whatley alleges that representations were made
b with regard to transfer of tne stock And thev re saving
7 that Mr Chapman and Mrs Chapman did not transfer stock as
8 thev had represented thev would They again call that a
9 fraud cause of action when-aeain-Your Honor that cause oi
10 action flows directly out of the contract
11
Paragraph one of the agreement states that the
12 seller warrants that sellers are the sole and complete owners
13 of the shares and the sellers own no other or further shares,
14 and the sellers have all of the rights, privileges and
15 authorities necessary to sell such shares of World Wide Photo
16 to Duyer
17
If there s been a breach here, Your Honor, it's a
18 breach of that representation it's a breach of the contract,
19 and the agreement to transfer stock over Whether that
20 happened or not is a contract issue it s not a fraud
21 issue
22
Now, certainly it's possible in circumstances to
23 to characterize something that is a breach or contract as
24 fraud But if it flows out of the contract in the first
25 place it is essentially a, a breach of contract cause of
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1 against me for that personal fraud But short of that I am
2 immune from any kind of an action that might be brought
3 because ot my involvement with the Chapmans in drafting their
4 documents for this transaction
5
In the State of Utah in order to plead fraud one
6 must plead these eight, or nine, I m sorr> these nine
7 elements This is coming out the (inaudible word) versus
S Hill case, a 1999 case And I m sure the Court is well aware
9 of what these all are And a, here, and I'm talking now
10 just about the cause of action against be personall\, we are
11 arguing and we're moving the Court to dismiss tne cause of
12 any fraud causes of action against me because essentially
13 none of these have been satisfied None of these elements
14 have actually been specifically pied in the contract
15 complaint
16
These are the three references to anything that I
17 personally did in connection with this transaction I would
18 like to go througn each of those
19
The first one comes out in the introduction, it s
20 paragraph 11 of the complaint where it reads
21
"On or about April 5th 2001 Mr Whatley
22
and Chapmans entered into an agreement
23
entitled Stock and Asset Purchase and
24
Sale Tnat document was dratted by
25
defendant Chnstensen '
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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i
T n e second allegation with SDecific reference to me
2 comes out of the third count, the rraua cause of action
5
And again Your Honor I would matce u clear that
4 the oniy wav thev can ever pieaa a case against me is if tliev
: actually Died with SDecificirv an actual fraud cause of
6 action So I picked up the allegations that go to thai
7 rraud allegation So Count Three, fraud reads, paragraph
5 49
9
' The above actions began occurring—
10
within a very snon time of signing the
11
agreements '
12
<\nd thev re complaining about wnat thev are
13 alleging Mr Chapman did after the the signing ot the
14 agreement
15
"Plaintiff therefore alleges on
16
information and belief that Mr Cnapman
17
had no intention of honoring those
1S
promises at the time thev were made
19
Those contractual representations,
20
warranties and promises were conveved and
21
drafted bv Mr Chnstensen assisting
22
Mr Chapman's fraud "
23
So again, the allegation is that 1 conveved and
24 drafted the promises set forth in the agreement
25
Finally in Count Three paragraph 56 of the same

1 cause of action states
2
"The statement that Mr Whatlev was
3
contracting to purcnase the outstanding
4
shares of the corporation appears
5
multiple times in the document which
•6
Mr Chnstensen drafted and which the
7
Chapmans signed It is entitled Stock
S
and Asset Purchase and Sale
9
Mr Whatlev requested the stock records
10
and corporation records and was initialh
11
told the" would be produced Ultimately
12
Mr Chapman admitted they were not
13
On information and belief the named
14
defendants either knew or should have
15
known that the contractual
16
representations regarding stock and
17
corporation records were false when
18
made '
19
Your Honor, I've been through this agreement
20 carefully And with regard to specific fraud causes of
21 action these are the only allegations that are made against
22 me specifically And our position, Your Honor, is that in
23 order to plead fraud against any individual one must allege,
24 first of all that a representation was made There s no
25 allegation here that 1 made any representations There's
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1 representations that Mr Chapman, or there are allegations
2 that Mr Chapman made representations But there's not a
3 singie representation that, or allegation that I made any
4 kind of a representation
5
And so essentially paragraph one, or the first
6 element of the, of the fraud cause of action has not been
7 satisfied And m order to bring a cause of action against
8 an attorney or anybody else there must be a specific
9 representation that that attomev actually made
10 representations that were relied on Dy the other party And
11 that's not done All we have here are allegations relative
12 to documents having been drafted by me Ano, Your Honor,
13 I m unaware that the drafting of documents m the State of
14 Utah is actionable, which is whv we re bringing the motion to
15 dismiss here
16
We have ouoted tne Heathman versus Hatch case which
17 is a Utah case And I m lust going to read the one part of
1 S it, Y our Honor, and 1 m quoting here where it states
19
"It has long been recognized m Utah
20
that where the terms fraud, conspiracy
21
and negligence are but general
22
accusations m the nature of conclusions
23
of the pieaoer they will not stand up
24
against a motion to dismiss on tna+
25
ground Tne basic facts must be set
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forth with sufficient particulantv to
show what facts are claimed to constitute
such charges "
And again, Your Honor, the only facts that we're
aware of is that I drafted documents
Now, I've got to go back just a bit and help the
Court recognize or remember that wnat happened here wnen this
whole document was put together, when this agreement was put
together. Mr Willardson drafted the initial purchase and
sale agreement I then was given a copy of that agreement to
review for Mr Chapman I reviewed the agreement and 1 made
suggested changes And a we went back and forth,
Mr Willardson and myself went back and forth I never
talked to Mr Whatley, the party But I taliced to, talked
to Mr Willardson on probably two or three different
occasions as we went back and forth drafting this document
After that we made some cnanges, and as I understood it tne
document was signed 1 was not party or even part of trie
actual signing of the documents
That certainly would not rise to the level, at
least that I m aware of in the State of Utah would not
rise to the level on fraud on mv oart because I happened to
be involved m drafting documents If it were so,
"VourHonor-THE JUDGE Counsel, are vou standing to object
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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2
MR WILLARDSON lam Your Honor
3
Mi Cnnstensen has a, an interesting position
4 being here before the Court He s both tunctiomng as
5 attomev ana as deiendant ana he nas suommed argument and,
t> and he s been arguing But it seems to me that he s also
7 testifying now And I think thats inappropriate If he
S vvants to 0e a witness ne needs to sit down and let another
9 lawver argue and then ne can he called to testifS But this
10 is not an evidentiary hearing, its an argument
11
THE JUDGE If it s before me by affidavit I tnink
12 its okay But if voure going beyond whats berore me in
13 the iorm of an affidavit you are testifying
14
MR CHRISTENSEN Weil, you have any affidavit
15
THE JUDGE Okay
1c
MR CHRISTENSEN And and again Y our Honor, that
17 miormation I m giving you in terms of how it was put
1S together is for background purposes only Our motion is
lc> based on what has been Died This is a motion to dismiss
20
THE JUDGE Well, then let s go with what s been
21 pied
22
MR WILLARDSON Mav I ask to see a copy ot
23 Mr Cnnstensen s affidavit? I didn t ever receive mat in
24 any of the pleadings I have a copy of Mr Chapman s
25 affidavit

1
(Inaudible discussion at counsel table )
2
MR CHRISTENSEN T hats and thats correct
3 Your Honor What I m It's not my affidavit its
4 Mr Chapman's affidavit
5
But what wnat I ve stated is in fact referenced in
6 Mr Whatlev s affidavit when he states m fact The last
7 thing here
S
I m going straight to the issue of the draft of the
9 documents Tne com Diana-states *4r Christensen drarted the
10 agreement Tne memo drafted bv Mr Wiliaroson savs that
11 Mr Willardson reduced the agreement to writing
12 Mr Whatlev m his own affidavit savs Mr Willardson reduced
13 the agreement to writing And I ve got the actual paragraph
14 reterences here to what the comDlaint says relative to what
15 Mr Whatlev, or Wiliardson says in his opposition memo and
lo wnat Whatiey says in his affidavit
17
With regard to whether Christensen communicated
18 with Whatlej, again, the complaint states
19
"Those contractual representations
20
warranties and promises were conveyed and
21
drafted by Mr Christensen "
22
That comes out of this right here And yet, and
23 then in his memo in opposition Mr Willardson states
24
' Christensen mav not nave met with or
25
spoken with Mr Wnatley directly but he
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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did the drafting and it was his changes
that Chapman discussed with Mr Whatiey
and insisted upon implementing '
And again, out of Whatley's affidavit himself he
states
"Christensen mav not have met with or
spoken with me directly, but he did the
drafting and it was his changes that
Chapman discussed with me and insisted
uDon implementing '
S o l think it s clear, Your Honor, there s,
there s certainly no evidence before the Court that I ever
spoke with M r Whatiey There s no evidence oefore the
Court that M r Wnatley ever replied or relied on any of my
representations
In the end, Y our Honor what happens here is there
was an agreement that was prepared The agreement was signed
by Mr Whatiey as the purchaser, and the agreement was signed
by the Chapmans as the sellers I was not partv to that
agreement I am not sign the agreement I never met with
Mr Whatlev I never made anv representations to
Mr Whatiey I never preDared or signed any kind of an
ODimon of counsel that Mr Whatiey would have reueo on
None of that is here berore tne Court It s ven
clear that the only thing oefore the Court is the iact that I
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assisted Mr Willardson in drafting the documents There
were two attorneys involved in drafting documents
And Your Honor, that is not fraud in the State of
Utah
And again, if is there is fraud here it needs to
have been pled witn particularity witn regards to me
Essentially what we have here, Your Honor, is a
kind of a kill the messenger approach And that is if a
partv is angry about what he thinks has happened let's not
only sue the party he bought the business from but let s sue
everybody &l^ that thai partv may have been associated
with And Your Honor, that simply doesn't, they don t have
the right to do that, at least with regard to me
So again we believe that the complaint needs to be
dismissed at ieast with regards to me, primarily because
there has been no pleading with particularity relative to anv
representations I personally maoe to Mr Whatie\
Finally, and I ve pointed this out here, that
Weil whv dont 1 stop there, Your Honor There s
a couple of things I may bring up in rebuttal Out thats
essentially is wnat our motions are oaseo on
THE JUDGE All right Thank you very mucn
Oka> Mr Willarason?
ARGUMENT BY MR WILLARDSON
MR WILLARDSON Thank vou, Your Honor May it
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please the Court Mr Chnstensen
There are reallv oniv a couple of problems with
what Mr Chnstensen said One is that the factual
allegations are either false or misleading, ana two is that
thev re all irrelevant irrelevant to tne purposes ior wnich
we are here today
The motion to compel amitration can be disposed of
very simpiv We have already agreed to participate in an
0
arbitration ano in fact Mr Chnstensen._ar_Mi_-Chnstensen
10 and I have doth participated in the selection of an
11 aroitrator and Mr Chnstensen and I have already agreed to
12 a pretrial in that arbitration on March 5th And if
13 Your Honor would like to see the documents from the AAA I
14 would be I have them here and I'd be very' pieased to show
' 5 them to the Court So our—
16
THE JUDGE Okay So are you conceding his
! 7 motion and that I should grant it7
15
MR WILLARDSON NO I'm conceding that to the
19 extent that a, a dispute under the agreement exists, that we
20 are cooperating completely m arbitration and that is going
21 forward
22
However, it is our position and the basis of our,
23 or part of one of the mne counts of our complaint, that
24 there is no enforceaole agreement and, therefore since the
25 entire agreement is void there is no obligation to arbitrate
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1
THE JUDGE Then whats being arbitrated?
2
MR WILLARDSON Mr Chapman's claim against
3 Mr Wnatley is being arbitrated See,—
4
THE JUDGE Just the counterclaim? Do we have a
5 counterclaim in this case?
6
MR WILLARDSON No There's not been an answer
7 filed What we've had filed8
THE JUDGE Yes I didn't think so
9
MR WILLARDSON What we've had filed is just
10 these two motions by the plaintiff One to dismiss and the
11 other to compel arbitration
12
The13
THE JUDGE Is that what's in front of the
14 arbitrator? Wnat s in front of the arbitrator?
15
MR WILLARDSON Mr Chapman s claim that
16 Mr Whatlev owes him 5400,000 or S457.000
n
i
THE JUDGE Okay So none of your clients claims
1 S are in front of the arbitrator, just Mr Chapman s efforts to
19 entorce the contract?
20
MR WILLARDSON That s correct
21
THE JUDGE It only goes one wa\
22
MR WILLARDSON Right Secondly, in addition
23 to the alleged contract bemg void the allegations of both
24 Mr Whatlev ano a, Mr Chapman are that mere is a breach
25 In the legal autnontv that I've provided in the brief that
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1 as to anv of the failings on the part of Mr Chapman and the
2 other defendants that are covered in the document that was
3 signed S o 4
THE JUDGE Okay So let me ask vou We, we
5 have a paragraph like this m a contract that 1 thmk is
6 pretty clear I mean. I don't thinK it takes rocket science
7 to read this paragraph
S
You're saving that to avoid arbitration all v ou
9 need to do is allege mat the, tne agreement, the contract is
10 void?
11
MR WILLARDSON Well, that s what the statute
12 savs
13
THE JUDGE So does that mean that it comes to the
14 court first? And when I make a determination mat it's
15 either void or not that s wnen it finally goes to
16 arbitration?
17
MR WILLARDSON Well if, if the parties agree
18 that, that arbitration is covered then obviously they
19 arbitrate And Mr Chapman has a claim ano we are
20 arbitrating it
21
THE JUDGE So which of the causes of action do
22 you think you re arbitrating?
23
MR' WILLARDSON We don't believe that any of
24 the causes of action m this complaint are being
25 arbitrated
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1 you've already read 1 point out that the Supreme Coun of the
2 United States and other courts as well have held that a
3 breach does not arise under the contract because logically
4 speaking a contract is not made for its own breach So even
5 a breach claim is at least arguably outside of the
6 contract
7
The other eight out of nine Counts in the complaint
8 here are not contractual but tort
9
Now, Mr Chnstensen argues that well the, the
10 defamation wouldn't have happened if they hadnt signed this
11 agreement and the theft wouldn't have happened if they hadn't
12 signed this agreement and etcetera, etcetera, etcetera But
13 in fact Oh, and the, we don't know what the, we don't
14 know what the defamation is, and this computer hacking
15 wouldn't have occurred if it hadn't been for the agreement
16 ana, and whatnot
17
With that argument we really need to send a
18 transcript of this to the SEC because they'll be able to
19 disband There is no longer anv need for prosecuting anyone
20 who participates m a fraudulent activity, mere s no longer
21 anv need to enforce securities laws because everything, all
22 these rrauduient secunnes contracts that get written and
23 sued upon ana people go to ian on over really are mst
24 contractual matters Tnere can't be anv fraud as long as
25 there s a contract
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His argument just, while it sounds essentialK
plausible SIITIDIV is not consistent with the ract that one set
or conduct mav constitute m o r e man one causes of action,
either in criminal l a w or civil law
N o w the a
M r Whatlev can onlv have one
remed\ But he s c e n a i n l v entitled to plead m o r e than
one cause of action and he s done so ana eight of those
8 are ton There are, there is nothing in that aroitration
9 ciause that even hints mat therc-s-trrczreement to
10 arbitrate torts A n a in iact I have oeen unable to fina any
11 case that would bring a Dreton contract into consideration
'2 bv ii court In fact 1 trunk that a contract to have a tort
13 separate and then be arbitrated would be void ab initio
14 against public policy
tD
Nonetheless this clause cannot cover anv of the
16 tons and that s e i g h t of the nine Counts in the complaint
n
1
Mr C h n s t e n s e n has a really crushing burden to
15 sustain here T h e standard as vou re aware for this kind
19 of motion a m o t i o n to dismiss under 12(b)(6), is that the
20 court :s to take ail of the matters pled in the pleadings as
21 if thev are the gospel truth, and to draw all reasonable
22 inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and then there has to
23 be no set of circumstances given al' those positive facts for
24 the plaintiff and all tnose positive inferences for the
25 plaintiff under vvhicn a cause of action can be found

1
Now the as I pointed out in the, in the pleading
2 in this complaint, i t s a l a r g e c o m p j a i n t but the pleading
2 is mteneiated
Everv Count does not stand on its own and
n and everv Count a o e s n t j u s t reference the paragraphs which
5 preceed that C o u n t Each Count represents all tne
o allegations of all t h e Counts
7
So w h e n M r Chnstensen goes througn and savs well
S mv name is oniy m e n t i o n e d here, here and here in connection
° with fraud that is not reading the complaint thoroughly ana
10 its not accurate
11
Mr C h n s t e n s e n , one of M r Chnstensen's bnets
12 acknowledges that tne complaint specifically defines the term
13 named defendants to include M r Christiansen or
l-i Mr C h n s t e n s e n \ n d M r Chnstensen is therefore, named
15 either by the use of the w o r d s ' named defendant" or by his
16 given name or his Christian name, in paragraphs 14, IS 25
17 37 4 5 , 4 9 , 5 0 , 5 1 , 5 2 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 5 8 , 5 9 , 6 2 , 6 5 Oh, pardon
18 me 65 j u s t says derendants which means all defendants 60
19 and 66 as well A n d 67 and 68 also mentioned defendants
20 75 mentioned defendants
And then 76 and then 80 and, SO
21 including M r C h n s t e n s e n s n a m e specifically And 84 again
22 includes the n a m e d defendants
23
THE JUDGE
N o w M r Willaroson when I read your
24 brief I went t h r o u g h all of the paragraphs that vou listed as
25 having involved M r C h n s t e n s e n
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Would vou give m e a factual summarv of everything
he did that vou c o m p l a i n of in the complaint/? Just, just
tell me right here a n d n o w what what facts have vou alleged
in the complaint that involve him
MR. W I L L A R D S O N
Okay
THE JUDGE
Obviously drafting the complaint is,
or drafting, or w h a t e v e r he did as far as drafting the
contract is one of the, of the facts W h a t else do you
allege he did' 7
M R W I L L A R D S O N That he participated with the
Chapmans in forming a, competitive Business entities, m
stealing my c l i e n t s data
THE JUDGE
W h a t did he do1?
MR WILLARDSON
Well obviously we haven't had
discover}' yet B u t it is clear from what w e nave been able
to discover outside of discovery that M r Chnstensen was
panicipating with tne ChaDmans in forming these competitive
businesses that w e r e attempting to, tnat K were stealing my
clients intellectual property, and B, were trying to put my
client out of business
T H E J U D G E A n d m what way was he
panicipating" 1 A s their attorney 0
MR WILLARDSON
The office of the of one of the
entities is Mr C h n s t e n s e n s office as registered with the
State of Utan as of Julv of 2002
COURT PROCEEDINGS
P A G E 35

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE JUDGE
Okay So why is that important?
MR WILLARDSON
WellT H E J U D G E W h a t entity was it?
MR WILLARDSON
W h a t w e ve got here is a group of
people the defendants, w h o approached mv client and said we
have this great business, it s m a i o n g positive cash flow of
on over $10 000 every single month and i t s got sales of over
$800,000, etcetera, etcetera
T H E J U D G E I k n o w that I understand that
MR WILLARDSON
But we're not going to let vou
look at any of the documents ano, and we just want to get out
of the business So we'll sign this thing, we promise that
everything is j u s t as it is and w e won't do anvthmg except a
little hobby w o r k in our, our garage
THE JUDGE
So where does he fit into that?
MR WILLARDSON
And, where does M r Cnristensen
fit in?
T H E J U D G E Uh-hun (affirmative)
MR WILLARDSON
Well, he is the person who
coached and masterminded the C h a p m a n s -THE JUDGE
A n d h o w do v o u MR WILLARDSON
- scheme
THE JUDGE - k n o w mat0
I don t see anything m the complaint anywhere thai
substantiates, substantiates vour claim that ne s tne
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1 mastermind behind this whole thing
2
MR WILLARDSON He was the one who came UD with
3 the idea of a, of trust deeds on the propem He was the
4 one who5
THE JUDGE So now is that6
MR WILLARDSON -- drafted the Pardon?
7
THE JUDGE How is that different from being their
S attorney if he comes up with, if he advised them as to how to
9 make it some son of a transaction mat has collateral
10 Isn't what attornevs do 9
11
MR WILLARDSON Thats what attornevs ao But
12 when, when attorneys coacn—
13
THE JUDGE Do vou want to be sued the next time
14 you do that, Mr Willardson0 I mean, isn t that what vou re
15 opening this up to?
16
MR WILLARDSON No Not
17
I don't believe that lawyers should attack other
1 8 lawyers in general However, as countless security fraud
19 cases will demonstrate, when a lawyer, and even
20 Mr Chnstensen's own case says that if the lawyer goes
2 3 beyond merely counseling the client, then actually actively
22 participates in some malicious act then ne is liable
23
And we believe that since Mr Christensen created
24 this situation with the, the property deeds, wrote them m
25 such a way that they were on their face unenforceably,
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That's not the standard We've got people
operating here~
THE JUDGE So you're telling me that in front of
the jury, when we get this to a jury, when vou prove vour
allegations of fraud against Mr Chnstensen, you're not
going to be able to prove all nine elements against him'
" " MR WILLARDSON No, 1THE JUDGE Some of them will be against the
Chapmans and some aeamst him''
MR WILLARDSON No I hope to be able to
prove all nine elements against all of the defendants
ButTHE JUDGE Have vou got case law that savs you
can do it any other way?
MR WILLARDSON Well, I haven't researched that
specific point for this argument But a fraudulent
enterprise includes all of the participants
Ana we re at the inception of this case We
haven t done discover, I believe that Mr Christensen will
have been found to conceal material miormation from
Mr Whatlev whicn is concealment is an alternative element
ot representation You can, if vou deliberately conceal
mrormation that's material for someone as part of a
fraudulent act mat does renoer you liable
THE JUDGE Okay
COURXPROCEEDINGS
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unenforceable ano is, was assisting the Chapmans in
attempting to put my client out of business and stealing
their property, that that goes oevond merely advice
THE JUDGE Well didn't vour clients nave you as
counsel at the same time this contract was entered into?
MR WILLARDSON My client, my client actually
b
1 consulted me early on and verv late In the mia, of
S course, I was not involved too substantially great I mean
o I was aware that the transaction was being contemplated
10 but there was a hiatus wnen I was not being consulted about
II it
12
THE JUDGE Okay All right I'll let you go
13 forward
14
MR WILLARDSON So taking all of the allegations
15 in all the paragraphs of the complaint, then all of the
16 necessary elements for fraud have been alleged And when
P vou nave a fraudulent enterprise, a person can t, or an
18 entity or, or a group cannot avoid liability for fraud simply
19 by splitting it up, we're going to have vou make all the
20 representations and we're going to have, that are false, and
21 we're going to have you persuade them to rely on them, and
22 we're going to have you do this other element so we ve got
23 there, we've got all nine elements of fraud but we don't have
24 any one person against whom all nine of those things can
25 individually be pled
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1
MR WILLARDSON So a, taking all of the
2 allegations as true and all of the inferences that can
3 reasonably drawn, be drawn from them, there is no, it's not
4 possible to say that no cause of action can possibly exist
5 against any of the defendants It's certainly not possible
6 to say that as to the two Chapman defendants
7
Now, as to the alleged contradictory pleadings
S Mr Christensen has apparently not read all of the things
o that he is citing Under drafter of documents he asserts
10 that the memo and Mr Whatiey s affidavit savs that I
11 reduced the agreement to writing What is actually said m
12 the affidavit and m the memo m opposition is that
13 Mr Whatiey recounted to me wnat he believed the agreement to
14 be and I reduced Mr Whatiey's understanding to writing
15 That's not the same as me doing the final agreement by any
16 means
17
THE JUDGE And what paragraph was that in his
18 affidavit?
19
MR WILLARDSON In the affidavit it's paragraph
20 30 In the memo in opposition it's paragraph 26
21
THE JUDGE Okay Let me just find this
22 paragrapnSO Thank vou
23
MR WILLARDSON Next ne proposes that a, we have
24 a contradiction between the statement tnat Cnapman ran the
25 operation of World Wide Photo that's tne first column under
COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1 identity off short inaudible away rrom mic) and the
Z statement that Mr Christensen has been the prime mover in
3 ail of the activit es of derendams Those are two
4 different contracts, or contexts
3
World Wide Photo is a photo finishing operation
6 The activities of defendants alleged here are this
7 trauduient and otherwise tortious scheme to bilk mv client of
5 S40Q 000 DIUS two pieces or property
Q
There isn t anv contradiction-aftSer-idcntitv of
10 mastermind
11
A.na unaer the location and base or operations the
12 first column says there is no specific reference to a base af
13 operations so therefore there cannot be any contradiction
14 berween the complaint ana ana either the affidavit or the
1 ^ memo
16
What we have here is a multifaceted largely tort
17 complaint that has been pied And if evaluated under
18 standard tnat applies a valid and sustainable cause of
19 action pending discovery and we \ e got Mr Christensen
20 trying to expand an arbitration clause into areas which it
21 clearly is not intended to cover which it cannot under law
22 cover and to pretry this matter betore we re entitled to anv
23 discoverv
24
Mr Christensen asserts that he s got a clear
2D 12(b)(6) motion Nevertheless m support of that 12(b)(6)

1 motion is a seven page affidavit only the first 10
2 paragraphs of which ending on Dage three of the affidavit
- can oe even areued to relate to the auestion of the
4 aroitration clause Paragraphs-5
THE JUDGE Let me just find that
6
MR WILLARDSON Sure
7
THE JUDGE Was it actually attached to the
8 motion to compel7 And the motion to dismiss7 Or was it
0
separate 7
10
MR WILLARDSON It was filed at the same time as
11 the two motions
12
THE JUDGE Ml right
13
MR WILLARDSON The two motions had a
14 consolidated bner which cannot-15
THE JUDGE Okay I found it Okay Its the
lo arnaavit of Bruce Chapman
P
MR WILLARDSON Right
18
THE JUDGE Oka^ So vour your allegation here
19 is the first ten deal with20
MR WILLARDSON Either introductory matters or
21 matters for paragrapn ten deals is the last one to deal
22 with the arbitration agreement Then you have paragraphs 11
23 through 29 pages three through six that deal with the
24 substance of the case
25
Now if this were if he'd restricted himself to
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arbitration matters then I think you might have a better
argument than he s got But in fact when he Under the,
the express and clear language of the rule if you add
anything to the pleading you ve got a Rule 56(f) motion and
it s mandatory that it be treated as such And it's clear
under Rule D6 and 56(f) in particular that when you re
trying when someone is trying to dispose of things m the
case on a substantive basis that the opposing party in this
case the plaintiff is entitled to do discovery to flush
those things out
And so I believe that that we re entitled to
conduct discovery oefore any substantive resolution is
obtained It s clear from the Pacific Development versus
Thornton case tne 2001 case that you cant stretch an
arbitration clause beyond what it says
And given the tact that we have disputes of
material facts Mr Christensen asserts tnat Mr Whatley had
all the records Mr Whatley asserts tnat no he did not
have anv significant records until ver\ shortly betore he had
me send tne letter that was referenced in ADIII OI of the
ioilowing year They assert tnat the that the deal was
nnal and finalized and that everything was performed We
assert that not onl\ was it not finalized tnat Mr Chapman
was continually trying to renegotiate tne price and terms
during the entire penod that Mr Whatle> was associated with
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the business And not only, they say all the assets were
transferred, our assertion is that Mr Chapman was removing
assets throughout the entire penod that Mr Whatley was
associated with it
So if this were a motion for summary judgment being
decided toda\ there are clearly material disputes of fact
We haven t had discovery The burden is insuperably mgn
And and we are entitled to have a, all the inferences drawn
in our favor
Just one more short evidence of Mr Christensen s
distortion of what he s actually said He s asserted to
Your Honor that a the notice that was given says that we re
going to put the thing, the business permanently out of
business And he s also asserted that a that no thought of
arbitration occurred until or litigation occurred until
after the arbitrauon demand was filed
In the letter dated April 23rd 2002 the last
paragraph of the letter says
'In light of the above and foregoing
tnis letter constitutes a demand that
Mr and Mrs Chapman execute a document
acknowledging the contract above is void
and releasing Mr Wnatlev and nis
property trom all liability and
refunding Mr Whatley the amounts paid
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1 our case.
2
Thank vou. Your Honor.
3
THE.il/DGE: Thank vou.
4
FURTHER ARGUMENT 13 Y MR. CliRLSTENSEN
5
MR. CHRJSTENSEN: Very briefly. Your Honor. A
6 couple of items.
7
One. I'm a little at a loss here to understand what
S Mr. Willardson is really arguing For when he states that he
l
> has no problem with us-mm-mg-forward with the arbitration so
10 long as he has the right to bring his causes of action in a
1 1 court of law It appears to me. again, under the
12 arbitration clause that any action on either side is supposed
13 to have been arbitrated and he can't choose to stay outside
14 of the arbitration.
i5
And also, it doesn't make sense to me to have the
16 merits of this case totally adjudicated in an. in an
17 arbitration oniy to turn around and ha\e this court have to
I 8 do it all over again. Obviously 1 .see problems with res
I1) judicata. 1 see problems with a. judicial economy, ali of
20 those issues. But to state and. and make the arguments thai
21 it out to go both ways at the same time just doesn t make
22 sense and 1 think that they, that it wouldn't be upheld by an
23 appellate court.
24
This notion that he has adequately pled a cause of
25 action against me personally because 1 am a quote, "named

!
2

oui-ol-pockcl. 533.01)0
The foregoing demand actually
constitutes an offer oF settlement. If
A
ihat demand is noi complied with we will
;
have no choice hut to go Forward with
^
litigation scckinLf damages which we
presently estimate".. Etcetera
N
"Please be advised that my client is not
l
'
continuing to pour money into your
in
clients business and will not he paying
Ii
any more bills including payroll. Time
12
is therefore of the essence in order to
13
constitute a timely response" ...
l-t
etcetera.
15
That does not say the business is permanently being
1^ put out of business. It doesn't. And it certainly belies
I"7 the. the assertion of Mr. Chnstensen that this litigation is
IN m any way precipitated b\ their arbitration In fact, we
I1' were attempting to work out a noniitigous solution for many
2" months until the deiendanis here decided to try- and prevent
2 I us getting our day in court by having the arbitration.
22
But as I said, their arbitration demand is moot.
23 Tbev cannot overcome the standard that applies to
24 dismissal. And they're not entitled to deprive us, deprive
25 us oI'due process by preventing us from doing discovery on

COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE 46

COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE-15

Ii

-JL.

1 defendant", also does not comply completely with the nine
2 elements thai are required under pleading fraud with
5 particularity. Again, it's not enough just to say the named
4 defendants have done this or the named defendants have done
5 that. If Mr. Willardson is going to be able to successfully
(t pend a cause of action for fraud against me personally he has
7 the obligation and he has the burden in his pleading of
X pointing out to the court what it is 1 did specifically.
*•* Thai is what pleading fraud with particularity is all about.
10 1 have read already to the Conn what Utah case law says with
11 regard to that. If he wants to maintain a cause of action
12
13
14
15
In
17
IS
I1'
20
21
22
23
24
23

against me he needs to specifically state what it is 1 did.
And lo just lump me in with a bunch of named defendants and
say that the named defendants did all of these different
things is not sufficient in terms of pleading fraud with
particularity in the Slate of Utah.
This notion of forming a competitive business
enterprise being actionable, again, is completely without
support Attorneys create businesses all the time for their
clients by incorporating them. If that's all the allegation
we have here. Your Honor, it is not actionable It's not
actionable to draft a document for a client, nor is it
actionable to incorporate a business, or to obtain a business
name for a client. And that's all 1 hear Mr. Willardson
complain of with regard tome.
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1
Again, there's no allegation that I actually was
2 the competitor or that 1 actually was the one that may have
3 made misrepresentations. It's just that I did nothing more
4 than satisfy my responsibilities as an attorney,
5
THE JUDGE: What aboutlrre allegation that one of
6 these competing businesses is located at your office''
7
MR. CHR1STENSEN: Well Your Honor, again, none of
8 this is before the Court, it's not been, it's not been, it's
9 not in the pleading. But since Counsel brought it up I'll
10 explain to Your Honor what happened. If 1 may approach the
1 1 bench.
12
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative).
13
MR. WILLARDSON: Your Honor, 1 object. It is
14 before the Court because it was one of the attachments to the
15 motion.
16
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Because it was what0
17
MR. WILLARDSON: This '^ before the Court. It's
IS one of the attachments to the motions and the printout from
1° the a. State Department of Commerce showing that
20 Mr. Christensen's office is the office of World Wide
21 Imaging.
22
THE JUDGE: And is that m your complaint0
23
MR. WILLARDSON It's in the response to his
24 motions.
25
THE JUDGE: Okay. But do you make that
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allegation in the complaint7
MR WILLARDSON We allege in the comDiamt that
Mr Chnsiensen assisTed the ChaDmans in aoing their
misdeeds
THE JUDGE Okav So vou don t make the
allegation and specifically in a complaint that one of their
competing businesses is located at his office7
MR WILLARDSON T aon t recollect that I do

14
1^
16
17
lb
19
20

24
25

THE JUDGE Then I m not worried about it So
111 give that back to vou
MR CHRISTENSEN c inally for the first time
\ our Honor I hear that now I m being accused ot concealing
iniormation irom Mr Whatie\ Again I would remind the
Court that 1 don t nave am dun to give information to
Mr Whatie\ 1 think mv dury is just the opposite
In the first place I don t beiieve I ever concealed
anv iniormation from anybody all I did was draft documents
here But in the second niaceMR WILLARDSON We ve got testimony again
^i our Honor
KIR CHRISTENSEN I m arguing what has been, what
has been what has oeen accused here Your Honor And I
guess m\ position—
THE JUDGE 1 think you need to argue it then in

1 context of of the complaint and what the complaint says
2
MR CHRISTENSEN The complaint ooesn t say
3 anything about concealed inrormation
4
THE JUDGE Okav
MR CHRISTENSEN So thats the first time I ve
6 heard that And I won t respond to it since it has not been
7 pleaded
5
In in conclusion Your Honor I think what w e
9 really have here is a fishing expeditior We nave CoLnsei
10 arguing that he ought to nave the right to sue me so he can
11 then go out and I m quoting now that he he would then ha\e
12 a valid cause of action ODen quote pending discover,
13 close quote
14
Under the pleading rules of the State of Utah and
1 ** under the fraud rules of the State of Utah its not enough to
16 just to sa\ someone committed fraud now let me go out and
17 see if I can find a way to prove it That s not how it
18 works You nave to state specificallv with particularly
19 what someone did what the misrepresentation was how
20 thev ve been damaged by it what the what the intention
21 was None of that has been pleaded here None of it with
22 regard to me And to tell the truth none of it has been
23 pleaded with particularity with regard to either of the
24 Chapmans
25
I believe this Court ought not to sanction counsel
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suing opposing c&unsel just so that he can turn around and
then try to both have me out of the case and try to dig into
what my conversations may or may not have been with the
Chapmans in connection with this negotiation 1 think it s
wrong I don t think it should be sanctioned
I think that clearl} back to the arbitration it s
clear that this ought to be arbitrated tne whole thing both
sides of the case in front of the arbitrator Especially
when m tins situation opposing counsel has aireadv agreed to
the arbitration
Thank you
THE JUDGE Could you address his argument about
vour affidavit? Or I m not I m sorn Mr Chapman s
affidavit And whether or not that goes to the motion to
dismiss or the motion to compeP
MR CHRISTENSEN Sure The affidavit goes to
the motion to compel That s what it s there tor We gave
the Court at least our version of tne background facts
relative to that motion to compel in the arbitration
clause How it came about. wn\ its there what went on
oetween the Dairies in connection with it
Certainly and clearly our motion to dismiss
references onl\ the complaint Tnere s nothing in our motion
to dismiss tnat reterences the affidavit And if you want
to read through the motion itself read through the
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memorandum all references are to the complaint all
references are to the pleadings themselves There is
nothing m there that that seeks to have the Court oeheve a
certain version ot the facts The version ot the facts
before the Court are the versions set forth m the
allegations m the complain* and our anility to have the
complaint dismissed rises or falls on what is pleaded in the
complaint itself But there are no references to the
affidavit m the complaint
THE JUDGE All right
MR CHRISTENSEN I m sorry There are no
references to the to the affidavit in our motion or in our
memorandum in support of that
THE JUDGE Okay
MR CHRISTENSEN Thank you Your Honor
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR WILLARDSON
MP WILLARDSON Mr Chnstensen continues to take
liberties with the facts He asserts that tne arbitration
that Mr Chapman started is going to totally adjudicate all
these issues
There are federal tons and common law tons
alleged not covered The standard a for these kinds of
motions is set tortn in Educators Mutual versLs Allied
Property and Casualty insurance 890 P 2d 102^ in so dome
we quote
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HT
1
Accept the factual allegations in the
2
complaint on page 1030 as true and
3
consider all reasonable inferences to be
4
drawn from those facts in A light most
5
favorable to the plaintiff" End quote
6
The onlv way that Mr Chnstensen s arguments can
7 succeed is if that stanaard is violated because this is not a
S mal, discover/ has not occurred and. therefore we are at
9 the very least entitled discovery betore any of the other
10 motions is resolved because they are diSDOSitive
11
And as is pointed out as to arbitration the
12 defendant already has everything that thev might argue thev
13 bargained for And a, they are not baptized by a
14 contractual arbitration clause Even if it were valid, which
15 we aon't concede that it is, but even if they were valid
16 they are not baptized for any tons they might have
17 committed
IS
Thank you Your Honor
19
COURTS RULING
20
THE JUDGE Thank you
21
I'm going to start with the motion to dismiss
22
As I indicated to the parties I am familiar with
23 the file, I've read it thorough!} I think I ve probably
24 gone through the contract two or three times now, and the
25 complaint two or three times
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As the parties mav have noted I've made an effort
during this hearing to keep the parties to the complaint, and
both parties have strayed from the complaint But I'm not
going to
I think that the affidavit that was provided to the
Court by Mr Cnapman goes to the motion to compel arbitration
and I am going to consider it for that purpose only And I
look onlv at the complaint
0
Mr Wiharason is right wnen he reminds me that in
10 looking at the complaint I must take the facts alleged there
11 as true And I do In looking at the complaint I tnmk tne
12 First place for me to begin is to consider each cause of
13 action and whetner as claimed bv Mr Willardson it's a matter
14 of tort or a matter of contract
15
1 am persuaded that I must do more than simply look
1 6 at tne title that s above each cause of action
7
l
On Count One, its entitled Voia
1S Coniract/Rescission What it talks about in mis cause of
1Q action at length is the minimum monthlv flow cash flow that
20 was represented in the recitals to the contract, the fact
21 that the sellers didn't provide tne 12 month financial
22 records, that there was a misrepresentation by the seller in
23 footnote one that he was selling all the assets they claim
24 that was not true And it continues to give reasons why the
25 contract is void at length I think this is the longest
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And in looking at Rule 12(b)(6) it states in part
"Every defense in law or fact to claim
for relief m anv pleading wnether a
claim counterclaim, crossciaim or
thiro-panv claim, shall be asserted in a
responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following
defenses mav at the option of the pleader
oe made ov motion '
And here we go to subparagraph (6)
' Failure to state a claim upon wnich
relief can be granted '
And, lets see Going down further
"If on a motion asserting the defense
numbered 6 to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, matters outside
the pleading are presented to and not
excluded bv the court, the motion snail
be treated as one for summary judgment
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given a
reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to sucn a motion
by Rule 56 '
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1 cause of action
2
Count Two clearly calls it a breach of contract and
3 it discusses a, the failure to transfer bank accounts, the
4 resignation required by the contract for Mr and Mrs Chapman
5 to, or the requirement for them to resign as corporate
6 officers, and their failure to do so
7
Count Three I tniiuc is the most interesting It
8 alleges fraud And then it talks about the noncompete clause
9 and claims that in spite of the noncompete clause that
10 Mr Chapman and nis son Degan soliciting other ousmess m
11 Utah County, that the defendants retused Mr Whatiey access
12 to the books, and it discusses the SI0,000 claim that was
13 made and the fact that thev didn't get the 10,000 per month,
14 that the value of the equipment they claim was not as it was
15 represented to them
16
And I find in reading this carefully that really
17 this is not the typical fraud allegation It doesn't even
18 attempt, I think, to work tnrough all of the elements of
19 fraud And it is still in reality a complaint that there's
20 been a breach of contract And tne same with the
21 subparagraph cause of action in that same group as to tne
22 stock fraud
23
Next is the breach of fiduciary duties And this
24 deals the allegations here deal with the retaking, alleged
25 retaking of the business by Mr Cnapman, and the fact tnat as
COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE 56

a trustee ne began embezzling business receipts and an
2 allegation that he had not timely renewed the coruorate
registration with the State of Utah and that the Cnapman
- aerenaants have stolen corporate opDonunities oy setting up
^ other entities which again would bring us bac*. to the
6 noncompete clause
And so 1 find that this is again realK an issue of
S tne breach oi the contract
9
And the conversion and theft Coum-Hve-iS again
10 an issue as to whether or not there was compliance with the
11 contract ana wnat was properly or improperly done with tne
12 Dropem that was supposed to have been transferred as can
I J or the contract
14
Count Si\ is the slander of title which deals with
b the oropertv that was used as I guess collateral what
16 would we call it It alleges that Mr Whatle> nas received
17 offers to sell the property but he can t do so because ot
18 the defenaants having filed documents m the county
1^ recorders office that are preventing Mr Whatiev from
20 selling his land
21
Again that is all tied into the contract
22
Count Seven is the defamation It claims that
23 Bruce Chapman has told Mr Whatiev s \ enaors that he s
24 stolen propert) a stolen cash stripped the business
2^ behaved in a dishonest and dishonorable fashion and that
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1 that 1 guess was located at the business And this would
2 have again been a violation of the contract and the
agreement between the parties as to how this business was
4 going to run
5
As I look at the entire complaint and read it in
0 context paragraph to paragraph it is very clear to me that
7 everything that we re here for is based on a contract And
8 depending on how the contract is interpreted and the facts
9 are interpreted as to the creation of the contract and the
10 enforcement ot the contract everything else will fall into
11 place m the decision making process for either the
12 arbitrator or if it went to a jury for a jury But it all
13 centers around the contract
K
I took a look at the case law that was offered by
1 * Mr Willardson and I just can t read it the same way that
16 Mr Willardson does
17
I think tins is clearlv under tne arbitration
1S clause m this contract a dispute that s unaer tnis
19 agreement And I think it s m some wav subterfuge to trv
20 and get around that bv saying tnat because the the piamtifi
21 thinks it s u, ^oid ab initio that that taices it out of the
22 aroitration clause 1 aon t thirbv it can and I don t think
23 ii aoes I mini that this is a dispute unaer this agreement
2T and thaf the parties aid acree that any action brousnt should
2i be submitted to the to arbitration
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1 Mr Chapman and Mr Christensen have publiciv accused
2 Mr Whatle\ of piling up hundreds of thousands of debt on the
business and that because of those statements rus credit has
4 been damaeea
D
Again this all goes back to ana will be proved m
6 the process of proving eitner the contracts voidability or
7 enforceability ana am accompanying preaches
8
Count eight is the tortious interrerence with the
9 business wmcn is ven' similar frankly io some ot the other
10 things And simplv says that Mi Whatiev s business has been
11 interrupted b\ the wrongrul actions of the namea
1
2 defendants Well its again all cased on the contract
13
The bottom line folks is if it weren t for the
34 contract nobodv would be here today
1^
Counr nine the violation of the 18 USC 1030 has
16 several interesting problems I ve checked the statute very
17 carefully it does allow for both criminal and civil
18 proceedings Paragraph 89 savs
19
On information and belief Chapmans
20
through their son have intentionally
21
accessed that computer
22
Apparently it s the son that accessed it according
23 to this allegation, but he s not a party to this suit But
24 the the basic allegation here is computer hacking thar
25 their son accessed one of their computers or their FTP server
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1
And I am going to grant the motion to compel
2 arbitration and order that the parties go forward with
3 arbitration on all issues from both sides not just the
4 defendants claims against the plaintiff but plaintiffs
5 ciaims against the defendants
6
Now let me deal with Wei1 I kind or
7 switched gears here l started to talk about the motion to
8 dismiss
9
As to the motion to dismiss as I look at the
10 complaint and putting aside the statements tnat have oeen
11 made today b\ both parties that are bevond the complaint
12 when I look at the complaint and all its paragraphs and all
13 its causes of action and especially the fraud cause or
14 action everything I see before me that refers to
15 Mr Christensen comes down to several things His clients
16 consulted with mm during the creation of this contract He
17 wrote a portion or he
18
Let me put it this wa^ In looking at the
19 complaint itself and taking those facts as true it is clear
20 that Mr Cnnstensen mav have used some input from
21 Mr Willardson And that between tne two or them m whatever
22 form the contracr was written whether ne wrote it all or
23 wrote onh part of n for purposes of tnis rearing I m
24 going to sa\ that he wTOte it all even if he wrote it all
25 as claimed m the contract although its a little
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1 confusing, the oniv allegation that I see m the complaint
2 ts that he was acting as an attorney for his clients There
3 are no facts alleged tnat I can take at face value in the
4 compiaint that persuade me that he's any kind of a mastermind
5 benind any nefarious doings of the Chapmans. the defendants,
6 the other aefendants
7
As to the fraud alleganon, I will again reiterate
8 that as I read through tne pleadings I went througn verv
9 carefully all of the paragraphs that the Diamtiff used to
10 justify the inclusion of Mr Chnstensen in this case And
11 as I looked at even' one oi those paragraphs all 1 could find
12 were factual allegations and some conciusorv allegations that
13 he was acting as an attorney, that he helped write the
14 contract, that he advised his clients And then there is a
15 very conclusionary allegation that he's a mastermind of
16 something
17
As to the fraud, fraud must be pled in a complaint
1S with some particularity The case law is very clear
19 And there has to be more than a conciusionary allegation of
20 fraud for it to survive a motion to dismiss as we have
21 here
22
And I find that in looking at the cause of action
23 number tnree which is the fraud cause of action, and even in
24 looking at all of the other paragrapns mentioned by
25 Mr Willardson in his motion, I'm sorry, in his memo and in

1 his arguments today, the nine elements of fraud are noi
2 alleged with sufficient Darticuiarity to escaoe dismissal
3
I don't find any allegations here in the complaint
4 that Mr Chnstensen made representations to anyone other
5 than to his own clients as their aavisor and as their
6 counsel 1 don't, 1 just see nothing here that persuades
7 me And looking at the facts as alleged in the complaint m
8 their best light as perfectly true I see nothing here that
9 persuaoes me that he acted as anything bpyond an attorney in
10 this matter
11
And so I do grant the motion to dismiss as to
12 Mr Chnstensen
13
And I guess it's clear by now I am denying the
14 Rule 56 motion made by the plaintiffs
15
I have frankly not really relied on the affidavit
16 of Mr Chapman in making my decision toaay I have looKed at
17 a, the complaint strictly and the alleged facts in the
18 complaint in making this decision I have not relied upon
19 Mr Chapman's affidavit
20
I will ask Mr Chnstensen to write findings ana an
21 order, and I will order the parties into arbitration
22
The statute allows me to stay this action or to
23 dismiss it And at this point given wnat is in front of me I
24 don't see any reason to require that the, tne parties to
25 start all over again, a, so weil
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No I'm not going to go that version
Given the ruling I've made ana my analysis of the
contract and finding that, of the contract and the complaint,
and finding that all of the allegations really do go to the
contract, I will grant the motion to dismiss the case and
send the parties into arbitration I think that's the
appropriate thing to do at this point
All right Thank vou, folks, for your attendance
9 today and your time I appreciate your arguments They were
10 very clear and very helpful And we're in recess
11
MR CHRISTENSEN Thank you
12
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
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STATE OF UTAH
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I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and
Notary Public m and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify
that I received the electromcalh recorded videotape #179
in the matter of Whatley vs Chapman, hearing date February
26, 2003, and that I transcribea it into typewriting and that
a full, true and correct transcnption of said hearing so
recorded and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages
numbered 1 through 64, inclusive except wnere it is indicated
that the tape recording was inaudible
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 10th day of
September, 2003
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License 22-102811-7801
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-04
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
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BRYAN J. WHATLEY, an individual,
Plaintiff,

4T7VHT

C T A T P H I } T I T A Inf

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
! MOTIONS AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(f) MOTION

v.
Civil No. 020405636
BRUCE E. CHAPMAN, CERI
CHAPMAN, JAMES L. CHRISTENSEN,
and DOES I-V,

Judge Claudia Laycock

Defendants.

The following motions came on regularly for hearing before this Court on Wednesday,
February 26, 2003, at 10:30 a.m.:
1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, dated January 10, 2003;

2.

Defendants5 Motion to Compel Arbitration, dated January 10, 2003: and

3.

Plaintiff s Motion for Relief Under Rule Rule 56(f), dated January 23, 2003.

Plaintiff Bryan J. Whatley was present at the hearing and was represented by his attorney,
Timothy Miguel Willardson. Defendants Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman ("Chapmans") and

James L. Christensen were also present and were represented by their attorneys, James L.
Christensen and Christopher G. Jessop. The Court, having considered the memoranda, affidavits,
oral argument of counsel, and all relevant pleadings and documents pertaining to the motions, now
makes the following findings and enters the following order:
FINDINGS
I. The effect of the affidavits of Mr. Chapman and Mr. Whatley.
f1

After reviewing the affidavit of Mr. Chapman, and considering the arguments of the

parties, the Court finds that Mr. Chapman's affidavit was submitted exclusively in support of
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration.
*)T2

Furthermore, the Court has not relied on the affidavit of Mr. Chapman in making its

decision with regard to Defendants* motion to dismiss, but has looked to the allegations made in
the complaint, and the provisions of the contract between the parties. Hence, the Court declines
to treat either of Defendants' motions as motions for summary judgment, and, for the purposes
of this ruling, accepts the allegations in Plaintiffs complaint as true.

See St. Benedict's

Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) ("A rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to
relief based on those facts.")
II. Motion to Compel Arbitration
t3

According to the allegations in Plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff and the Chapmans entered

into an agreement entitled Stock and Asset Purchase and Sale (" Agreement"), on or about April
5, 2001, that was to transfer ownership and control of a photographic business, World-Wide

2

Photo, Inc., from the Chapmans to Mr. Whatley. (Complaint, f 11.) The Agreement contains
an arbitration clause that reads as follows:
In the event of a dispute under this agreement, the parties agree that any action
brought shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. Such arbitration need not be conducted by the
American Arbitration Association, even though it would follow their rules.
Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County, Utah, and not elsewhere.
(Complaint, Exhibit A, i[ 9(m).)
f4

The Court finds that the arbitration clause is clear on its face and is binding upon the

parties.
K5

The Court finds that Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiffs

complaint, titled

"Void

contract/recission," and "Breach of Contract" respectively, are breach of contract causes of action
that arise under the Agreement.
f6

With regard to Count 3 of Plaintiffs complaint, titled "Fraud," the court finds that Plaintiff

has made no any facts with particularity supporting the elements in this cause of action, and that
this cause of action, including the sub-cause of action for "stock fraud," is really a breach of
contract cause of action, that arises under the Agreement.
V

The

Court

finds

that

Count 4

("Breach

of Fiduciary

Duties"),

Count 5

("Conversion/Theft"), Count 6 ("Slander of Title"), Count 7 ("Defamation") and Count 8
("Tortious Interference With Business") are all. m substance, breach of contract causes of action
that arise under the Agreement, and that none of these causes of action would exist but for the
Agreement between Mr. Whatley and the Chapmans.

j

^8

With regard to Count 9 of Plaintiffs complaint ("Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030") the

court fmds that when taken as true. Count 9 only directly applies to the Chapmans' son. who is
not a party to the lawsuit, and that this cause of action is a breach of contract cause of action that
arises under the Agreement in any case.
^9

In addition, the Court finds that it is clear, when looking at the entire complaint in context,

paragraph by paragraph, that everything Plaintiff complains of in his complaint is based on the
contract and arises under the contract. The Court further finds that Plaintiffs argument that his
causes of action do not arise under the agreement is, in some respects, subterfuge to try to get
around his contractual obligation to arbitrate.
f 10

The Court further finds that the parties agreed to submit any action with regard to the

contract to arbitration, and that the arbitration clause is enforceable as a matter of law.
m . MOTION TO DISMISS
f 11

With regard to Defendants5 motion to dismiss as to Mr. Christensen, after scrutinizing the

complaint, and putting aside the statements made in their memoranda and at oral argument by both
parties that go beyond the complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead the elements
of fraud with sufficient particularity to escape dismissal, which elements are as follows:
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact
(3) which was false and (4; which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b)
made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it
and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity7, (7) did
in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and
damage.
Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58, 1 9, 982 P.2d 578.

4

if 12

The Court finds no allegations in the complaint that Mr. Christensen made representations

to anyone other than his own clients, as their advisor and counsel. The only substantive allegation
made in Plaintiffs complaint is that Mr. Christensen acted as an attorney for his clients.
If 13

Consequently, the Court finds that there is no basis for the inclusion of Mr. Christensen

as a party to the lawsuit.
ORDER
Based on the Court's findings, the Court hereby orders as follows:
I" 14

Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted with respect to Mr. Christensen for Plaintiff's

failure 10 plead any facts that justify Mr. Christensen's inclusion as a party to the lawsuit.
?15

Defendants motion to dismiss is granted with respect to the remaining defendants because

the arbitration clause in the Agreement is clear on its face and enforceable against the parties.
i[16

Plaintiffs motion for relief under Rule 56(f) is hereby denied.

if 17

Defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted, and, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-31a-4(l), the Court orders the Plaintiff and Defendants to submit all of their claims with respect
to the Agreement, including all of Plaintiffs causes of action raised in the complaint, to
arbitration,
f 18

The Court has discretion under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4 to dismiss or stay this lawsuit

pending the outcome of arbitration. Given the Court's findings, the lawsuit is hereby dismissed
as all of Plaintiffs claims arise under the contract between Plaintiff and the Chapmans. and are
subject to a valid, binding arbitration clause.

5

DATED this _^3day of April, 2003

Approved as to form and substance:
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendants

/ /

s /

James L. Christensen /
Christopher G. Jessop

Timothy Miguel Willardson,
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid,
and faxed to the following at the address(es) indicated on the jjj^tda.} of April, 2003
Timothy Miguel Willardson
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Facsimile 576-1960
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
BRYAN J. WHATLEY,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Civil No. 020405636

vs.

Judse: #5

Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman, James L.
Christensen, and Does I - V,
Defendants.

1.

c^®6)Zo

¥£J

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff Bryan J. Whatley, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court

the final judgment of Claudia Laycock entered rn this matter on Ma}' 29, 2003. This appeal is
therefore within the 30 day time to appeal.
2.

This appeal is taken from the entire judgment.

DATED:

Tuesday, May 27, 2003.

Attorney for Timothy Miguel Willardson
Attachments: Anneal Fee

S205Cost Bond

S300

CERTIFY-^HAT THIS
AN ORIGINAL DOC
FOURTH JUDICIAL
COUNTY, STATE OFy,
DATE
DEPUTV-^SUftJ

Timothv Mieuel Willardson - ^4-4-3
ATTORNEY' FOP. A P P E L L ANT
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone (801; 576-1400
IN THE FOURTH JUDICLAJL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
_

.

^

,

*_,

^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

BRYAN J WHAJLEY,
Plaintiff,

' Civil No 020405636
vs
Brace E Chapman, Cen Chapman. James L
Christensen, and Does I - V,
Defendants

Jud^e fo
J

I hereby cenify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing "Notice of Appeal" was
placed for deliver} as specified below Where "MaiT is specified, the items were placed in the
United States Mail with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as follows
James Christensen
Corbridge, B and & Christensen
39 Exchange Place, #100
SLC, Utah"84111

Sent.via
% Mail
Facsimile
Hand-delivery

-•-'

Timotnj Miguel Willardson (-^443 j
Attorney at Lav
10885 South State Street
Sandy UT 84070
Telephone

(801)576-1400

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE FOUP.TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JD.EV x n i ^

,

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO STAY JUDGMENT
PENDING APPEAL

vs
BRUCE E CHAPMAN, CERI CHAPMAN,
JAMES L CHRISTENSEN, and DOES I-V,

Civil No 020405636
Judge* Claudia Laycock

Defendants

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, Bryan J Whatley, by and through his attorney, Timothy
Miguel Willardson and respectfully moves this Court as follows:
To Stay the Judgment m the above captioned case pending appeal pursuant to Rule 62(d)
Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure upon filing of a supersedeas bond by Plaintiff In support of this
motion Plaintiff shows the Court that the requested stay is necessary to avoid prejudicing
plaintiff s rights The issues include a Federal criminal statute and other non-contractual issues
If the court's judgment is not stayed, plaintiff will be forced to litigate these issues twiceumoe to
the arbitrator and, after the appeal again before the district court In addition, since there is no

clear cur law covering what to do in a situation like this, where extra-contractual issues are
ordered into arbitration, the risk to plaintiff of unfair prejudice is extraordinarily high.
DATED this CP

day of June, 2003

Timothy Miguel Willardson
Attorney for Plaintiff

I hereby certify that I am employed by Timothy Miguel Willardson and that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO STAY JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL was
mailed, first class postage prepaid as follows:
James L. Christensen
CORBRIDGE B AIRD & CHRISTENSEN
39 Exchange Place, #100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this

[

Q

Sent via:
Y Mail
J_
Facsimile (801) 534-1948
Hand-delivery

day of June, 2003.
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BRYAN J. WHATLEY,

RULING SETTING ASIDE THE
DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANTS BRUCE
E. CHAPMAN, CERI CHAPMAN, AND
DOES I-V and ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.

BRUCE E. CHAPMAN, CEPJ CHAPMAN,
and JAMES L. CHRISTENSEN,
Date: 10 November 2003
Case No. 020405636
Judge Claudia Laycock
Division 5

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court as it was preparing its ruling in a companion case, MM
Properly Management, L.C. v World-Wide Photo, Inc., et. a!., our file no. "030400447. In its
review of both matters, the Court became persuaded that it had incorrectly ruled as to the issue of
the dismissal of three of the defendants in this matter. Therefore, the Court on its own motion
has reviewed carefully the applicable statute and the Order Granting DefendantsJ Motions and
Denying Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion1 and now enters the following ruling:
FACTS
1. On April 23, 2003 the Court signed an Order Granting Defendants' Motions and
Denying Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion (the "Order"). It was entered on April 29? 2003.
2. The order, which was written by counsel for defendants, accurately reflected the
Court's bench ruling of February 26, 2003 and ordered the following as the disposition of the
case:

]

The Court notes that briefing is now complete on plaintiffs Motion 10 Slav Judgment
Pending Appeal, however, neither party has filed a notice to submit so the Coun will not address
said motion in this ruling.
1

(aj Plaintiffs motion for relief under Rule 56(f) was denied
(b) Defendants' motion to compel arbitration was granted,
©) Defendants' motion to dismiss James L Chnstensen from the case was
granted,
(d) The remaining defendants' motion to dismiss was granted
3 The remaining defendants (Bruce E Chapman, Cen Chapman, and Does I-V) were
dismissed because the lawsuit was based on a contract that contained a unequivocal and
enforceable arbitration clause and because the Court believed that Utah Code Annotated §783ia-4 gave discretion to a court to dismiss or sta> the lawsuit pending the outcome of arbitration
4 The Court chose, both at the February 2003 hearing and in the April 2003 order, to
dismiss the remaining parties from the lav suit and to send the parties to arbitration
DISCUSSION
Section 78-3 la-4 of the Utah Arbitration Act addresses the procedure that a court should
follow when ordering pames into arbitration2 In subparagraph (3) it states "An order to submit
an agreement to arbitration stays an) action or proceeding involving an issue subject to
arbitration under the agreement

If a motion is made in an action or proceeding, the order for

arbitration shall include a stay of the action or proceeding " There is no other provision in the
Utah Arbitration Act that would allow a court to dismiss a lawsuit pending arbitration
This Court misinterpreted section 78-3 la-4 as giving the Court discretion to dismiss the

2

This portion of the Utah Code has been repealed and replaced with a more recent version
of the Utah Arbitration Act in section 78-31a-101 through 78-31a-131 However section 783la-4 still applies to the preseni action because the nov repealed arbitration act governs contracts
signed before May 6, 2002, the contract involved m the present suit was signed on April 2, 2002

lawsuit after ordenng arbitration The Court will now correct nself set aside the dismissal of the
law suit as to the defendants othei than James L Chnstensen, and stay the lawsuit under section
78-31a-4(3) of the Utah Arbitration Act until arbitration is complete
The Court has also reviewed the other portions of the order and finds that the remaining
portions of the ruling of April 29, 2003 are correct Defendant James L Chnstensen was
properly dismissed, plaintiffs motion for relief under Rule 56(f) was properly denied, and
defendants' motion to compel arbitration was properly granted This ruling only grants relief
from the portion of the ordei that dismissed the remaining defendants (Bruce E Chapman, Cen
Chapman, and Does I-V), according to the Conn's misinterpretation of section 78-31a-4(3j.
ORDER
1. The Court sets aside its previous order of April 29, 2003 onh a:, to the dismissal of
defendants Bruce E, Chapman, Cen Chapman, and Does I-V
2 The Court orders this case stayed pending the completion of arbitration proceedings
3. All other portions of the April 29, 2003 order remain in effect.

D

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing by mailing a true and exact copy thereof,
postage prepaid on the \7 day of November, 2003 to
James L Chnstensen
Christopher G Jessop
Corbndge Baird & Chnstensen
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705
Timothy Willardson
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070

l^tyuty court clerk
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I Hereby Certify that I caused to be delivered as specified below, on the date specified
below, two true and correct copies of the foregoing "ADDENDUM TO INITIAL BRIEF OF
APPELLANT" to the following:

James Christensen
Corbridge, Baird & Christensen
39 Exchange Place, #100
SLCUtah 84111

Sent via:
Mail
Facsimile
A Hand-delivery

Date:
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